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CRS861028Apage83
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corrects an error by which it was placed to the unappropriated surplus instead of to the appropriation to which it belongs." 12 Comp. Dec. 733, 735 (1906). This concept has consistently been followed. See 2 Comp. Gen. S99 (1923); 3 Comp. Gen. 762 (l924); and 45 Comp. Gen. 724 (1966). In the second situation, a private party pays money to a Federal agency, the agency deposits it as miscellaneous
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CRS861028Apage88
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described in subsection (b) of this section has committed a vio ation of any Federal criminal law other than a viola- tion “( constituting a petty ofiense; , b) The ersons referred to in subsection (a) of this section are-— “( 1) ti ePresident and Vice President; a- f“(2l) any individual serving in a position listed in section 5312 a tit e 5; i “(3) any individual working in the Executive Oflice
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CRS861028Apage85
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CRS-77 (4) Miscellaneous Augmentation Cases As pointed out earlier in the introductory comments, the augmentation theory is relevant in a wide variety of contexts. The most common applications are the areas pre- viously discussed--the spectrum of situations involving the miscellaneous receipts statutes and the acceptance of gifts. pThis portion of the discussion will present a sampling of cases to illustrate other applications of the theory. Another way of stating the augmentation rule is that when Congress appropriates funds for an activity, the appro- 'priation represents a limitation Congress has fixed for that activity, and all expenditures for that activity must come from that appropriation absent express authority to the con- trary. Thus, a Federal institution is normally not eligible to receive grant funds from another Federal institution. It is not neccessary for the grant statute to expressly exclude tFederal institutions as eligible grantees; the rule will apply based on the augmentation theory unless the grant statute expressly includes Federal institutions. ., . The improper treatment of reimbursable transactions may result in an augmentation. Thus, if a given reimbursement must be credited to the appropriation that "earned" it, i.e., that financed the transaction, and that appropriation has expired, crediting the reimbursement to current funds is an improper augmentation. An example of this type of transac- tion is the Economy Act. See 31 U.S.C. 5 686(b) and Chapter 8, this Manual. a 5-90
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CRS861028Apage87
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of an appropriation made to a regular contingent fund of the department may -not be bought out of another amount available for obligation. § 1350. Criminal penalty An officer or employee of the United _States Government or of the District of Columbia governm_ent_ knowingly and willfully violating section 1341_(a) or 1342 of this title shall be fined not more t an $5,000, imprisoned for not more than 2 years
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CRS861028Apage86
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augmentation. B—132900-O.M., November 1, 1977. Several statutes applicable to the Defense Department _provide similar options. For a detailed discussion of these statutes, see B-179708-O.M., July 21,_l975, and B-l79708~O.M., December 1, 1975.
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CRS86630ENRpage25
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gasoline consumption can be expected to rise with the falling price of crude oil, though here the lag in pass throng? of crude price declines suggests less of an initial price decline than the drop in crude oil prices. Given an average 1985 city retail price for gasoline of, about $1.20 per gallon, ;;/ the estimated decrease in average 1986 price to $0.95 per gallon (20.8 percent) would result
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CRS86630ENRpage08
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impact on the U.S. price level, though energy intensive industries could be slightly affected. It would add long-run disincentives to U.S. production, but less so than an oil excise tax. International trade and conservation impacts would appear slight at the $10 billion revenue level. Gasoline Tax Perhaps the most politically controversial of the proposals--because it most noticeably impacts voters
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CRS86630ENRpage39
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Oklahona 1 458 138.9 648 196.5 Florida 1464 137.1 316 29.6 Arkansas 300 128.9 213 91.5 UNITED STATES 30050 128.4 17352 74.2 Oregon 341 128.1 69 25.9 Nebraska 202 126.5 133 83.3 Mississippi 324 125.2 245 94.7 Nashington 530 2 123.3 111 25.8 Seorgia 699 121.9 305 53.2 Alabama 465 117.5 228 57.6 Kentucky 432 116.3 180 48.5 Hissouri 574 115.5 267 53.7 Virginia 623 112.3 147 26.5 California 2780 110.4 1582 62
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CRS86630ENRpage18
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. With production in the 17.5 trillion cubic ft range, the 85 cent tax would result in nearly $15 billion in direct Treasury revenue. Seen as a revenue raiser, the rule of thumb here would be that every $1.00/bbl of excise tax on oil would bring in $3 billion in gas tax revenues. To achieve a $10 billion gross Federal revenue target, a levy the equivalent of about $1.15/bbl of oil and 20 cents per mcf (1000 cubic
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CRS86630ENRpage14
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of $4.50 to $5/bbl, such a levy would generate about $10 billion in direct Treasury revenues at an annual rate. §/ Proportionately, a $10/bbl fee proposed in some legislation would generate $20 billion. 2/ Chemical ManufacturersAssociation. An Investigation of the Impact of an Oil Tax on the Economy. March 12, 1986. §/ This does not include corporate income tax gains from domestic oil producers
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CRS86630ENRpage20
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CRS-l6 Congressional Coalition asked that we scale tax alternatives to yield gross Treasury revenue of $10 billion per year, we note that the equivalent of less than $1.00/bbl on all energy sources would produce gross Treasury revenues of almost $10 billion. Against a backdrop of declining energy prices, a Btu tax could be small enough to be perceived by few consumers and still result in large
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CRS86630ENRpage05
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tax. Each alternative tax is structured for comparative purposes such that gross Treasury revenues of approximately $10 billion (at an annual rate) are. yielded. Factors used in comparing the alternatives, as requested by the Coalition, included demand and supply effects in the current and near-term market, regional and income group equity concerns, ease of administra- tion, efficiency of the tax
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CRS86630ENRpage04
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TABLE 1. TABLE 2. TABLE 3. TABLE 4. TABLE 5. TABLE 6. TABLE 7. TABLE 1.1. FIGURE 1. LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Impacts of Alternate $10 Billion Energy Taxes States in the Northeast-Midwest Coalition With Above Average Sensitivity to Energy Cost Increases. The United States Statewide Per Capita Consumption of Petroleum and Natural Gas--1983. States of the Northeast-Midwest Coalition Consumption
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CRS86630ENRpage53
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CRS-49 have economic impacts of approximately one—third that of a $30 billion impost. But beyond the proposition of energy taxes, perhaps a more interesting proposition which has not been evaluated is the matter of how much increased Treasury revenue would flow in if the economy were left to enjoy the beneficial effects of lower energy prices. Would the stimulatory effects--when viewed relative to a tax, or the status quo of just a few months ago when oil prices were much higher--result in a better overall budget situation. Those most impressed with this scenario tend to favor fiscal policy which would be to defer any energy tax until, first, oil markets stabilize, or at least yield a clearer indication of the futurei outlook, and secondly, the economy begins to react to the new energy price regime. It is the latter that could be the most important consideration regarding budgetary matters.
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CRS86630ENRpage41
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23.2 47.7 11.1 13.3 359.0 4304.0 Hisconsin 89.6 18.9 20.9 116.0 24.4 27.1 427.9 4751.0 Pennsylvania 232.1 19.5 18.1 253.2 21.3 19.7 1284.1 11895.0 Indiana 172.0 31.4 15.6 214.2 39.1 19.4 1102.5 5479.0 Hichigan 120.8 13.3 14.9 180.8 19.9 22.3 810.9 9069.0 Total Sector 2478.2 1799.7 9333.8 103010.0 xsunption 9 UNITED STATES 7580.0 17354.0 25910.0 233981.0 Percentage Rep- presented by 10.4 36.0 44.0
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CRS86630ENRpage47
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48.3 17.2 New Hampshire 57.0 16.8 29.5 1.7 New York 1337.1 364.1 27.2 36.2 Delaware _ 99.2 24.9 25.1 2.5 New Jersey 303.8 53.6 17.6 5.3 Haine 158.9 22.1 13.9 2.2 Haryland 347.5 40.3 11.6 4.0 Pennsylvania 1276.2 125.6 9.8 12.5 UNITED SIATES 24938.9 1543.7 6.2 NA illinois 1076.5 39.7 3.7 3.9 Hichiqan 762.0 8.6 1.1 0.9 ‘ Iowa 257.9 0.9 0.3 0.1 Hisconsin 432.6 1.5 0.3 1 0.1 0hio 1098.1 3.7 0.3 0.4
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CRS86630ENRpage30
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1.5 mbd of domestic petroleum products supply--could be taxed at processing plants that extract these liquid hydrocarbons from the gas stream. Since there are less than 300 operating refineries, the small number of points from which a tax could be collected points toward ease of administration, although this might turn out less sanguine upon further study. Another alternative for collecting
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CRS86630ENRpage24
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increased energy taxes may have in this rapidly changing environment. 1) Gross crude oil imports 3.098 mbd (excluding SPR) 2) Gross product imports I 1.830 mbd 3) Total product supplied for 15.697 mbd domestic use 4) Motor gasoline 6.815 mbd 5) Total U.S. energy consumption lQ/ (1985 estimate based on extrapolation of 1984 EIA estimates assuming comparable quarterly patterns for 1985) 74,132 Trillion Btu
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