(177,941 - 177,960 of 185,425)
Pages
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage113
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
, the economic illusion simply parades as a rationale for inequality. It is, as Kuttner describes it, “self- interest masquerading as technical imperative.” Its spokesmen tell iis that equality will sap our initiative but they do not ex- plain that the measures to prevent this, such as the Reagan tax bill, give a 16 percent tax saving to families with incomes over $200,000 and a 21 percent increase to families
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage53
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
or VALOR (AND DISCRETION) 4 Tom Bethell 44‘; Supply-Side Revolution. by Paul Craig Roberts (Harvard, 3]! pp.. $18.50) THE KEY insight of the supply-side movement was simply this: It is po- litically. possible to cut tax rates, while it is impossible to cut spending. (Fed- eral spen:ding has not been out since the end of the Korean War.) This had not been grasped——-and it still has not
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage57
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
THE FRIEDMAN PROBLEM A William F. Rickenbacker Tyranny of the Status Quo, by Milton and Rose Friedman (Harcourt, Brace, 182 pp.. $10.95) ERE’S ANOTHER short and spicy mes- sage from the ever gallant, charm- ing, patriotic, and freedom-loving Fried- mans, gradingMr. Reagan’s first couple of years in office (he gets a low pass, I gather), and offering some programs for future action. Devotees
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage59
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
freely to have chosen to ignore this important his- torical episode. Ignoring the experience of free-mar- ket fractional-reserve gold-based bank- ing systems, the Friedmans treat a commodity money——in practice, gold‘ coins-——as the only alternative to a governmental monopoly. They then at- tack the gold standard by attacking the experience of this country from 1800 to 1934 or so. But, for most
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage55
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
- ported in the daily papers, supple- mented by Roberts’s own Treasury memos. Still, it is a valuable account, and Craig Roberts deserves our grati- tude. Few people in Washington have 44 Nanomu. REVIEW / June 1, 1984 brought as much commitment and in- tensity to the tight for liberty. Without his formidable support, the supply-side movement today would be much en- ieebled. Cl 21
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage97
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
monetary policy. In chapter 9, Bryant presents a detailed discus- sion of Fed policy in the 1979-82 period. He exam- ines the mechanics of the Fed's process in pursuing its monetary targets and looks at how successfully those targets have been achieved. He discusses the 1979 change in Fed operating procedure and con- siders its significance. Also, he gives recommenda- tions for the best procedure
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage105
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
Presidential Purse Strings nesaoenruu ECONOMICS: The Making of Eco- nomic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Be- yond. By Herbert Stein. Simon and Schuster. 414 pp. . _ $16.95" By sruanr saucusr ’ HE “great traumas” of American economic in T the past half century or so, Herbert Stein believes—- oorrectly, in my judgment--have been associated with unemployment and inflation
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage99
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
»Reproduced with the permission of the Wall Street Review 224-227. Wm. Craig Stubblebine and Thomas D. Willett, Editors REAGANOMICS: A MIDTERM REPORT. San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983. 232 pp. $14.95. ISBN O-9l76l6-54-5 Reviewer: JOHN C. GREEN Furman University The long predicted upturn in the economy is underway, giving politicians and pundits a much needed rest
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage101
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
program for a number of years were to some extent surprised by how quick and easy our victories in 1980 and 1981 seemed to have come. Our difficulties this year have brought us back to the reality that the battle for good economic policy will require a long-term commitment...in educat- ing the American people and the news media 44 226 ...that long run economic growth can be obtained only with
-
-
Title
-
CRS84798Lpage103
-
Page from
-
info:fedora/mu:77086
-
Text
-
restrictive monetary policy. The costs of tight money were exacerbated by huge tax cuts. Remov- ing the heavy hand of government in both these" ways did not produce sudden expansion, but large budget deficits. and high interest rates. High inter- est rates in turn helped deepen the recession, which then threw fiscal and monetary policy further out of kilter. On the face of it, reducing the role of government appears to have made things worse. The one possible way out of these problems was large cuts in government spending. Musgrave claims that the administration deliberately pursued a policy of unbalanced budgets to force the Con- gress into dramatic cuts in domestic spending. This strategy failed; between the President's defense buildup and domestic spending, which even con- servative Republicans felt obliged to support. needed budget reductions could not be achieved. Other political miscalculations occurred as well. The large and unproductive tax advantages given to businessmen were the political price of the supply-side tax cuts. Further, the domestic spend- ing reductions that were achieved came at the expense of the weakest constituency on Capitol Hill, the poor. Hence, Reaganomics has not really reduced the role of government and politics in the economy, but instigated a particularly undesirable form of both: government for the wealthy. Like Willeft, however, Musgrave sees a number of bright spots in Reaganomics. Income tax indexation was a good idea, as was reducing mar- ginal tax rates. He welcomes the prospect of the “New Federalism," and the Presidents ‘deregula- tion initiatives. Individually, these policies have what Reaganomics as a whole lacks. Namely viidcly accepted goals and good prospects for success. Musgrave's point of view is summed up nicely by another critic. William H. Branson. who dis- putes Willett‘s credibility thesis. Reaganomics does not lack credibility because of the impatience of the electorate or rhetorical oversell. but because it is fundamentally bad policy. Ultimately. a signif- icant portion of the electorate must be convinced of the purposes and the effectiveness of economic policy. Branson believes that such a consensus is unlikely for Reaganomics because much of it is unfair and ineffective. Alice Rivlin. the former director of the Congres- sional Budget Office. expands on the policy point in her brief comment. She claims that the adminis- tration and its backers were not alone in support- ing contradictory goals; after the I980 election almost everyone wanted some form of tax reduc- tion, progress toward a balanced budget. increased defense spending and a reduction in inflation. Simply put. no one has found a way to produce these simultaneoulsy. or to develop acceptable 227 priorities. Such choices are the sum and substance of politics. and in the absence ofsuccessful politics. Riylin concludes. we get the kind of economic policy we deserve. So the non-supply-side critics of Reaganomics see economic policy as unavoidably a product of the political process. for better or for worse. Policy differences aside, the “radical" supply-siders would agree with this; the “main- stream" supply-siders would not. although their policy proposals are much closer to those of the neo-Keynesians. Reaganomit-s: A Midterm Report ought to prompt a degree of self-consciousness among poli- ticians and pundits when they resume debating economic policy. The political process may be as crucial an element in successful economic policy as the particular policy instruments chosen. John C. Green is Assistant Professor of Political St'ient'e at Furman University. Greenville. South Carolina. _—. ll’ 45
Pages