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CRS87231Epage25
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..I.?.‘ I.‘ cas-23 ______ The Tax Reform Act of 1986: the effects on public utilities, by Donald W. Kiefer. [Washington] 198T:»*(Report no. 87-224 E) [Tax reform and foreign investment by U.S. firms, by David L. ]Brumbaugh. t[Washington] 1987. (Report no. 87-89 E) --- Tax reform effects, by Nonna A.Noto et al. [Washington] 1986. 8 (Is- sue Brief no. 1887010) I- Updated regularly. Tax reform: its
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CRS86574Epage09
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Authority 1,466 Outlays 1,245 Construction, Metropolitan Washington Airports (21-25-1333 -X-1-402-A; 69-1333) Budget Authority 301 Outlaysi 130 Aviation insurance revolving fund (21-25-4120 -X-3-402-A; 69-4120) Obligation Limitation _ ‘ 4 Outlays ‘ p - ” " A . _ 4 Trust fund share of FAA Operations (21-25-8104 -X-7-402-A; 69-8104) % Budget Authority 19,178 Outlays 19,178 Grants-in-aid for airports
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CRS86574Epage07
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CRS-5+ Department of~Transportation-ProgramsaFunding:Sequestration,1FYi1986t ($ thousands) -- continued? Account~Title,_Category~ Sequester;Amounts> FederaldRailroad3Administration, Railiserviceiassistancea (2l+l6-01227 -X-l-4O1¥A;369—Ol22) Budget Authority Outlays Northeast corridor improvement program (21-16-0123 -X-1-401-A; 69-0123) Buget Authority Outlays Office of the Administrator (21-16-0700
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CRS86553EPWpage05
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'OOOQOOOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOIO000000000000OIOOOOOOOCOOOOOOOIOIOOO COORDINATION WITH 401(k) PLANS AND 4O3(b)‘ANNUITIES.....7...........,..... La|wO.COOOOOO'OOOOOCOCOOO_O‘OO0'0GOOO'Q'OOOOOQOOOOO,OOOOOOflOO.O=OOO‘OOOOI PrOpo’SalOOO‘C!OOOOOOOOOIOOO0,0)OOO'OO‘OOOOOOOO'0.000IOOOIOOO ‘HURT ’3838OO1OOfiOOOCOOOO|ODOOOOOOIQOO0,0COOO'OO‘OOfOQ]OOOCOOOOOOOO'OOOOOOOOOOOOf uauiuauz WITHDRAWALSCIOOOOCOCCQOOOOOOO
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CRS86553EPWpage15
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of two separate individuals argue that this treats one-earner couples unfairly. The Administration has estimated that revenue losses associated with IRA deductions will be about $16 billion in fiscal year 1987. Much like these rev- enue losses, the additional $1 billion in revenue losses associated with the Administration's spousal IRA proposal would have been skewed in favor of high- income
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CRS86553EPWpage09
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contribution exceed $2,000 in the 0 ‘ ' Present law contains an anomaly under which a married couple with only one earner can contribute up to a total of $2,250 to their IRAs while a married , couple that has two earners, one of which earned less than $250, is subject to a lower overall limit. ‘For example, if one spouse had compensation of $25,000, ‘and the other spouse had $100, the overall deduction
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CRS85890Apage17
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individual fiemhers, is discussed infra at pp; 12-15.’ ' 7 I I Exclusivity of Congress"Rulemahing and Disciplinary Authority I I I Under art. I, 5, cl. 2 of the Constitution, "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with I ‘the Concurrence of ten thirds, expel a Member." Under this blanket language there is‘little doubt
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CRS85890Apage18
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to such Constitution include the authority to delegate some portion of that power to another branch of government? This is another question~&hich has not yet been ' 27/ which it was presented, United States V. Johnson and United States v. Brewster. 39/.144 U.s. 1, 5 (1892). ’ p T ' .., g1] 383 U.S. L69 (1966). ,g§/ 408 U.S. 501 (1972). f’. 28/i
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CRS85890Apage04
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by the Supreme Court in a 1977 case, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, and turns upon the "potential for disruption" of the branch of government which is asserting the claim. Of these three proposals, H.R; l4l and H.R. 66B are on their face more disruptive than H.r. 691, in that they involve both the‘, ,executive and judicial branches in the adjudication and enforcement process and would
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CRS85890Apage21
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'« cas-LS Dissenting Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas, was even stronger in expressing his View that Congress cannot as an institution I I .waive the immunities of its individual Members: . 'H 5 4 Johnson put aside the question of whether an other- A « wise impermissible prosecution conducted pursuant to ' . ‘ a statute such as we now have before us--a statute. specifically including congressional conduct and, purporting to be an exennise of congressional power to.discipline its Membeta--would be consistent with , the'Speech or Debate Clamse ... . . I am convinced ‘ 4 that such a statute contravenes the letter and purpose i. l ' * of the Clause. Truegpcongress itself has defined the _ , ' ' D crime and specifically delegated to the Executive the discretion to prosecute and to the courts the power to try. Nonetheless, I fail to understand how a ma- jority of Congress can bind an objecting Congressman - . to a course so clearly at odds with the constitutional command that'legislative conduct shall be subject to question in no'place other than the Senate or the I House'of Representatives. The Speech or Debate Clause is an allocation of power. It authorizes Congress to .call offending members to.account in their appropriate Houses. A statute that represents-an abdication of that power is‘in my éiew impermissible . . . . The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize corrupt Congressmen. it reserves the power to discipline‘in the Houses of Congress. I would insist that those qduses develop their own institutions and procedures. for dealing with those in their midst who would prosti- I « tute the legislative processrggfl It is stressed that the preceding comments were taken from dissenting I I opinions, and'that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this point. There is ‘language in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Davis v. ?assman, supra, which can be read as indicating that the Chief Justice and the two Justices who joined in hisldissent might find such action constitutionally valid. .However, until the question is definitively settled, it remains'a potential impediment to the pejforcement of any enactment purporting to bring Congress within the scope of an e’ployment discrimination statute which is not internally administered." 3 / Id. at 562-3. _
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CRS85890Apage08
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on the following reasoning. ; ' '. . ,under generally-applicable discrimination statutes. . l»f CR3-2' As will be discussed in more detail later, H.R. l4l'and;H.R. 66l include " Congress within the scope of several employment discrimination statutes which are enforced by executive branch agencies and through the judicial system. H.R.,69l extends to both thellegislative
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CRS85890Apage15
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arrest while attending or traveling to and from Congress, I T which is also set forth at art{ L, sec. 6, cll l. I gg/ 421 U.s. 491 (1975). t q_g/.395 U.S. ass (1969). ' , ‘ , ‘ 4 q;§/ See Kaye, "Congressional Papers and judicial Subpoenas," 23 UCLA L. Rev. 57 (1975), and "Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the Constitution,7 24 UCLA L; Rev. 523 (1977). ‘ 1 23/ 421 u
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, introduced by Rep. Jacobs on Jan. 3,'l985; H.R. 661, introduced by Rep. Don Edwards on Jan.,24, i985; and H.R. 691,; introduced by Rep. Lynn‘fiartin on Jan. 24, 1983. In addition, a. Res. 137, introduced by Rep. Schroeder .. June 5, L985, establishes an internal mechanism in the House of Representatives'to hear and adjudicate discrimination complaints. Finally,‘H. Con} Res. 139 establish- es
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