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CRS83635ENRpage81
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CRS83635ENRpage81
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one-quarter) of the agricultural land annually converted tononfarm uses was cropland. Over half of the converted land was forestland or "other" land. Although not precisely known, it was estimated that as much as 200,000 acres of high or medium potential cropland was annually converted between 1967 and 1975 (Brewer and Boxley 1981). Thus, about 875,000 acres of the cropland base
CRS83635ENRpage12
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CRS83635ENRpage12
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.fi.,.e.__i_ _._.._,.,:3'...,e,: , 2 CRS-1 INTRODUCTION Population growth and development generally result in the conversion of rural land to more intensive uses. Some of this rural land is used for new residences, shopping centers, office buildings, and warehouses. Apart from these urban uses, new roads, airports, and highways consume relatively large amounts of rural land and significantly
CRS83635ENRpage87
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CRS83635ENRpage87
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of aerial photos revealed a 23 percent increase in urban acreageAin the53 fastest growing counties in the 1960-1970 period. In contrast, the NALS found a 47 percent increase in urban_acrea§e forA§he entire country between 1967 and 1975. Fischel (1982) concluded that this differential is highly implausible; In summary; critics have argued that problems with the NALS terminology and data resulted
CRS84573ENRpage07
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CRS84573ENRpage07
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CRS-2 The concept of specific protection of aquifers is not new. In the Safe Drinking Water Act (P.L. 93-523), aquifers that are the sole source of drinking water for areas may receive a special designation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Under Subsection l42(e), the EPA administrator may designate an aquifer for special protection if it his the sole source of drinking water
CRS84573ENRpage05
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CRS84573ENRpage05
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aquifers. For further information on these Congressional activities, refer to Ground-, water Contamination and Protection. g] l] U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Ground- water: What It Is, and How It Is Being Protected. Report no. 84-16 ENR, by Donald V. Feliciano. Washington, 1984. 52 p. 2/ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.u Ground- water Contamination
CRS84573ENRpage03
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CRS84573ENRpage03
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ABSTRACT This report examines the importance of sole source aquifers of ground- water to the Nation's drinking water supply and how these aquifers are protected under Federal law. The report also includes a description of the sole source aquifers recognized by the Environmental Protection Agency and identifies the Congressional districts that overlie them. At this time, 17 sole source
CRS84573ENRpage18
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UBRARV or WASHENGTQN I umzvemawr ST. Lows;-5 ‘M0.
CRS84573ENRpage16
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CRS84573ENRpage08
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CRS84573ENRpage02
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CRS84573ENRpage01
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Congressional Research Service V The Library of Congress n * as _' we a «E rAR¥' Washington eteniversiw SOLE souncs AQUIFERS AND RELATED CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS by Donald V. Feliciano Analyst in Environmental Policy Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division March 21, 1984 1.TR%4-\2<2.
Welfare reform
Title
Welfare reform: Brief summary of selected major proposals
Date
1987
Summary
This report provides brief summaries of selected proposals to revise programs of aid for needy children and their families. All proposals would alter treatment of recipients of the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and some also include recommendations to revise cash welfare for the needy aged, blind, or disabled (Supplemental Security Income--SSI). The report summarizes several provisions of current law and then describes how the proposals would change them. Examined are: benefit rules, work/school obligations, treatment of earnings, job refusal on income grounds, eligibility of two-parent families, the Federal funding share, and the interaction of AFDC with other programs.
CRS87309EPWpage13
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CRS87309EPWpage13
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to refugees for at least 2 years, or (2) are under age 22 and lack a high school diploma. ,Pay cash bonus to States for placement (for at least 1 year) of an AFDC household head (or head of a family that received refugee aid) in a nonsubsidized job that provides an income at least equal to cash welfare benefits and ends entitlement to cash aid. For those with two Years of welfare enrollment, bonus equals 75
CRS87371Lpage36
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CRS87371Lpage36
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, while the U. S. compound in Mos- cow is being built in what once was a swamp. That deal was signed by President Nixon in 1972 during the era of détente. But the Reagan administration still has a lotto answer for. Soviet snooping inside our current Mos- cow embassy, made possible by the they fraternize.’ HERBLOCK IN THE WASHINGTON POST the highest mus ‘First let's find the masterminds alleged
CRS87371Lpage08
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CRS87371Lpage08
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Wye. ’(?.ime§-flgicagune Thaaoda. 3/, /42'/-, €cl3~f5«u7J 90.8. 9198 7» Reproduced with Permission. The (New Orleans) Times-Picayurie Watching the watchers The third recent major failure of American counterintelligence is per- haps the most spectacular and was perhaps the most preventable. We have had a CIA agent, briefed for assignment to Moscow, defect and have exposed, after great damage was done, a ring of Navy men who fed a widespectrum of defense intelligence to the Soviets. Now two Marine guards at the American Embassy in Moscow stand charged with letting KGB officers roam the most sensitive areas of the embassy after hours. Marine guards at diplomatic missions abroad are, virtually by definition, above suspicion. They are not privy to security information. They keep the keys to buildings and offices because they the premises to see that classified papers and equipment are not left on desks and in waste-baskets,’ that file cabinets are locked and classified equipment is not left out. They do not have combinations, but combination locks are no mystery to foreign professionals. A lot is still fuzzy in the charges, but even at minimum they are serious. The code room is said to have been thoroughly penetrated, A but it is said to be unclear whether the am}:-essador’s and the CIA station chiefs offices were. The guards are said to have provided the Soviets names, photographs, addresses and phone numbers of American intelligence agents, information Marine guards do not possess and cannot normally acquire, unless giving others access to the CIA office files is meant. The two are said to have turned over classified contents of burn bags, which would mean that embassy procedure was sloppy --— such burning is supposed to be supervised by cleared embassy personnel. Indeed, several procedures seem to have been sloppy if the guards committed the deeds they are charged with, and several other people and institutions need to be examined for remedies. News note that no one else has yet been disciplined in the case, but the Marine sergeant who commands the embassy guard unit must have many ques- tions to answer. The two guards are said to have been seduced into treason by Russian female employees of the embassy who were KGB agents. It is assumed that all Russian embassy employees are. KGB agents or report to the KGB (last fall, belatedly and unrelated to this incident, hiring of local personnel was ended). The embassy is small, isolated from local society and thus turned in onto itself. How, then, could such alliances have gone unknown or even unsuspected by the men’s superiors, colleagues or acquaintances? Foreign intelligence services are able and can beat us fair and square. But most tum- coat agents, seen too late in retrospect, exhibit characteristics or behavior that should have alerted their superiors _at least to suspicion. The Marines are naturally fearful that all will be tarred with this bmsh. But, in fact, the system of providing diplomatic missions with Marine guards should now come under review. It is a relic from the time when such guards were actually defensive forces; now they are impressively uniformed watchmen --— young, largely unsophisticated, trained not for this work but for battlefield action --4 doing a job better assigned to professional counterintelligence officers. Even lacking reports of successes, which must go unreported to be successes, we assume that American counterintelligence is broadly effective. But trumpeted failures give the impression that we are always locking the barn door after a horse that should have been known to be a rogue has escaped. The lesson to be learned is always the same: tighten up and pay attention.
CRS87371Lpage26
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CRS87371Lpage26
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THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL /9. /0/4 0198 7 The Milwaukee Journal. Reproduced with Permission. 7 /9/7» W / .o.=5 a «pronoun 3 nonaoa a E on :o:a.:m_EEua 2: E3 :2: 3.5 §2§.u$=8 3. mmmmma 8 can Boumofi 5 >838» ms 2: mascara mmaomzu 3 fiaucm o5 .§EoE 8 canoe: m_ :o:awamo>:_ «SE 5:2 .:._2_ £5 3 33¢ 6.5 293 $2: 3932 52: on S ..u>o3o: .u..3aEo.E on 2.53 £ .bEEo.E vmE.§o on 8 coo: btofiau uo men: :2: .o
CRS87371Lpage22
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CRS87371Lpage22
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- omcial - Americans living in Moscow. One need only think back to 1960 after the U-2 spy incident to those dramatic pictures of an indignant Henry Cabot Lodge showing Americans a massive rep- lica of the Great Seal of the US from the American embassy in Moscow - in which the Soviets had planted a listening device. And among security lapses, there was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Leba- non a few
CRS87371Lpage12
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CRS87371Lpage12
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How- ard, who handed over stacks of secrets before defecting in1985. It has happened to the Soviets as well. a In the case of the Marine guards, though, the State Depart- ment was asking for trouble. It plopped 28 Marines — all young, single and green — into the mid- dle of an unfriendly country for two years at a time and told them not to befriend local wom- Editorials — 0193',’ The Burlington
CRS87371Lpage47
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CRS87371Lpage47
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-es who undermined internal security and counterintelligence programs in the early 1970s, enabling foreign powers to get their noses under the tent. As long ago as 1980, the Heritage Founda- tion warned in its Mandate for Leadership that “counterintelligence in the United States has all but disintegrated. .. As the need for counterintelligence has grown,” it contin- - ued, “our ability to meet those
CRS87371Lpage30
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&W; /%”f / 6 iflnrllanh ¥,lr2S§ lleralh *3 19 87 Reproduced with Permission. S Portland (Maine) Press Herald a S / From Russia with love Whoever negotiated the deal allowing the Soviet Union and the United States to build new embassies in each other’s countries ought to be fired from govern- ment service and forced to sell aluminum siding for a living. Consider: The Russian embassy, built atop

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