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CRS86630ENRpage34
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for gasoline, the $10,000 to $l9,999 class pays 5.2 percent, the $20,000 to $29,999 class pays 4.4 percent and the $30,000 to $39,999 class pays 3.6 percent. These figures are consistent with the conventional wisdom that lower income consumers pay a higher share of their income for gasoline than those in upper brackets. If these figures are accurate, this means that a gasoline tax increase would be roughly
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CRS86630ENRpage32
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‘CRS-28 to the treasury. Generally speaking, a gasoline and a Btu tax all result in direct treasury collection of virtually all revenue flows in the economy due to the tax programs. The petroleum excise tax would capture all revenue flows except any increase that it caused in natural gas prices. Were natural gas prices to be above where they would have been, producers and more than likely pipelines would realize extra revenues. This is a likelihood, because gas would be priced to a large extent in competition with heavy fuel oil. The extent of impact in terms of dollars and areas of pipeline service areas is hard to say, but the fact is that pipelines and gas producers would probably be unintended beneficiaries of oil taxes. Thus, the petroleum only taxes are not symmetrical in their effects on energy markets. In the case of an oil excise tax, from the econometric modeling exercise described in the appendix implications can be drawn regarding the efficiency of the excise levy as a budget deficit reduction measure. While a very high proportion of the fee is represented in increased Federal revenues in this modeling exercise, the net effect of comparing increased revenues with higher forecast expenditures is that only about half of the increased revenues go to deficit reduction. The rest pay for the inflated cost of Federal expenditures stemming from the tax impact on the general price level. The oil import fee does result in measurable "inefficiency" in as much as the shares of oil revenues flowing under the tax can be estimated. As noted above, the Treasury claims about 40 percent of the revenues directly; industry claims the remaining 60 percent--but these are subject to taxation themselves. How much the corporate income tax would claim here is open to debate. The general corporate income tax is 46_percent at the Federal level. bPresumably, the fee-derived income would at least initially be taxed at this rate. But revenues from oil production are typically sheltered from
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CRS86630ENRpage07
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of oil fuel import fee would raise $10 billion in gross Treasury revenue, an oil excise tax of $1.60 to $1.75/bbl would generate the same amount.
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CRS86630ENRpage43
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2,963 503 North Carolina 3,002,379 6,082 494 Florida 5,233,924 10,680 490 South Carolina 1,595,731 3,264 489 Louisiana 2,166,543 4,438 488 Nebraska 770,289 1,597 482 Alahaoa 1,898,948 3,959 480 Virginia 2,657,044 5,550 479 Oregon 1,262,901 2,662 474 Kentucky 1,750,240 3,714 471 Nashington 1,984,205 4,300 461 Colorado 1,446,121 3,139 461 California 11,404,767 25,174 453 UNITED STATES 105,300,798
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CRS86630ENRpage46
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of the Nation's petroleum consumption in that sector falls within the coalition States. As table 7 reveals, the nationwide average percentage of petroleum input to electric utilities is 6.2 percent. Most of the coalition States falling below that average do so because petroleum consumption in the utility sector is negligible. However, most of the coalition States in New England exceed
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CRS86630ENRpage17
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1 CRS-l3 The excise tax has supporters among those seeking revenue enhancements from an easily administered tax but not wishing to see oil producers profit from an import fee. Adherence to this View hold that the income redistribution which would likely result from domestic oil tracking the price of (taxed) imported petroleum would be regionally unfair and undesirable.. A Btu Tax: The Natural Gas
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CRS86630ENRpage12
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., A key assumption underlying this comparison is that lower oil prices will stimulate U.S. oil consumption in 1986 over increases due to expected strong economic growth. Based on recent macro forecasts, an average l986 price of $16.50 is used. Short-run price elasticities are then applied to estimate 1986 consumption under current market conditions. This baseline is then used to approximate how much
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CRS86630ENRpage28
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CRS-24 energy consumption in 1983, the latest year for EIA data. 12/ The effect of this cost increase on 1986 U.S. energy consumption on average would be negligible, but energy intensive industries making commodity items with normal profit margins would be hurt somewhat. For an estimated 1.6 percent increase in 1986 U.S. total energy cost, consumption would be reduced by less than .16 percentage
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CRS86630ENRpage22
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forward. For purposes of this assessment, several assumptions will be made and their demand effects analyzed for each of the alternate energy taxes. First, a 1986 average crude oil price of $16.50 per barrel is used as the base on which any tax or fee would be imposed--a reasonable approximation of where
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CRS86630ENRpage03
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Import Fee. Oil Excise Tax. Gasoline Tax. Btu Tax . SUPPLY CONSIDERATIONS. EASE OF ADMINISTRATION . Gasoline Tax. Oil Import Fee. Oil Excise Tax. Btu Tax . EFFICIENCY . EQUITY ISSUES. U1 4>4-\uJt\3I\> IO 12 l3 l6 18 18 22 23 23 23 24 25 25 26 26 27 27 29
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CRS86630ENRpage29
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CRS-25 low as $12/bbl at this writing--could cause the output of stripper and other low output wells to decline. The drilling decline represents a long-term concern, since drilling ultimately leads to reserve additions, which supports production in out- years. The nearer term concern centers on the output of low-yield wells. Over a million bbls per day of domestic production comes from stripper
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CRS86630ENRpage26
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CRS-22 some short run price responsiveness to total U.S. energy demand, a 37 percent decrease in oil prices would result in at least a 16 percent decrease in total U.S. energy costs. Given a short run price elasticity of -.1, for example, this would suggest a 1.6 percent increase in total Btu consumption over any increases due to l986 economic expansion. Given the above 1986 baseline assumptions
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CRS86630ENRpage38
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CRS-34 TABLE 2. States in the Northeast~Midwest Coalition With Above Average Sensitivity to Energy Cost Increases If Per Capita Oil Consumption Per Capita Natural Gas Consumptionn Maine Illinois Delaware Indiana New Jersey Michigan Connecticut I Iowa Massachusetts Oil as a Percent of Total Industrial Energy Use~% Natural Gas a a Percent of Total Industrial Energy Use: Maine Delaware Massachusetts
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CRS86630ENRpage06
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CRS-2 ill for future production. Near-term adverse market conditions will also adversely affect the large number of marginal wells that contribute an important part of U.S. oil supply, Some are seriously concerned about long—term resource conservation and dependence on foreign energy suppliers. A tax would help preserve the price structure which has resulted in price- induced conservation. Absent
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CRS86630ENRpage48
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: * Real GNP reductions of 0.7 percent in 1987 and 0.7 percent in 1988 result. * The rate of inflation (measured by the GNP deflator) is increased by 0.9 percent in I987 and 0.5 percent in 1988. By l99O the effect of a lower growth and smaller deficits results in a 0.2 percent reduction in prices.
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CRS83110EPWpage84
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CRS-68 17. ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES (CASE componsmr) T Note: This program supersedes the program of Assistance to Indo- chinese refugees, enacted in 1975, for which FY 1979 and FY 1980 data appear in a summary table at the end of this report. A. Funding Formula The Refugee Act of 1980 authorizes 100 percent federally funded cash assistance for needy refugees during their first years in the United
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CRS83110EPWpage79
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payments of the credit were permitted beginning on July 1, 1979. Since October 1981, P.L. 97-35 has re- quired welfare offices to assume that an AFDC family considered eligible for EITC is receiving it on an advance-basis (as an addition to the paycheck), regardless of whether it is so paid. In FY 1981 earned income credits (generally earned in 1980) totalled $2,008 billion, of which about $1.318 billion
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CRS83110EPWpage78
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CRS-62 14. EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC) _1_/ A. Fundin§Formula This benefit is 100 percent federally funded. B. Eligibility Requirements The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is available to a parent_g/ or parents) with earnings whose adjusted gross income is not above $10,000 annually and who maintains a household 3/ for (a) a child who is either under 19 or a student; or (b) a son 5? daughter
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CRS83110EPWpage83
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CRS—67 16. FOSTER CARE Note: The program described here started on October 1, 1980, established in a new part (Part IV-E) of the AFDC title of the Social Security Act. Previously, foster care was a separate component of the regular AFDC program. A. Funding Formula The Medicaid matching formula (see program No. 1) decides the Federal funding share in each State. Under the Medicaid formula
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