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CRS86553EPWpage08
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CRS86553EPWpage08
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CRS86553EPWpage18
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CRS86553EPWpage18
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CRS86553EPWpage12
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CRS86553EPWpage16
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CRS85890Apage17
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CRS85890Apage17
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individual fiemhers, is discussed infra at pp; 12-15.’ ' 7 I I Exclusivity of Congress"Rulemahing and Disciplinary Authority I I I Under art. I, 5, cl. 2 of the Constitution, "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with I ‘the Concurrence of ten thirds, expel a Member." Under this blanket language there is‘little doubt
CRS85890Apage18
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CRS85890Apage18
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to such Constitution include the authority to delegate some portion of that power to another branch of government? This is another question~&hich has not yet been ' 27/ which it was presented, United States V. Johnson and United States v. Brewster. 39/.144 U.s. 1, 5 (1892). ’ p T ' .., g1] 383 U.S. L69 (1966). ,g§/ 408 U.S. 501 (1972). f’. 28/i
CRS85890Apage04
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CRS85890Apage04
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by the Supreme Court in a 1977 case, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, and turns upon the "potential for disruption" of the branch of government which is asserting the claim. Of these three proposals, H.R; l4l and H.R. 66B are on their face more disruptive than H.r. 691, in that they involve both the‘, ,executive and judicial branches in the adjudication and enforcement process and would
CRS85890Apage21
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CRS85890Apage21
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'« cas-LS Dissenting Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas, was even stronger in expressing his View that Congress cannot as an institution I I .waive the immunities of its individual Members: . 'H 5 4 Johnson put aside the question of whether an other- A « wise impermissible prosecution conducted pursuant to ' . ‘ a statute such as we now have before us--a statute. specifically including congressional conduct and, purporting to be an exennise of congressional power to.discipline its Membeta--would be consistent with , the'Speech or Debate Clamse ... . . I am convinced ‘ 4 that such a statute contravenes the letter and purpose i. l ' * of the Clause. Truegpcongress itself has defined the _ , ' ' D crime and specifically delegated to the Executive the discretion to prosecute and to the courts the power to try. Nonetheless, I fail to understand how a ma- jority of Congress can bind an objecting Congressman - . to a course so clearly at odds with the constitutional command that'legislative conduct shall be subject to question in no'place other than the Senate or the I House'of Representatives. The Speech or Debate Clause is an allocation of power. It authorizes Congress to .call offending members to.account in their appropriate Houses. A statute that represents-an abdication of that power is‘in my éiew impermissible . . . . The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize corrupt Congressmen. it reserves the power to discipline‘in the Houses of Congress. I would insist that those qduses develop their own institutions and procedures. for dealing with those in their midst who would prosti- I « tute the legislative processrggfl It is stressed that the preceding comments were taken from dissenting I I opinions, and'that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this point. There is ‘language in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Davis v. ?assman, supra, which can be read as indicating that the Chief Justice and the two Justices who joined in hisldissent might find such action constitutionally valid. .However, until the question is definitively settled, it remains'a potential impediment to the pejforcement of any enactment purporting to bring Congress within the scope of an e’ployment discrimination statute which is not internally administered." 3 / Id. at 562-3. _
CRS85890Apage08
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CRS85890Apage08
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on the following reasoning. ; ' '. . ,under generally-applicable discrimination statutes. . l»f CR3-2' As will be discussed in more detail later, H.R. l4l'and;H.R. 66l include " Congress within the scope of several employment discrimination statutes which are enforced by executive branch agencies and through the judicial system. H.R.,69l extends to both thellegislative
CRS85890Apage15
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CRS85890Apage15
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arrest while attending or traveling to and from Congress, I T which is also set forth at art{ L, sec. 6, cll l. I gg/ 421 U.s. 491 (1975). t q_g/.395 U.S. ass (1969). ' , ‘ , ‘ 4 q;§/ See Kaye, "Congressional Papers and judicial Subpoenas," 23 UCLA L. Rev. 57 (1975), and "Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the Constitution,7 24 UCLA L; Rev. 523 (1977). ‘ 1 23/ 421 u
CRS85890Apage07
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, introduced by Rep. Jacobs on Jan. 3,'l985; H.R. 661, introduced by Rep. Don Edwards on Jan.,24, i985; and H.R. 691,; introduced by Rep. Lynn‘fiartin on Jan. 24, 1983. In addition, a. Res. 137, introduced by Rep. Schroeder .. June 5, L985, establishes an internal mechanism in the House of Representatives'to hear and adjudicate discrimination complaints. Finally,‘H. Con} Res. 139 establish- es
CRS85890Apage22
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maximum hours for the workweek; I la ofi Labor; 1 2000e-2(a). L‘ C3 \-. 43.. K) C: _ (/3 - (3 U) {D 0 41/€42 U.S;C. sec, 2000e-S. / 29 3.3.0. sec; 153. / 29 U{S.C. sec. LS7. / 29 U.S.C. sec. 158. / U.-S-C.'S8C. ’ :3. 9.3. 515‘. .£§/ 29 U.S.G. sec. L59. ii ‘g1/ 29 U.S.C. sec. 206. 5*... ‘/ 29 U.S.C. sec. 207. I?‘
CRS85890Apage06
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CRS86547ENRpage18
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CRS86547ENRpage18
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the final one? Other programs, like honey and soybeans, use only loans to support prices. How will USDA limit loans to curtail outlays for these programs-by reducing the loan rate, raising interest charged, or changing eligibility? The dairy program presents special questions. USDA might simply ,reduce the Federal rate of support for manufacturing milk, now at $11.60 per hundred pounds (cwt.). However
CRS861020ENRSPRpage32
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CRS861020ENRSPRpage32
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the biotechnology research guidelines developed by the National Institutes of 28 See, Hart, I. C. and J. A. Bines. The Effect of Injecting or Infusing Low Doses of Bovine Growth Hormone or Milk Yield, Milk Composition and the Quantity of Hormone in the Milk Serum of Cows. Animal Production, v.40, 1985. p. 243-250. 29 Personal Communication. Aug. 18, 1986, Lehmann, Richard,lCenter for Veterinary Medicine, Food
CRS861020ENRSPRpage24
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CRS~20 The use of bovine growth hormone to increase milk production is an example of biotechnological progress which does not contribute to increased profitability. A dairy farmer with 100 cows would spend $4,000 per year for the hormone drug and $9,000 for additional feed concentrate. At today's support prices, this $13,000 investment would return $17,000 in additional milk receipts
CRS861020ENRSPRpage10
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CRS-6 - consumption, which includes the milk contained in all dairy products consumed, dropped from 706 pcunds in 1955 to 596 pounds in 1985.5 However, population growth more than offset this per capita decline, pushing total civilian consumption of milk from 114.6 billion pounds in 1955 to 141.2 billion pounds in 1985, an average increase of 0.7 percent per year. A U.S. milk herd totalling more
CRS861020ENRSPRpage21
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CRS861020ENRSPRpage21
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), introduced on September 19, would require USDA to submit a report to Congress only on the impact of BST on milk production and price supports.18 PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND COST What will the availability of BST supplements mean to the individual dairy farmer? will he or she find BST easy to apply? How much will it cost? As of late 1986, researchers had not yet perfected practical application of thee hormone
CRS861020ENRSPRpage37
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CRS861020ENRSPRpage37
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, and were to include in that analysis environmental, economic and social effects, the agency would not be 39 21 ova 2S.31a, format item 9. 40 FDA letter.
CRS861020ENRSPRpage38
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cRs—34 bound to take a particular action under NEPA. While FDA must uphold both NEPA and the FDCA, NEPA requires only that environmental effects be explored before major Federal action (e.g., drug approval) is taken.41,42 However, NEPA does not prescribe the action to be taken after environmental effects are considered. On the other hand, the FDCA requires that drugs that meet the statutory requirements of safety and effectiveness be approved. FDA has stated that ultimately, drug approval decisions are necessarily based only on scientific considerations having to do with whether a drug is safe and effective.43« There may be a need to reconcile NEPA and FDCA if, for example, BST were found to be safe and effective but caused significant environmental effects. In balancing these two laws, such factors as the significance of the environmental impact, the degree to which the effect posed a risk to public health, and the amount by which environmental effects could be mitigated by requiring prescriptions or warning labels on the drug would influence the action FDA finally takes. Efficacy and Animal Health Issues It appears that among the more substantial issues to be resolved before BST can be approved are the long-term efficacy and safety to the cow. Currently available data were collected from cows treated with BST under optimum research conditions over a relatively short interval of time. Under 41 21 can 25.42. 42 42 use 4332. 43 FDA letter.

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