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Barriger Library Special Collections Directory

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Title: Finance docket no. 20204 : the Preston Railroad Company--abandonment (portion)--banner mine (Turner-Douglas Mine) W. Va.
Date: 1958, 1958

Title: B-1 John W. Barriger III Collection
Date: 1984
Description: The working library of noted railroad executive John W. Barriger III (1899-1976) was acquired in 1982, the generous donation of his family. Widely recognized as one of the twentieth century's best-known and most distinguished railroad executives, Mr. Barriger was also an avid scholar, book collector, and photographer. His collection of books, papers, photographs, and memorabilia - collected over an active career of 50 years - forms the nucleus of the Library's railroad collections, one of the largest rail transportation collections in the world.

Title: Plat of St. Louis and East St. Louis showing the Railway System of the Terminal RR Assoc. of St. Louis
Date: 1956, 1956

Title: GM&O Dispatcher Sheets
Description: 4 Dispatcher sheets from the GM&O Railroad

Title: Reverse of Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-8-1952
Date: 1952-01-08, 1952-01-08
Description: Reverse of Dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O. January 8, 1952.

Title: Reverse of Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-7-1952
Date: 1952-01-07, 1952-01-07
Description: Reverse of dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O. 1-7-1952

Title: Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-8-1952
Date: 1952-01-08, 1952-01-08
Description: Dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O. January 8, 1952.

Title: Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-7-1952
Date: 1952-01-07, 1952-01-07
Description: Dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O. January 7, 1952.

Title: Reverse of Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-6-1952
Date: 1952-01-06, 1952-01-06
Description: Dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O.

Title: Dispatcher Sheet Alabama Division Laurel, MS 1-6-1952
Date: 1952-01-06, 1952-01-06
Description: Dispatcher sheet from Laurel, MS for the Alabama Division of the GM&O.

Title: Mechanical Instructions for Enginemen
Date: 1954-07-01
Description: This work was made for the Burlington Lines beginning in January of 1946. It was revised in 1951 and issued again in 1954. It provided instructions to engineers and firemen in the care and operation of locomotives. Mastery of these instructions helped firemen maintain their positions and gain promotion to the rank of engineer. Engineers and firemen were required to carry this book with them while on the job.

Title: Wreck, Pennsylvania Railroad Train, Federal Express, January 15, 1953, Washington Terminal, Washington, DC
Date: 1953-02-27, 1953-02-27
Description: Summary investigation report of the wreck of the Federal in 1953.
Text: EE%7% (Mo-'49) :3 WASHINGION, D. C .. FORM No: 21 ‘1'l~}!5 C5133 omemn-rite’ ‘mi ieanoni ‘FILE No. REPORT MADE AT WASHI NGTON, 1)., c 0 DATE WHEN 7/ $3 REPORT MADE BY mwmawcm E . BUSCEER ' PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 9 1.39 23~27/53 MADE SJ’? cbs TITLE nal, Washington, Dc Co‘ WREOK,_PENNSYLV&NIA RAILROAD TRAIN, FEDERAL EXPRESS, January l5, l9S3Q Washington Termi— ‘" CHARACTER ...
Show moreEE%7% (Mo-'49) :3 WASHINGION, D. C .. FORM No: 21 ‘1'l~}!5 C5133 omemn-rite’ ‘mi ieanoni ‘FILE No. REPORT MADE AT WASHI NGTON, 1)., c 0 DATE WHEN 7/ $3 REPORT MADE BY mwmawcm E . BUSCEER ' PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 9 1.39 23~27/53 MADE SJ’? cbs TITLE nal, Washington, Dc Co‘ WREOK,_PENNSYLV&NIA RAILROAD TRAIN, FEDERAL EXPRESS, January l5, l9S3Q Washington Termi— ‘" CHARACTER or-‘ c;AsE. A SABOTAGE; FEDERAL TRAIN ‘WRECK STATUTE ' SYNOPSIS OF‘ FACTS: ‘last two carso ’mannero Investigative Summary Report The Federal Express departed Boston, Massachusetts for Washington, Dc Cog 11200 pomo, 1/lb/53° At time con» sisted_of a double diesel engine and l3 carso Near Kingston, R0 Io) train stopped because of sticking brakes on After some delay engiu neer discovered anglecock on rear of 3d car in closed positiono Anglecock opened and train continued to New Haven, Conno Here 3 additional cars added and an electric engine replaced the dieselo Complete inspection re- vealed braking system normalo Trip New Haven~New York conducted in usual At New York a PER electric engine replaced New Haven engine and another inspection again found braking system normalo Train left New York and made scheduled stops at Phiiadelphiag Wilmington and Baltimore in normal man~ ner. After leaving Baltimore train at» tained speed of 80 mph, and when at~ tempting stop at Washington, Do C03 brakes found to be insufficient and engine and 3 cars crashed into Union Station at 8338 acme, l/l5/53° Three additional cars derailedo Crash caused Apptaovzao AND FORWARDED: SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE DO NOT WRITE IN Tl-HIESE SPACES W sag If 7 COPIES or-' THIS REPORT S~Bureau lwBoston (98ml638) (info) leNew Haven (984lllh) (info} leNew York (98«2678) (info) l~Baltimore (98~llSO) (info) §éWashington Field (98~523) ' Searched _f,‘~4,‘v7?§§; _ __________ _ um me. ‘And ______________ __d ___________ _ Hkd éﬁﬁzt PROPERTY OF FBI - This confidential report and its contents are loaned to you by the FE! and are not to be distributed outside of agency to which loaned. pro 98—523 LEB:PCN eighty-seven injuries and property damages estimated at one million dol~ larso Investigation reflects crash probably caused by anglecock on rear of 3d car again being closed, cutting off braking on last 13 carsn Investigation at each stop made by instant train from Boston to'Washington failed to disclose any unidentified persons in proximity of anglecocko Train crew member at each stop was in proximity of anglecock due to loca~ tion of baggage car there. ICC safety in- spector concluded anglecock closed by striking against center end sill on car. Experiments conducted at'Wash. Terminal Yard.substantiated conclusion. ICC, RR and Westinghouse Airbrake officials, after experiments, concluded accident caused by structural errors fx WFO 98-523 Io IIc IIIO TABIE OF CONTENTS NARRATIVE OF CRASH. o o o . 0 0 Ac B0 C0 D0 E9 CAUSE OF CRASHo . o 0 . OE3RAT:ON OF THE BRAKING SYSTEM ON A PASS- Identity of Train . o u . 9 Details of the Crash. 9 o 0 Personal Injuries 0 9 . 0 . O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Property Damage . . . . o 0 o . . Washington Terminal Topographical Imbmmﬂwno one 000 ooo 0 O O O O O D 0 0 o o 0 O 9 0 0 0 0 Preliminary Investigation . 0 . o o 0 The Closed Anglecock Theory Developed Hearings Conducted to Determine Cause of Crasho . o o 0 0 0 o . . . o . o o lo: Hearing Conducted by United States Senate Comittee on Interstate and D 0 n 0 Foreign Commercea 0 . . 0 . 0 o 0 o 2? Washington Terminal Company . o 0 o 30‘ Interstate Commerce Commission. a O ENGER TRAIN o 9 o o o 0 o o o o . O D O 0 O INVESTIGATION — BOSTON TO NEW'HKVEN o 0 0 A0 B0 C0 D; 73' 1.15 Fe CI‘8Wo V o 0 0 o 0 o 0 O c 0 o 0 e Yard'Workers (Dover Street Railroad Yard“BOS-tOn)ooooooooc ooo Yard Workers (South tation ~ Boston) 0 o 0 O O 0 D 0 Station Workers (South Station - Boston)° Back Bay Station ~ Boston 0 o 0 o o . 0 0 Union Station — Providence, Rhodelsland INVESTIGATION -. NEW HAVEN TO NEW YORK 0 o . Ac Bo Co Tra em 0 0 0 O O 0 0 0 D O O 0 Yard Workers. 0 o o . . o . o o u o Other New Haven Employees . 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 ® COO3'\'lO\ O\ 12 12 13 13 19 2h WFO 98-523 VI. VII. VIII. INVESTTGATION ~ NEW YORK CITY TO.WASHING— Do Ca 0 D D 0 O o 9 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 o A. B. C. D. E. PULIMAN COMPANY EMPLOYEES. . ., . . . . . ' Train Crew . . . . . . . . Pennsyiyania Railroad Station. . . . Thirtieth Street Station — Philadel- phia . . . . ._. . . . . . . . . . . Pennsylvania Railroad Station ~ Wilmington, Delaware . . . . . . . . 0 o 0 o 0 _Pennsylvania Railroad-Station — Baltimore, Maryland. . . . . . . . . 1. Pennsylvania Railroad Station Employees. . . . . . . . . . . 2. Car Department Employees . . . 3. Baggage Room Employees .‘. . . h. Track Gang Employees . . . . . 5. Railway Express Agency Em- ployees. . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Postal Transportation Service. 7. Block Tower Operators. . . . . 8. Grade Crossing Attendants. . . D 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 9. Interviews with Subjects of At» _ tempted Wreck of B & 0 Train Near Baltimore, January 2h, 1953 INVESTIGATION - vrAsHINGToN,. D. c. . . . A. B. C. D. E. F0 GD H. Switch Tower Employees . . . . . . . Witnesses to the Accident. . . . . . Switch Engine Crew That Removed Cars From Wrecked Train . . . . . . . . . Crew Exanining Cars After Removal. . Master Mechanics Crew. . . . . . . . Washington Terminal Employees. . . . Pennsylvania Railroad Employees. . . Experiments Conducted in‘Washington Tenminal Yard. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 a 0 0 q 0 O O 0 0 O 0 0 6h 7% 78 8h 91 115 12h 131 137 150 193 161 WFO 98-523 IXO INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION X. A. Orville Do Jolly o . . o . Bo James Ea Friend. . o 0 0 . Co Howard R0 Longhursta 0 o . WESTINGHOUSE AIRBRAKE COMPANY. O O O 0 O O 0 O 0 O 0 0 O 9 169 169 169 169 192 205 wro 98-523 LEB:sjr DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C. I. NARRATIVE or CRASH , A. Identity of Train The Federal Express (or train 73'*l7’.3) departed “Boston, Massachusetts, at 11:05) pm, on January 11;, 1953, over the ri,ght-o1’s=v.~:a_',' oi‘ the New York, New. Haven and Hartford Railroad”enroute to ‘v':Ta'shington, ,D.. Go it the time of its departure ‘from Boston it consisted of a double ciiesel engine and thirteen cars, The trip was normal until the train reached ‘a point outside of Kingston, Rhode Island, where it was stopped because of the brakes on the rear two cars sticking. After some delay the engineer discovered that me anglecock on the rear of the third car was in a closed pos ition, He opened this anglecoclg, and thereafter the brakes operated in a- normal manner, and the train continued without incident into New Haven, Connecticut. At~Nevr Have, Connecticut, three additional sleeping cars were added to the rear of thedtrain. ' Here an inspection was also made of the braking system, including an ‘examination of the anglecocks, and everything was reported as being in a normal condition, A new electric engine and an engine crew were also added for the trip to New York‘. This trip, according to the engine crew, was normalo From New York City to Washington, 3), G. this train travels over the rightap-i-ay of the¢Pennsylvania Railroad, At New York City another engine, this time the’;g.=.'<':3 arty oi‘ the Pennsylvania Railroad, and engine crew was added for the trip to Washington, ‘Dc Co The braking system of the entire train was again examined, at Neuj York and was found to be normalo The train left New York for Washington, making scheduled stops at the 30th Street Station, Philadelphia, Wilmingz_ton,- Delaware and Balti- more, Marylando According to the engine crew, these stops were all made in a normal manner, U}: on approaching the Union Station, Washington, 1‘). C09 the engineer attempted to brake his train to a halt but was unable to do 500 He therefore went past his stopping point and crashed into the station at approximately 3:38'a.r~,.;, January 15, 1953., At the time of the crash the train consisted of'tne following units: WFO 98«S23 NHParlor NHParlor NHParlor NHParlor—Baggage Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper “Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper Sleeper 16 cars Bo Details of the Crash 8663 BSN Washn .86h3 All All 8665 6103 New'Hemepin NY County New Nicollet Surinam City of Lancaster City of Canton Breeds Hill Minnesota Club City of Gary India Pt Spgfld Breslin Tr All Long Point The Federal Express upon reaching the Union Station at Washington, Dc 0., was unable to stopa The train continued throuh the station yard reaching the end of the trenk and knocking down the bumper guardo It then continued jumping a concrete curbing, knocked down a piller supporting the roof of the station concourse and continued acrrss the concourse to the entrance of the waiting roomo At this point the weight of the engine and of the cars following ﬂee engine caused the floor of the concourse to collapseo When the concourse floor collapsed the engine and two coach cars fell into the baggage room which was located under the concourseo by the collapse of the flooru train were derailed but remained in an cars of the sixteen-car train remained and were shortly removedo A third coach was partially in the crevice caused The fourth, fifth and sixth cars of the upright position., The last ten on the track in.a normal position ‘.".’F0 98’-5 23 ‘ Co gersonal Injuries As a result of the crash of the Federal Express, eight;r—-- seven persons were injured; however, no persons were killed as of January 25, 1953: ‘ten days after the crash, and all but four of these’ persons had been released from the hospital., The persors remaining in the hospital as of that date were three passengers and one employee of the railroad, At the time of the crash there were a total of 173 Persons reported being on the train and apparently not injured. These figures were furnished by the Washington Terminal Companyo 1). Property Damage Captain W. A., PEAL, of the ‘érashixigton Terminal Police, advised that an estimate had been made of the damages by the companies in-» volved, that is, the Pennsylvania Railroad and the ‘-iTashington Terminal Gdmpany, at which time the property damage was estimated to be .1j3l,OO0,000o E., Washington Terminal Topographical Infornaation Biro HOWARD R. LONGHU§iS‘I’, Interstate Commerce Commissioné, made available topographical and profile map.. This map,1-Ihich was P1‘epared' by the ICC for use in its hearing and report, shows Pemisylvania Railroad southbound track beginning at a point 2009 mi.Les from the point of aooim dento According to the map 9 the Pennsylvania Railroad track on which the Federal Express was traveling enters the Washington Terminal Company Yards on track forty-one at a point 5030 feet from the point of accidento at a point appro:rimate.l,y 2200 feet from the point of accident the train made a cross from yard track forty-one to station track sixteeno It proceeded to the terminal on this traekc This drawing also contains a profile map of the ascenciw ing and descending gradient involved at various points along the route of the Federal Expresso This profile map covers an 11,000 feet approach to the point of acoidento _ The drawing also contains information reflecting distances between various points from Boston to Washingtono Other miscellaneous in» formation is contained on the map or dravring., (See photostat on page )0 - » V Tangent 9 2,120 ft. 5 to Q v.—« {> Eiﬂo Divlsgpn Post, o‘.'96 mi. @o@o PHOTO OF LGGOMOTIVE A1\T.D_CAR {Ir 1 AND FRONT OF CAR # Z QTI4 V T = -__!§A;, PENHSYLVAHMRR _} gm ﬂy! ii;/. * or 0 AR #1 PHOTO TAKEN FROM PHOTO SHOWING» REAR OF C AED SIDE OF ‘CAR #3 WFO 98u523 LEB:cbs IIO ggygp OF CRg§§ A0 Preliminary Investigation to Determine Cause of Crash Immediately upon determining that the Federal Express had crashed into the Union Station investigation was initiated to determine if there vvas any violation of laws within the primary investigative jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigations The train crew of the Federal Express was interviewed; however, they were able to furnish only the information that the brakes on the train had failed upon arriving in the Washington Terminal Yardso The train crew advised that all previous stops had been obtained in a very normal mannero Early in the afternoon of the day of the crash Agents were advised that the angleoock-on the rear of the third car had been found in a partly closed position and there was an indication that this anglecock being in that position was the cause of the crasho However, a conference held among railroad experts resulted in these experts forming the conclusion that that anglecock could not have caused the accident in view of the fact that it was not in such a closed position to sufficiently affect the braking power on the train as it was still opened enough to allow a service application of the brakesu There were also several fresh.marks on the handle of the anglecock and all of these marks were on the side which would have forced it from the open position to the closed position, according to railroad officialso They, at that time, discounted that that particular anglecock had been tampered with and were of the opinion that the anglecock had been partly closed by reason of the oollisiono At about 10:00 Po Mo on the day of the crash, Agents were advised that another anglecock had been found in a completely closed positiono This anglecock had been found in the debris under the rear end of the first car of the wrecked train and it had been torn from.the rear of that care Investigation was conducted to determine if this anglem cock could have been the cause of the crasho' However, infer» mation was obtained from Ho R0 LONGHURST, Safety Inspector, .=.'_'[_2.= WFO 98w523 Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of-Safetyg that this snglecock could not have been the cause of instant orasho The reason furnished by Mro LONGHURST was that two hours after the wreck occurred the wheels of the engine and the first three cars were still hot, indicating excessive braking on those wheelso The brake shoes were also disaiored by heato The wheels on cars h, 59 and 6 were cold, indicating that there was no braking on these cars and probably no braking on the remaining ten cars on the traino B0 The Closed Anglecock Theory Developed SIDNEY KERL, Manager of the Washington Terminal, advised that in his opinion the closed a1gleooek, which had some from the rear of the first car of the traing was the cause of the accidentu He explained that with the angieoock in a closed position the engineer could not apply the brakes to any of the cars past the closed angle= coeko He explained that on the Federal Express this meant that if the anglecock on the rear of the first car were in a closed position the engineer could only apply brakes to the engine and the first car and the brakes on the other fifteen cars would be unaffected by the engineer applying the brakeso Ho Ho LGNGHURST discounted the theory of Mro KERR in View of the condition of the brakes on the second and third ears and stated it was his opinion that the cause of the crash was the angleooek on the rear of the third cart 00 Hearings Conducted to Determine the ggse of Crash in Hearing Conducted on January 21 and 229 19539 by the United States Senate Cgmmittee on Interstate and Epreign Commerce At this Hearing, Senator CHARLES We TOBEY presided and present were Senators TOBEY, CAPEHART9 BRICKER9 BUTLER9 COOPER, GBISWOLD, POTTER, HUNT, PASTORE, and MOHRONEYO The following persons were called as witnesses: NFC 98m523 Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Safetyg that this englecock could not have been the cause of instant orasho The reason furnished by Mro LONGHURST was that two hours after the wreck occurred the wheels of the ' engine and the first three cars were still hot, indicating excessive braking on those wheelso The brake shoes were also disaiored by heato The wheels on cars A, 59 and 6 were sold? indicating that there was no braking on these cars and probably no braking on the remaining ten cars on the traino B0 The Closed Anglecock Theory Developed SIDNEY KERL, Manager of the Washington Terminal9 advised that in his opinion the closed alglecoekg which had come from the rear of the first car of the traing was the cause of the acoidento He explained that with the angleeock in a closed position the engineer could not apply the brakes to any of the cars past the closed anglea COCKQ He explained that on the Federal Express this meant that if the anglecock on the rear of the first car were in a closed position the engineer could only apply brakes to the engine and the first car and the brakes on the other fifteen cars would be unaffected by the engineer applying the brakeso Ho Ho LCNGHURST discounted the theory of Mro KEBL in View of the condition of the brakes on the second and third cars and stated it was his opinion that the cause of the crash was the angleeook on the rear of the third earn Go Hearings Conducted to Determine the §s..1~2sie ,9.@.’....€3.«:-’°.:<eeh. 1° ﬁesring Conducted on January 21 and 229 19539 by the United States Senate Committee on Interstate and Epreign Commerce At this Hearing, Senator CHARLES We TOBEY presided and present were Senators TOBEY, CAPEHART9 BRIGKEH9 BUTLER9 COOPER, GBISWOLD, POTT%, HUNT9 PASTORE9 and MORROMEYO The following persons were called as witnesses: WFO 98u523 as HARRY WILLIAM BROWER, Enginemang Pennsylvania Railroad BROWER testified that he was not advised of prior trouble with the anglecock on the rear of the #3 car when he was given the train in New Yorke Between Baltimore and Washington he was going at a speed of 80 miles an hour and at the control station he was able to slow the train to hon He then realized he had insufficient brakes to stop and began to blow his horn and put his brakes in an emergency positiono In an effort to stop the traing he reversed the engine; however, this failed to aid him in slowing the traino BROWER further testified that the anglea cock on the rear of the third car could have been tampered with in Baltimore but he did not see anyone tampering with the traino He stated that prior to attempting to slow the train upon approaching Washington he made 2h reductions in speed from New York to Baltimoreo be JOHN WILLIAM MOYER9 Firemang Pennsylvania Railroad MOYER testified that the train made a normal trip from New York until approaching Washington“ when he was advised by the engineer that the train was not stopping he put on the emergency brakes and got no reactionc MOYER testified he saw nothing unusual take place in Baltimores Marylando Co THOMAS JOSEPH MUBPHEY, Conductoq& Pennsylvania Railroad MUBPHEY testified that he had no eonversation with the previous crew of the train at New Ybrk and had no knowledgeefpnwious trouble with the angleoock on the train. His first Knowledge that the train was in distress was when they passed New York Avenue at excessive speedo He put on the conductor*s valve and warned passengers of the impending orasho MURPHEY further testified that he saw no one tampering with the train in Ba1timore9 Marylando =]_u_= WFO 98=523 do FRED E0 KING; Front Brakemang Pennsylvania Railroad KING testified he did not hear the train whistle prior to the crash and as he attempted to open the conduetor*s valve on the fourth car the train hit the interlocking switch which caused him to lose his balance and he could not remember whether he pulled the valve or note $0 QQHN Ho MNG2 ReagnBrakeman2 Pennsylvania Railroad MENG testified that he became aware the train was in trouble about a half minute out of Waehingtong and because of the cars lurching he could not get to the conduetor“s valveo f°_ JOHN wo FEENEY3 Tower Ggeratorg Pennsylvania Railroad _ FEENEY told of seeing the train approaching his tower at approximately 50 miles per heuro He did not have the opportunity to switch the train to another track but did telephone the stationmaster“s office that the . train was approaching that effioe and would crasho go EDWARD R0 BRUMLEY, General Attorney; New Haven Railroad BRUMLEY represented the New Haven Railroad at the Senate Hearingo he WILLIAM HENEY MATTA, Locomotive‘Engineer9 New Haven Railroad ' MATTA testified he found the angle» cock at the rear of the #3 car closed at Kingsten Swamp, 3,15: WFO 98w523 Rhode Islands He stated his opinion was that anglecocks could only be moved by the human hand and not by vibrationo 4* io RALPH E0 WARDa Passenger Conductorq New Haven Railroad WARD told of discovering sticky brakes on the last two cars of the Federal Express at Kingston Swamp and ordered the train to stopo He stated that if any: one turned the anglecock it would have to have been done in Providenceo WARD said the idea of sabotage had never occurred to himo He testified that he reported sticky brakes at New Haven and New Yorko He was unaware that an anglecock had been found closed on the train until the following dayo jg ADELBERT SCHROEDER, Assistant General Counsel, .?;e.ar,LeL3;Y_.a.r;:ea.Eai,l1f9.a.§u SCHROEDER represented the Pennsylvania Railroad at the Senate Hearingo eke . Baggage Masterﬁ New Haven Railroad — KING testified that when he inquired at Kingston Swamp as to why the train was stopped he was told there was brake troubleo lo JOHN Do ROWLANDS an- Locomotive Engineer, New Haven Railroad ROWLAND testified he was told that the reason for the train‘s late arrival at New Haven was that the brakes on the last two cars were stickingc He expressed the opinion that someone must have turned the anglecock to cause the crasho WFO 98=S23 mo WILLIAM PQNNEEAKER3 Foreman9 Car Inspectorsj New Haven Railroad ‘ PANNEPAKER testified the entire train was inspected for brakes in New Haven and found normalo He also stated that anglecocks could not be turned by anyone on the trains He expressed the opinion that anglecocks could work loose if they were not locked and that quite a few anglecocks are found in an unlocked positiono 1'1 0 A0 1? Clerkg Stationmaster's Officeg Washington Terminal KLOPP advised that he did not actually see the impact of the train as he was running away from the point of impact» 00 §;cHAaD ouwiiwg Telegraph Operator, Washington Terminal Company »OUTLAW advised that he was in the stationmaster’s officeg located at the end of Track 169 when told by Mro KLGPP of a runéaway train approaching that officeo "He ran out and turned around and saw the train crash through the staticnmaster?s office and later sink through the floor< pa JOSEPH Do KNOTT§’ 3§if”K $treet9 So E0, Washington, Do Co KNOTT saw the train hit the block at the end of Track 169 go across the concourse striking the stationmaster*s office and the news standg and sink through the flocro qo WILLIAM Bo WEIGHTMAN, Air Brake Inspector, Eastern Regiona Pennsylvania Bailroad WEIGHTMAN testified on the evening of the crash he assembled the cars of the traing with the exception $17.: WFO 98=S23 of the first three, and made air brake testso These tests found no defects inasmuch as the air brakes were concerned» He laten,removed working parts from two of the first three carsfand put them on a standard test racko They passed satisfactorilyo He said that the angiecock from the rear of the #3 car in the position in which he found it was not closed sufficiently to affect the brakingo He stated that he examined the brakes on the first three cars after the accident and they were badly burned down, indicating emergency application of heavy braking on these carso He knew of no anglecock that had been closed on Pennsylvania Railroad cars and did not believe they could work loose accidentallyo He stated there was no mechanical failure found with the anglecock taken from the rear of the #3 care Po GEORGE We SWAFORD, Pennsy1vania4Railroad SWAFOBD testified there was no evidence of tampering with the anglecock taken from the rear of the first care Notes ‘This is probably JOHN FRANK SWAFFORD, Assistant Master Mechanic, Washington Terminal Companyo So CARL Do STEWARTE Vice Presidentz Westinghouse Air Brake Company Notes Mro STEWART's true name is CARLTON Do STEWART STEWART explained the braking system found on passenger trainso He said he had never received a report of an anglecock vibrating closedo He explained that there are some rather complicated movements to be made before the anglecock handle could be movedo He stated that it was conceivable that by some very odd circumstances there could be a combination of inanimate objects hitting in such a way that it could move the anglecock handleo He could not, howeverg conceive of this occurringo He surmised that someone either deliberately or inadvertently moved the anglecock by hando = 18 c —WFO 98e523 2, Washington Terminal Company A Hearing was conducted by the Washington Terminal Company in an effort to determine the cause of instant crash on January 15, 19530 This Hearing was presided over by Mr, SIDNEY KERL, Manager of the Washington Terminal Companyo Others attending this Hearing were: R, W, GRIGG, Superintendent, PRR R, "L, AGNEW, Passenger Trainmaster, PER GEO, S, HAMILTON, Jro, General Counsel, 1 Washington Terminal C00 JOHN L, HAMILTON, General Counsel, Washington Terminal Coo W. O, LAYCOCK, Trainmaster, Washington Terminal Co, Jo F. SWAFFORD, Asst, Master Mechanic,‘ Washington Terminal Co, M, G, STEWART, * Road Foreman of Engines, Washington Terminal Geo W, P,.PRIMM, Road Foreman of Engines, PER J, W, WHITE, Asst, Foreman, Office of Mesh, Engineer, PER ELMER GARNER, General'Car Inspector, PRR 5.19.» WFO 98=523 W, B, WEIGHTMAN, ' ' General Air Brake Inspector, PRR H, H. LeNGHURsT, , Safety Inspector, ICC C3 D, STEWART,- Vice President, Westinghouse Air Brake Co, J} W, HENRY, Mechanical Expert, Westinghouse Air Brake Coo RICHARD M, BESWICK, Asst, Manager, Westinghouse Air Brake Co, A,.SCHROEDER, - Assistant General Counsel, PRR Ho S,.MILLER, Asst, Master Mechanic, PRR STANLEY'wEBB, ~ Superintendent, Motor Power, PRR A, R, MARSH, Master Mechanic, PER W. A, PEAL, Captain of Police, Washington Terminal CO0 Lt, MICHAEL Jo MAHANEY, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D, C, A, R, SCHLEGEL, Car Foreman, PRR, Baltimore, Maryland PAUL F, MC ARDLE, Asst, Solicitor, PRR, ‘Washington, D, C. :20: WFO 98=S23 At this Hearing, the Pennsylvania Railroad train crew testified to substantially the same information as that which was furnished to the Senate Committee, This train crew consisted of: HARRY WILLIAM BRGWER, Engineer JOHN WILLIAM MOYER, Fireman THOMAS JOSEPH MURPHEY, Conductor FRED ELMER KING, Front Brakeman JOHN He MENG, Rear Brakemano ~ ”‘ HARRY So BALL, Assistant Train Director at C Tower, testified he first noticed the train approaching Washington at an excessive rate of speed due to the roar it made in passing the C Towero He immediately notified the K Tower of the train approaching at an excessive speed and said to give the train a clear track. JOHN W, FEENEY, Track Director, K Tower, advised that after being notified by BALL.of the train approaching he could do nothing to prevent the crash except notify the personnel in the trainmaster's office so that they could fleeo - JOHN HENRY SMITH, Foreman of Car Inspectors, Washington Terminal Company, told of finding the anglecock on the rear of the #3 car in a partially closed cone dition and observing this anglecock until its removal from the ear, WESLEY B, MORRISON, 111 First Street, N, E,, Washington, 9, C09 advised that he was a passenger on the train and was familiar with the operation of this train and .=2]_= WFO 98»S23 realized it was approaching Washington at an excessive speed, He was in the third car from the engine and,upon being thrown from one side of the car to the other, realized the train was in trouble and operated the conductor's valve on that car and got no reaction, ANDREW R, SCHLEGEL, Car Foreman, Pennsylvania Railroad, Baltimore, Maryland, told of finding H the anglecock, which was torn from the rear of car #1, in the debris at the base of that car, He said that when found this anglecock was in a completely-closed condition. K T, \ WOODROW MARK SMITH, Gang Foreman, Washington Terminal Company, told of removing the anglecock from the rear of the #3 car. He said that he did not believe that the handle of the anglecock was moved prior to the time it was first observed on the rear of the #3 car, He was shown a photograph taken of the anglecook after its removal from the car and said that the handle was locked approximately where it was while the anglecock was on the car, EUGENE M, GILLIS, Pullman employee, 811 Shirley Street, winter, Massachusetts, told of the train stopping after leaving Providence, Rhode Island, because of trouble with the brakes sticking. The following Pullman employees were also called as witnesses at this Hearing but did not testify individually: SR) Lo TO 00 Co F0 Jo R0 HO 9 C0 A0 R, E, SAMPSON LAUGHLIN BROWN Ho JOHNSON HUGHES D, FAIR MARRITT E. PERSON Lo BREWER STATON RUSSELL Ac COLBERT L. HOLMES - 32 - WFO 98~S23 These men were asked as a group by Chairman KERL if there were any persons of national or inter= national importance as passengers on the train; also whether there was anything unusual by way of suspicious people on the train or anyone who might have acted suspiciously to themo They all replied negativelyo y Mr. CARLTON STEWART, Vice President, Westinghouse Air Brake Company, was asked by Chairman KERL to express his opinion. STEWART advised that he had observed tests which were conducted on the braking system of the train after the crash and that his observation was that the engineer was successful in applying the brakes on the locomotive and the first three cars. He further observed that the anglecock between cars 3 and h at the time of the wreck was closed and at the time it was observed it was open and therefore there was some movement of that handleo He claimed that a movement of five degrees is the difference between getting brake applia cation and no application and therefore he thinks it is difficult for anyone to observe a difference of five degrees in looking at the handle and the handle must have been moved - somewhat from the time of the crash until its removalo He further observed that in regard to the anglecock on the first car being closed when it was lying in a pit where it was found is academic because the engineer was able to apply the brakes on at least the first three carso He said that tests, which were conducted by the Westinghouse Companyg indicated that there was braking on the engine and the first three cars of the traino Mro STANLEY WEBB, Superintendent of Motor Power, Pennsylvania Railroad, commented that in regard to the anglecock from the first car there were no marks on the handle or on the thumb locks to indicate that something had struck ito He said he was at a loss to understand how it could be closed by any impact or any combination of stresses that there wouldn*t be something to reflect that on the handleo Mro STEWART replied that he couldn't answer Mro WEBBVS inquiry and that he would try harder to answer it if itwerenﬁt for the fact that it didn't make much difference in the appliance of the brakes. _ 23 - WFO 98~523 3° Interstate Commerce Commission Hearing The Interstate Commerce Commission conducted a Hearing on the crash on January 26=29, 19530 This Hearing was before Comissioner WILLIAM Jo PATTERSON and was held in the ICC Building, Washington, D” Go During this Hearing train crew members and car inspectors from the New Haven Railroad who operated anﬁ inspected the train from Boston to New York and similar Penna sylvania Railroad employees who operated the train from New York to Washington testified at this Hearing, also certain employees of the Washington Terminal Company who examined and removed the wrecked train from the terminal testifiedo Principal witneesee at the ICC Hearing were Ho R0 LGNGHURST9 Safety Inspector of the ICC, and Mro Go Do STEWART, Vice President, Westinghouse Air Brake Companyo All of the persons who testified at the ICL Hearing were interviewed by Bureau Agents and the information which they furnished has been reportedg These witnesses all furnished substantially the same information which was furnished Agents on previous and subsequent interviewee “gun, 1% 987523 V asgr III. OPERATION OF THE BRAKING SYSTEM ON A PASSENGER TRAIN i JAMES B. SHAW, Assistant Train Master, Maryland Division _ of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who resides at 112 W; 29th Street, Wilmingw ton; Delaware, explained the braking system on the Pennsylvania Railroad trains as follows: - = The motion of a moving train is retarded or stopped by the pressure of metallic shoes forced against the wheels of the trains The power for forcing the brake shoes against the wheels is imparted through compressed air expanding into a cylinder forcing a piston outward, moving levers and rods which are connected to the brake shoeso The source of compressed air is from the atmosphere through an air compressor located on a locomotiveo The air is temporarily stored in main reservoirs on the locomotive at some pressure higher than that used in the braking sysm temo The standard main reservoir pressure on the Pennsylvania'Railroad electric locomotive is 130 to lhO pounds per square incho From the main reservoir the air is reduced in pressure through a feed valve to the amount desired in the brake system, the standard for which on the Penn» sylvania Railroad passenger trains in 110 pounds per square incha From the feed valve the air flows through'the automatic feed valve on the locomotive into a brake pipeo The brake pipe runs the entire length of the locomotive and of each car and has located on each end an angle cock or brake pipe and cock, to which is attached a flexible hose with suitable couplings so that the brake pipe may be joined together between the locomotive and the several cars of a traino The anglecock or brake pipe and cook on the front end of the locomotive and the rear end of the last car are nonually closed so that brake pipe pressure can not escape to the atmosphere. All of the other anglecocks or brake pipe and cocks on the train are normally open to permit the flow of brake pipe pressure to each car in the traino On each car tere are several branches connected to the main brake pipe, one of vdﬁoh is connected to a car valve designated as a triple or control valveo There are several types of control valves in common use and their functions are similar to each other; namely, the Uni» versal Control (U0) and the D—22° The consist of Fennsyivania Train #173 on the date of January 15, 1953 included seven of the UC type control valves and nine of the D-22 typea ~ 25 WFO 98~523 The other branch pipes on a car are connected to con- duptor's valves or back~up valves for the purpose of applying the brass from the train when necessaryo Of the several branch pipes, the one connected to the triple or control valve has a cutout cock in it for the purpose of cutting out the brake system on an individual car without in« terfering with the passage of brake pipe air to the balance of the traino With the automatic brake valve on the lodmptive in a charging positions air is free to flow into the brake pipe throughout the several car valves to the brake reservoir on the cars and charges them to the same pressure as carried in that car» To apply the brakes it is necessary to reduce brake pipe pressure at a service or an emergency rate. ‘When brake pipe pres» sure is reduced at a service rate, a differential of pressure is created _across a piston in the control valve causing the piston to move to appli- cation positiono with the control valve in application position, com» munication between the brake cylinder and the atmosphere is cut off and communication between the car reservoirs and brake cylinders is estabw lished. The amount of brake pipe reduction governs the amount of brake cylinder pressure developed up to a full service brake pipe reductiono The ratio of volume between the car reservoirs and the brake cylinder with nominal piston travel is such that about two and a half times the amount of brass pipe reduction is produced as brake cyl- inder pressnre except on light weight.cars having differential relay valves where the brake cylinder pressure is a decimal portion thereofo Each passenger car has a safety valve which limits brake cylinder pressure to the annunt obtained_by'twehty~four~pound service brake pipe reduction from 110 poundso This safety valve is cut off durw ing an emergency application. With the system charged, the loss of brake pipe pressure at a service or emergency rate from any cause will cause the brakes to applyo After the brakes have been applied; it is necessary to restore brake pipe pressure in order to release the brakeso At the car valves the brake pipe pressure being that left in the car reservoirs will cause the piston in the control valve’to move to release‘positiono with the control valve in release position, brake cylinder pressure is allowed to escape to the atmosphere through an exhaust pipe in his valve and brake pipe pressure is free to flow to the reservoirs thereby recharging them to brake pipe'pressﬁreo' 26 WFO 98-523 Brake pipe leakage is measured in pounds per minute, the maximum permissible amount on the Pennsylvania Railroad being five pounds. In testing the rear thirteen cars of Train #173, January 15, 1953, and adding three cars similar to those wrecked, it was established that the_brake pipe leakage was one pound per minute. The air leaking from the brake pipe at the rate of one pound per minute with an anglecock completely closed would not necessarily cause the brakes to apply behind the closed angle cock as the reservoir air could feed backward into the brake pipe under this slow rate of reduction. ‘ Each passenger car is equipped with a water raising system which is operated pneumatically. The air for operation is taken D“ from the brake pipe through a governor valve stored in the car reservoir which is operated from the car brake reservoirs. Ihen through a reducing valve the air flows to the water reservoir ‘where its pressure forces the water up into the care The governor is so arranged that it will not open until at least sixty pounds brake pipe pressure exists, after which it will remain open until the water raising system's air reservoir is charged to brake pipe pressure. A check valve prevents reversal flow of the air back into the brake pipe, The air for operating the pneumatic door system is also taken from the brake pipe and this supply is protected from back flow into the brake pipe. V o SHAW stated it is his opinion that this accident ‘ was caused by the angleoock being closed behind the third car and the rate of leakage behind the closed anglecock was insufficient to cause the brakes to apply on the rear thirteen care, He did not pretend to know how ﬂie angleoock was closed, although it is possible that it was closed by some persona Mr. SHAW stated he does not feel that a person contemplating sabotage would feel that he could accomplish his purpose by closing an anglecocko Mr, SHAW advised, however, that he never personalw ly found or noticed an anglecock in the partially closed position, but it ‘was his opinion that there are cases where anglecocks are in the partly closed positions = Mro SHAW further explained the purpose of the control valve as follows; these valves have three functions: 27 WFO 98-523 1. To provide communication between the brake pipe and car brake reservoir when brake pipe pressure is higher than the car reservoir pressure, This is known as the charging feature. 2, After the syiem is charged, the control valve operates in response to a reduction in brake pipe pressure at either a service or emergency rate to connect the reservoir with the brake cylinder, thereby applying the brakes. 3. After the brakes have applied, the control valve operates in response to a restoration of brake pipe pressure to permit brake cylinder pressure to escape to the atmosphere, thereby releasing the brakes, SHKW advised that the DC valve has a feature known as a protection valve, which operates when the brake pipe pressure is reduced to thirtyefive pounds PSI, when the pressure is reduced to thirtyhfive pounds, this protection valve vents the brake pipe pressure to the at— mosphere at emergency rate. SHKW'revealed that the newer type valve, known as the D~Q2 valve, does not have this feature, SHAW also advised that due to the friction inherent in the UC valve, it is slower to. operate than the newer D—22 valve. In tests required by the Pennsylvania Railroad, the railroad requires that the D—22 valve must apply the brakes before a reduction of five pounds is reached in the brake pipe pressure; however, when the UC valve is tested, the brakes must apply before a ten» pound reduction is reached, Mr, SHAW also was questioned as to whether the water supply would be low on the rear cars of Train #173, had there been no air supply to these cars, SHAW explained that if the mmter air storage reservoir had been charged in Boston with 110 pounds of air, it would operate until the air pressure was reduced to twenty pounds, and in his opinion, this_ could not happen on the short trip from Boston to Washington. SHKW advised he arrived in Washington, D, Cog at 12315 pom, on January.l5, 1953, and he immediately inspected cars two and three. He noted the condition of the brakesshoes, and he recalled the brakes used showed signs of being overheated, Their faces were brick red and showed , signs of having been in a molten state. SHAW inspected the rear truck of car one, and it showed the same condition. SHAW did not inspect the locomotive at all, SHAW then related he participated in various tests of the thirteen rear cars of Train #173, SHKW.was asked if he thoughtit 28 WFO 98-523 possible for the anglecock of the third car to be closed accidentially by pressure from some part of the train itself. SHAW stated this could be possible and explained that car three was equipped with tight lock couplers but that car four was not. SI’-LAW advised the two cars being joined by different type couplers would cause a variance in swivel difference, and thereby more play would result in a connection of this kind than had both cars been connected with the same type couplerso He advised, however, that he was of the opinion that for this to happen, the anglecock would almost certainly have had to have been left in an on, but not locked, positiom use 8-’—‘ 2 JRH: 33 r" 3 IV. INVESTIGATlON¥-BOSTON TO NEW HAVEN A. Train Crew__ 10 Mr. William Henry Matte, Locomotive Engineer WILLIAM HENRY MATTA advised he has had railroad experience since 1918 with ﬁe New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroado Mro MATTA stated he_reported to the Dover Street Engine House at 10:15 pom. in Boston, Massachusetts, on the night of January la, l953 where he was assigned two diesel engines. These engines were coupled together, each facing opposite directions, and MATTA said he took them to South Station in Boston where he coupled on to thirteen carso He said these thirteen cars were made up of three coaches, a combine car, and the remainder or rear portion of the train were pullman carsa Mr. MATTA related that "hen the engine was tagged on to the cars it had 110 pounds air pressure on the engine air pressure gaugeso He said immediately after tagging on he had charged the thirteen cars with air until they, too, had a pressure of llO poundso Prior to leaving Uouth Station Mr. NATTA advised he made a brake test which consisted of "pulling down" fifteen founds of air, waiting for one minute to determine the amount of brake pipe leakage and making certain that the brake pipe leakage did not exceed seven pounds per minuteo He stated any leakage above seven pounds might cause the brakes to set and make the train have a rough stopc He informed this brake test was satisfactaryo ’ In this connection he stated inspectors make exami- nations to see that the brakes are set (which means that the brake shoes are against the wheels of the train) and that the inspectors make other examinations including a physical examination of the anglecockso He stated that after the inspectors complete their examinations they signal him in accordance with the results of their examinationo He said at the South Station he received a signal of four whistles which meant it was all right for the train to move onto Upon leaving South Station enroute to the first stop at the Back Bay Station, Mr. MATTA said he did not make a running brake test inasmuch as the Back Bay Station is only approximately one _ 30, we 98-523 mile from South Station. .Mr. MATTA said he left Boston at 11500 p.m. " January lh, 1953 and was on time; Upon approaching Back Bay he was run- ning at a speed of about fifteen miles per hour where he made a service application of the brakes, "drawing off" about seven or eight pounds of air which caused the train to make a smooth stop, He said when he makes a service application of the brakes if they are functioning properly’ a he gets a good exhaust as distinguished from a short exhaust. He related that an experienced engineer can detect a short exhaust and should know whether the brakes on all cars are operating properly. He stated also that the engineer would rely on a reduction of speed to coincide with the 1 reduction of air to determine_whether the brakes are.operating properly, For example, he said a twentyefive pound reduction of air should cause a certain reduction of speed which, to_an experienced engineer, would either be normal or indicate that something is wrong. He said the stop in»Back, 5 , Bay was normal. ’ = - v . Mr. MATTA reported after leaving Back Bay Station in Boston the first time he used his brake was in the proximity of Boston ﬁwitch where he reduced his speed from seventy to fifty miles per hour, and subsequently from fifty to thirty miles per hour. He said prior to reaching Providence, the point of his next scheduled stop, he had again attained a speed of seventy miles per hour, and he first reduced his speed to fifty miles per hour, and about two miles prior to entering Providence had reduced his speed to about thirty miles per hour. At thatlpoint he said he drew down about ten or twelve pounds of air and made a satisfactory stop”in Providence. He advised he left Providence at 12:05 a.m. on January 15, 1953 and was on time, He said his next scheduled stop was New Haven; however, he said his next actual stop was in the vicinity of Kingston, Rhode Island, which is twenty—six miles from Providence.’ He said.he had experienced no trouble whatsoever with his brakes prior to reaching Kings- ton area, and as he approached Kingston, he received a twoswhistle signal and noted he was traveling about seventy miles per hour. He said this two—whistle signal was a stop signal coming from the rear of the train, He advised he made a service application of the brakes with a twenty-five pound reduction, and it took a little better" than a mile to stop the train from the seventy mile per hour speed. Mr. MATTA said the train should have stopped in half that distance under ordinary circumstances, In describing the twentyafive pound reduction, he advised that when he first got the two whistles he made a reduction of nine pounds and there was no retarding of speed. He said he then pulled down five more pounds with no reduction of speed, and he then pulled 31 WFO 98-523 down up to twenty~five pounds. He said there was a short exhaust which in this instance meant to him thatnot over half the cars had proper brakeso Mr. MATTA said he had no knowledge of any dragging brakes up to this point, and shortly before he received the two blasts of the whistle he had looked back when the train was going around a curve and had seen no sparks or any evidence of dragging brakeso He said when the train was stopped, he sat in the engine for from two to four minutes, after which he left the engine on the fireman's sides He said he re- ceived four whistles as he got off the engine, and these four whistles were a signal for him to apply the brakeso He stated he got back on to the engine and made a twenty—five pound reduction'in order to satisfy tests that were being made on the rear of the traino He said.he recdwed four more blasts of the whistle and released the brakes, after which he again received four blasts, and he applied a twenty-five pound reduce tion. After an interval of a few minutes he received four more blasts and released the brakes. He said he looked back and saw a lantern and someone making a hand motion, at which time he againvmade a twenty-i'ive pound reduction, after which he received four whistles and again re— leased the brakes. He said after receiving one other set of signals to apply and release the brakes, and having complied with these signals, he asked the firemen to go back and "see what goes on"o Subsequently, the firemen returned and told MATTA he had better check the brakeso HATTA stated he left the engine on the fireman‘s side, which is the left side of the train, and started an examination of the brakes. He said he noticed the brakes were released on the three head cars but were applied on the fourth care This caused him to decide that something was wrong between the third and fourth cars for the reason that there was no air going through from the third car to the fourth car to cause the brakes on the fourth-car to be released. he said he checked the anglecook on the front end of the fourﬁzcar and found it to be in an open position. He said he then went around to the right side of the train to inspect the anglecock on the rear end wf the third car, at which time he found it in a completely closed positiono He said in order to open this englecock at the rear of the third car he had to depress the triggers raise the handle and turn it to an open positionc In this position he said the handle is parallel to the air hoses, Immediately upon opening this anglecock Mro MATTE said he could hear the air rushing through the air hoses from car three to car four and almost simultaneously the brakes were set on car threeo 32 WFO 98-S23 He said this, of course, was due to the reduction of brake pipe pressure in car three when the air left that area and went back to car four and the rear carso Mro MATTA stated he returned to the engine shortly there~ after and received a signal of four whistleso He said he applied the brakes and gained the impression that he had a good exhausto He said he released the brakes after receiviny four more whistleso After starting the train he said he made a running test at thirty miles per hour with a fifteen-pound reduction and received a good response which to him meant that the brakes were working on all carsa He then made another five—pound reduction, after which he built up his pressure and proceeded toward New Haven with the traino According to Mro MATTA, he made twelve or more slowadowns between there and New'Haven, and the brakes were good on all these slowwdownso He said he experienced no additional difficulties of any descriytion with the brakes on this tram.’ According to Mro MATTA, upon arriving in New Haven,the train was fortywfive minutes late. He said the car inspectors out the engine off from the train, and he took the engine to the engine houseo He said he finished his duties at the engine house and caught Train #186 back to Bostono ﬁre MATTA Said he did not discuss the brake trouble which he had at Kingston, Rhode Island, with anyone in New Haven and that during his trip from Boston to New Haven and return he did not discuss the brake trouble with the conductor of the train or any of the crew other than the fireman inasmﬁch as none of them came forward to the engine cab at the timeo He said he was con» vinced the openingcﬁ the anglecock at the rear of car three by him near Kingston, Rhode Island, had corected the brake trouble, and he wassatism fied when he arrived at.Hew'Haven that the brakes on his Federal Express were working properlyo urn MATTA said he had never heard of a similar inciw dent previously and at no time had an anglecock closed on he train he was operating insofar as he knewo He said he had never heard of an anglecock changing its position as a result of jarring or vibration on a train, and it was his recollection that the anglecock at the rear of car three worked with such stiffness that vibrations could not close it or open ito 2. Mr. Charles Jay Wells, Fireman CHAREES JAY'WELLS advised he has more than eleven years service as a fireman and was so assigned on the Federal Express leaving Boston on the night of January lh, 19530 33 » z "9 r WFO 98-523 " 77 1 « ‘- J. . ‘ CHARLES WELLS advised he arrived at the Dover Street Yard of the New Haven Railroad in Boston at about 10:15 p.m. on January lh, 1953. He said he and Engineer MATTA checked the two units of the engine assigned to them, and finding nothing wrong, ran them over to the South Station where they coupled on to Hie Federal Express at about lO:h5 pgm. He recalled that the usual brakeiests were made at South Station, and everything was in proper ordero He related the trip from Boston to Providence, Rhode Island, was without incident, and they arrived at Providence between 11:50-and 11:55 p.m. He said that while in ?rovidence he observed nothing unusual except that the station platform seemed to be deserted, and he did not recall seeing any car in- spector on either side of the train.nhile he was«n.the platform inspect— ing the engineo He said after leaving Providence and reaching a point about ten miles South of Providence he looked back at all cars while mak- ing a curve, and he noticed nothing unusual. He said a similar check was made by him about three miles farther on. WELLS said that sometime after passing Kingston Station he and MATTA received a two-whistle signal to stop, and the train was brought to a stop somewhere south of Kingston. He said after MATTA had applied the brakes and released them several times in accordance with signals received, MATTA asked him to go back and see what was wrongs He advised he walked clear to the end of the rear car where he found=6onductor WARD, who told him the brakes had been sticking on the rear car. ‘He said he examined the rear car and-found the brakes to be in anapplied position and noticed the brake'shoes were smoking. WELLS said he then bled the brakes off the last car by opening the bleeder valve on he control valve, after which the brakes immediately released. WELLS said he then returned to the engine and told MATTA what he had done, an that MATTA had attempted to start the train but was unable to do so because the brakes were locked. He said he and EATTA then got down on the fireman‘s side of the engine and started back‘ checking all ‘the cars together. He said they found the brakes on the first three cars to be released, but on the fourth car the brakes were set tight. He stated that MATTA then told him to go on back and check‘ everything to the rear of the fourth car while he-examined the other side of cars three and four. WELLS said he then went on toward the rear where he again met Conductor WARD and told him the brakes were applied” on all cars except first three._ He said while talking to WARD, the brakes on the whole train went into emergency brakes, and he believed this was ,u T 31: t WFO 98-5 23 when MATTA opened the closed.anglecock° He said a few minutes later one test was made while he was still at the res of the train, and it was found that the brakes operated properlyo WELLS said ﬁrat inasmuch as he had to return to Boston on Train #186 shortly after reaching New Haven, he did not discuss his brake trouble with any railroad officials or per- sonnel in New Haven. WELLS was questioned concerning the closing of an anglecock as a means of amempting to wreck a train, at which time he stated this was not a good way to cause a WT8Cko he said in closing an anglecock this would cause a gradual leakage of air pressure in the cars behind the closed valve to such a point where the brakes would set gradually in these various cars and cause the brakes to drags He said this would be readily noticeable to the engineer operating the train, and it would actually stop the traino 3. Mr. Ralph Eugene Ward, Conductor RALPH EUGENE WAET advised he was the conductor on the Federal Express from Boston, hassachusetts to New York City on January lh»l5, 19539 He said he_reported for duty at the station in Boston at about 10:30 p.m. on January lh, 1953. Upon arriving there he advised the thirteen cars of the Federal Exgress were already on the track, and the engine was in the vicinity but had not actually been connected» Shortly thereafter, WEED said he watched the inspectors connect the double~unit diesel to the cars, after which he started toward the rear of the traino He said as he was along side car three of this train he noticed the brakes being applied on this care He said he was unable to state as to whether they'were agplied to any other cars at this time inw asmuch as he was not in a position to observe. He said, however, he was later advised by car inspector BROWN that the thirteen cars were all rights He said he presumed from BROWN'S statement that BROWN had checked the brakes on the entire train of thirteen carso WARD said that after receiving ap~ propriate signals he in turn signaled the engineer to start the trip at the regularly scheduled time of ll:OO p.m. WARD stated the trip from.Boston to Providence was normal in all respects, and.the brakes had been applied on several occa— sions during this portion of the trip. Upon reaching Providence where the train remained for approximately fifteen minutes WARD said he got off the ninth car from the station and went forward toward the engine on the 35 WFO 98-S23 engineer's side of the train, He said upon passing the position where the third and fourth cars were connected, he observed the ticket man standing there, and it was his opinion that this man was in a position to see if anyone was tampering with the anglecocks between the third and fourth cars, He said this ticket man had left his position between the third and fourth cars and had gone into the station; however, he stated the baggage man, whose car connected with the third car, main- tained his position approximately near the connection between the third and fourth cars. WARD stated the train left Providence at 12:05 acme, at which time he was up toward the front of the train, having given the signal to start from the second car. He said he walked back toward th rear of the train to prepare his reports, and as he reached the second car from the rear, he was advised by the brakeman, HOWARD HEINTZ, that sparks were flying from the two rear cars. WARD said he looked out at this time and observed sparks flying from the rear two cars and signaled the engineer to stop, He said the stop was made about twenty—six miles from hrovidenoe in a place known as Kingston Swamp and pointed out that Kingston is approximately 160 miles from Boston. “ WARD said the train had been in operation for twenty~seven minutes since leaving Providence when this stop in Kingston Swamp was made, WEED advised he sent the flagman back behind the train for the purpose of flagging any approaching trains, and he, WARD, examined the brakes to determine what the trouble was. He stated the brakes were red hot on the rear two cars and had turned to a cherry red. He related in an effort to release the brakes the main reservoirs on both rear cars were bled and the brakes released.thehselveso He stated he then returned to the train and signaled the engineer with four whistles to start. After learning the engineer was unable to start the train, WARD said he then got off and started forward on the fireman‘s side to the seventh car where he met the firemen who advised him the brakes were stuck on all but the first three cars of the train, ﬂARD said he had examined ﬁle angle» cocks on all the cars up to that point, He pointed out, however, he had examined only those on the fireman’s side and could not see those on the right hand side of the train. He said while stopped in Kingston Swamp there were several applicationsand releases of the brdses in an effort to determine just what was Wrong with them, He said after some delay he observed that the brakes were releasing properly, and he thereafter gave the engineer the signal to proceed to New Haveno Upon reaching New Haven WARD stated he made a report of the fact that the reason for the late arrival was due to the brakes 36 WFO 98~523 sticking on the last cars. He said he made no mention of trouble with any anglecocks inasmuch as he was not aware that the engineer had turned an anglecock until a later date. He said he reported to the head.car knocker (PENNEAKER) the fact that the brakes on the last cars were stickw ingo ‘YARD said that at New Haven three pullman cars were added to the rear of the train and a new engine was also added, He said PENNEPAKER had told him he would inspect the brakes on the last cars as the train left New Haven to see if they were all right. The train left New Haven enroute to New York, and everything was normal for the balance of the trip to New York, according to WARD¢ WARD said he did not notice any unusual activity at any of the stations he passed through, and he had no suspicions re~ garding anyone tampering with the train. He said his first knowledge of any angleccck trouble on this train did not come to his attention until the accident occurred in Washington, Dc C. He said after this accident he had read that there was an anglecock closure near Kingston. WARD stated this was his first experience with brakes sticking due to a closed anglecocko He said the only way in his opinion that an anglecock could become closed would be by someone closing it. \ ho Mro'William E0 King, Baggage Master WILLIE E. KING advised he was baggage master on Train #173 from Boston to New York, He stated he has been employed by the New Haven Railroad for thirty—six years, KING said he recalled the train.had made a nonnal stop in Providence, Rhode Island. He said he was doing his work in the baggage room while the train was in Providence and found nothing unusual occurring at this point. He said before the train left Providence he was standing in the rear vestibule of the third head car, it being noted that the baggage car was the fourth head car, He in» formed he stood in this vestibule between the third and fourth cars until the train left, and he saw no one around the rear of the third car tamper» ing with same or otherwise. He said when the train pulled out of Providence he immediately went to his baggage car and everything was normal until the train stopped beyond Kingston, Rhode Island, He said this stop was a nonnal emergency stop insofar as he could tello He informed there was no thrashing of cars or jamming of cars indicating other than a nonnal emergency stop, He advised it felt to him as though the engineer had 37 WFO 98~S23 complete control of the train, KING stated he walked through the train to he engine and asked the engineer what the matter was and was advised the engineer had received two whistles, which is the signal to stop the ‘train when it is in motion. He said the engineer asked him to go back and find out what the matter was and that he walked through the train to the rear where he met Conductor WARD, who informed him the brakes had been sticking on the last two cars, ~ KING said WARD had told him he had signaled the engineer to start the train but the engineer could not move the train, KING said after a few minutes delay everything was all right and the train continued enroute to New'Haven, He said everything on this trip from Boston to New Haven was normal with the exception of the above mentioned emergency stop, He stated he did not learn of any anglecock difficulty until he heard about it at a railroad meeting on January 17, 1953 in New York City, I 5. Mr, Timothy‘W; Costello, Passenger Conductor TIMOTHY W} COSTELLO advised he is rated as a passen~ ger conductor; however, on Train #173 leaving Boston at ll:OO p.m, on Janum ary lh, 1953 he was working as a ticket collector, He said he acted as such to Providence, Rhode Island, where he got off this train, ‘ COSTELLO advised that everything was perfectly normal in the operation of Train #l73 from Boston to Providence. He stated the brakes were applied on numerous occasions, and he noticed nothing unsual in the application of the brakes, COSTELLO'recalled that in Providence, Rhode Island, a car inspection crew walked both sides of the train, during which time they would have inspected the brakes, He said he got off the train at Providence and nturned to Boston the follow» ing morning on a local run, According to cosr‘ELLo, it is his opinion that an anglecock on a train could not be jarred to a closed position by vibration, He said he knew of no similar incident wherein an anglecock was improperly closed, ' 6. Mr. Howard B. Heintz, Flagman HOWARD R. HEINTZ advised he was flagman on Train #173 which left Boston, Massachusetts at 11:00 pom, on January lu, 1953s He saﬂd 38 WFO;98—S23 he completed his run on this train at Pennsylvania Station in New York City where Train #173 arrived around h:25 or h:3O aomo HEINTZ said upon leaving Boston, Massachusetts, car inspectors had signaled that the brakes were okay and that all slows downs and stoppages of this train had been perfectly normal until they had left Providence, Rhode Island. He said when they were about twentya seven miles out of Providence and just after passing Kingston Station, he glanced out along the train from the rear platform and noticed sparks flying from the wheels of the two rear cars, He stated he notiu fied the conductor who immediately signaled for the train to be stopped, HEINTZ related he got off the train and noticed the brake shoes on the rear car were red hot, He said he then took a position far to the rear of the train in connection with his duties as flagmana He stated he was called in on one occasion, but the train would not start, so he returned to his position as flagman in the rear of ﬂue train and was eventually recalled to the train, after which they continued their trip to New Haven. HEINIZ informed that he did not learn of any anglecock difficulty until he was so informed at a meeting of railroad officials on January 17, 1953, B0 Yard Wbrkers (Dover Street Railroad Yard~~Boston) lo Mr. Harold Sc Goodwin, Coupler HAROLD S. GOODWIN, who resides at 10 Off Station Street, East'Weymouth, Massachusetts, advised that on January lh, 1953 he and JOSEPH RYAN coupled Train #173 at the Dover Street Yard. He said‘ this train was composed of nine sleepers, one combine and three coacheso He stated he and RYAN had begun coupling these cars about 6:00 pom. and finished this operation at approximately 7:30 pom. He said the coupling operation consists of coupling the steam lines which are engaged by striking a pin with a hammer and connecting them and the air lines and signal lines. He pointed out that the latter two lines are readily con- nected by hand. He said after coupling ﬁle air and signal lines, he then opens the anglecock and signal cock on each car, He said each car has one anglecock and one signal cock on each end, therefore making a tbtal of two anglecocks and two signal cocks for each car, According to GOOEWIE5 he and RYAN properly coupled and adjusted all air lines, signal lines, anglecocks and signal cocks 39 ‘NFC 98-5 23 connecting the various cars of this train, He explained that his phase of this work is further checked by the airbrake inspectors and the car inspectors in both the Dover Street Yard and the South Station where the train is taken prior to its departure. GOODWIN stated in his experience he has never seen a railroad car or a train move with an anglecock in an improper position, He said it was his opinion that an anglecock could not be accidently moved through any motion or vibration of a trains 2, Mr. Joseph Lawrence Ryan, Coupler JOSEPH LAWRENCE RYAN, who-resides at 62 Horadan Way, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised that he had engaged in the coupling of various cars on Train #173 with HAROLD GOODWIN on theevening of Janu— ary lh, 19530 RYAN recalled there were from ten to thirteen cars to be coupled on Train #173 and that he and GOODWIN coupled ﬂue steamline and the air and signal lines between these cars. According to RYAN, he_also opened the anglecocks and signal cocks on several cars on this train. He said he was positive that all anglecocks and signal cocks were properly opened. RYAN stated that in his experience he knew of no incident where an anglecock was im» properly turned, and in his opinion this mechanism could not have its position accidentally changed through vibration or jarring motions on a train, are 3,” Mr, Edward Gray, Carpenter EDWARD GRAY advised that he resides at 50 Pontiac Street, Roxburyg Massachusetts, and is employed by the New Haven.Rail— road on the h:OO pom, to midnight shift, He said his duties as carpenter necessitate his passing through the trains after they come in to make necessary repairs, He said on January‘lh, 1953 he went through the Federal Express and noticed nothing unusualo He advised he knows nothing concerning the operation or the position of anglecocks and has heard of no incident in which an anglecock has been tampered With, ' he Mr, Paul J. Glennon, Carpenter .PAUL J. GLENNON stated he resides at 28 Custer Street, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, and that his duties require him ‘ to work on the inside of the train only. He recalled that he inspected f. ho WFO 98~523 cars on the Federal Express on January lh, 1953 and noticed nothing unn usual, He said he could offer.no information relating to the anglecock, stating he does not understand the function of an anglecock. u u 5. Mr. Francis J. Gould, Electrician FRANCIS Jo GOULD informed he resides at 18 Myrtle Street, North Quincy, Massachusetts, and is employed at the Dover Street Railroad Yard, He said he worked January lh, 1953 but had no contact whatsoever with Train #1730 ‘ * 60 Mr, Charles J, Maggelet, Electrician CHARLES J; MAGGELET advised he resides at 158 Hancock Street, Quincy, Massachusetts, He said that on January lh, 1953 in connection with his duties he checked the specific gravity in the batteries of Train #173. He said he did not notice any unauthorized or suspicious persons in the vicinity ofthis train when he serviced it on that date. 7° Mr. Thomas E.-Pearson, Electrician THOMAS E. PEARSON informed he resides at lS Pray Street, Quincy, Massachusetts, He said he could not recall servicing any of the coach cars which made up the Federal Express on January lh, 1953, He also informed he could not recall seeing any unauthorized or suspicious persons in the area_ofﬁis train on that date, 8. Mr, James F, Sullivan, Electrician JAMES F, SULLIVAN'said he resides at 260 Forest Street, Winchester, Massachusetts, and he did not work on the Federal Express on the night of January lb, 1953, He added he has no informam tion concerning the circumstances surrounding the Wreck of this train in Washington, D. Co 90 Mr, Henry John Weich, Electrician ~ HENRY JOHN WEICH said he resides at lh Washburn Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts. He said he does not work in the same vicinity where Train #173 was assembled and therefore had no information concerning this train. hi WFO 98~523 10, Mr, James Patrick Kenny, Electrichn JAMES PATRICK KENNY stated he resides at 7 Grampian Way, Dorchester, Massachusetts, and he had.inspected the electrical equip~ ment on Train #173 on January lh, 1953, KENNY advised he did not observe anything'of an unusual nature with relation to this train and said he has no information of value pertaining thereto. 5110 Mr. Harold Barney Pope, Jro, Electrician HAROLD BARNEY POPE, JR., who resides at 17 Hendry Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, stated in the course of his duties as an electrician on Januany lh, 1953 he did not observe anything of an unusual nature regarding Train #173, 12, Mr, John A. MacRae, Pipefitter JOHN A. MacRAE advised he resides at l0h§'River Street, Hyde Park, Massachusetts, and he could not recall having been in the vicinity of Train #173, although he did work on January lb, 19530 He said he did not notice anything of an unusual nature in the Dover Railroad Yard on that date. ‘ 13, fr, Melville A, Thompson, Yard Conductor MELVILLE A, THOMPSON, who resides on Lakeside Drive in Littleton, Nassachusetts, advised he was the yard conductor on the switch engine which moved Train #173 from the Dover Street Yards to the South Station on the night of January 11;, 1953.. He said the switch engine picked up Train #173 at approximately 9:30 pom, He rev called he had assisted in attaching the air hose running from the engine to the first car of the train, at which time he personally recalled opening and locking the anglecocko Following this, he said he walked down the fireman‘s side of the train checking each anglecock as to its position, while JOHN HAYNES, who was working with him, attended to similar duties in checking the anglecocks on the engineer's side, He said he also checked to make sure that the coupling between the cars was properly connected and made a visual check of other equipment be» tween the coaches to be certain this equipment was in working order, I On the basis of the above check THOMPSON said it appeared_everything on the fireman‘s side of the train was in order, h2 WFO 984523 After this inspection was made in the Dover Street Yard and.everything appeared to be in order, the yard engineer was given the appropriate signal to take the train to the South Station. THOMPSOh'said nothing unusual occurred in either the Dover Street Yard or during the transw fer of the train to South Station. THOMPSON said in his opinion it is not possible for an anglecock to be jarred from either an open to a closed position or from a closed to an open position while a train is in motion, He said, however, that while working he has occasionally observed anglecocks which are in improper positions, He said he felt this was due to over~sights on the part of employees in believing that an angle» cock had been placed in its proper position, when, in fact, such had not been done, THOMPSON stated he could not recall the number of in» stances in.which such had occurred,but he could only recall that it did happen occasionally, lho Mr, John Haynes, Yard Brakeman A JOHN HAYNES, who resides at 38 Turner Street, Waltham, Massachusetts, advised he is employed in the Dovertstreet Yards, He said on the night of January lh, 1953 he checked the anglecocks and other equipment between the cars on the Federal Express or Train #1730 He said in the course of this check made by him, and subsequently'while accompanying the train from the Dover Street Yards to the South Station, he observed nothing wrong nor did he observe anything of an unusual nature, HAXNES said, in his opinion, it is not possible for the position of an anglecock to be changed due to vibrations of the train once it is in a locked position. He advised he has on occasion observed anglecocks in a partially closed position and has occasionally seen them completely closed when they should have been opened, He said this did not happen very frequently, and he attributed this closure or partial closure either to over~sight or carlessness on the part of some employee, 15, Mr, W} T. Bogue, Car Cleaner W. T. BOGUE, who resides at 10 Cross Street, Natick, Massachusetts, advised that on the evening of January lh, 1953 he watered —the first three coaches and the first sleeper of the Federal Express, b3 WFO 98~S23 He advised he did not notice anything of an unusual nature and stated he had no information pertinent to this investigation, » 16, Mr, Kieran Hynes, Car Inspector ,,_ KIERAN'HYNES, who resides at 22 Verdun Street, Dorm chester, Massachusetts, informed he did not inspect any portion of the Federal Express on the evening of January 1h, 1953 inasnmeh as he was asm signed other duties at the time it was in the Dover Street Yards, HYNES said he was not of the opinion that jarring on a train could cause open» ing or closing of an aglecock. He said in his experience he has never found an anglecock in a partially closed position, 17, Mr, John E; Pothier, Car Inspector JOHN‘W. POTHIER, who resides at 26 Dwight Street, Boston, Massachusetts, advised he is employed at the Dover Street Yards during the evening hours, He said, however, he was not working in the Yard at the time the Federal Express left on January lb, 1953, 180 Mr, Wesley I, Brown, Car Cleaner WESLEY I. BROWN, who resides at 61 Glades Road, Minot, Massachusetts, advised January lb, 1953 was his day off, and he had no occasion to observe Train #173 at the Dover Street Yards. 19, Mrs, Margaret E, Collins, Car Cleaner MARGARET E. COLEINS, whose residence is 327 N. Harvard Street, Allston, Massachusetts, recalled she had worked on the Federal Express on the night of January 1n, 19530 She stated she knew of no unusual occurrences during that evening, ‘ 20, Mrs, Margaret K, Dawid, Car Cleaner MARGARET K. DAWID, who resides at b3 Rogers Street, South Boston, Massachusetts, stated her duties are limited to the clean- ing detail in the office of the Dover Street Railroad Yard, and she has no connection with cleaning of railroad cars, She said she has no in« formation of value regarding Train #i73, WFO 98-523 21, Mr. Francis Xavier Goode, Car Gleaner FRANCIS XAVIER GOODE, whose residence is 21 Robert- son Street, Quincy, Massachusetts, advised he serviced the Federal Ex» press on the evening of January lb, 1953, He said he has no information concerning the anglecock or any technical equipment on a railroad car and was unable to furnish any information of value to this investigation, 22, Mr, James J, Jordon, Car Cleaner ‘ JAMES J, JOBDON, who resides at Sh? E. hth Street, Douth Boston, Massachusetts, stated he did not work on the evening of January 1h, 1953 and had no information of value concerning Train #173, 23, Mrs, Gertrude Lenders, Car Cleaner GERTRUDE LANDERS, who resides at 292 Dudley Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised her work included the cleaning of the Federal Express on the evening'of January lh, 1953, She said she ob» served nothing of an unusual nature during that evening, 2h, Mrs. Mary L, Lipinski, Car Cleaner ‘ MARX L. LIPINSKI, who resides at 20 Bellflower Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, recalled helping clean the cars on the Federal Express on the evening of ﬁanuary lh, 1953, She related she has no in» formation of value and observed nothing suspicious or unusual in the vicinity of this train. 125, Mr, Emil Mamety, Car Gleaner EMEL MAMETY, who resides at 2h7 Boston Street in Dorchester, Massachusetts, recalled having helped clean the cars on the Federal Express on the evening of January lh, 1953, and stated he did not see or hear anyting of an unusual nature pertaining to this train, 26, Mrs, Gertrude Donahue, Car Cleaner GERTRUDE DONAHUE, who resides at 6 Arcadia Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, stated she helped clean Train #173 on the evening of January lh, 1953 but she had noticed nothing of an unusual natue duru ing the course of her duties on this train. b5 WFO 98~523 27, Mr, Francis Joseph Gruttner, Gar Cleaner FRANCIS JOSEPH GRUTTNER, who resides at 29 Mile wood Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, advised he helped clean Train #173 during the early evening of January lh, 19539 He informed he observed 'nothing of an unusual nature with reference to this train, 280 Mr, John Joseph Kilroy, Laborer JOHN JOSEPH KIIROY, whose residence is 3 Dartmouth Place, Boston, Massachusetts, advised he performed the duties of icing the pullman cars on Train 7173 on the evening of January lh, 1953, KILROY stated he did not observe anything of an unusual nature during the course of these duties, 29, Mrs, Barbara M, White, Car Cleaner BARBARA M. WHITE, a resident of hl Thomas Park, South Boston, Massachusetts, advised her duties on the evening of January lh, 1953 included cleaning ﬂue inside of the cars of Train #173, She stated she did not observe anything unusual in regard to this train on that evening, 36; Mrs, Mary Nevulis, Car Gleaner ’MARY NEVULIS, who resides at 73 Edwin Street, Dcrchester, Massachusetts, advised she was assigned duties cleaning Train #173 on January 1h, 1953, She informed she did not observe any» thing unusual during the course of her duties at that time, 31, Mr, Murray Go Foss, Electrician MURRAY G. FOSS advised he is ‘a resident at 8 'Walden Terrace, Concord, Massachusetts, He stated he is employed at the Dover Street Yard but his duties did not necessitate his working on Train #173 on January lh, 1953, He stated he observed nothing unw usual on that date in the Dover Street Yard, 32. Mr. John J, Sheehan, Gar Inspector i JOHN J. SHEEHAN, who resides at 29 Eastman Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, stated on the evening of January lh, 1953 he k6 WFO 98-523 hooked up the steam hose between the cars on the Federal Express prior to its departure from the Dover Street Yards. Mr, SHEEHAN said this work took place about an hour and a half prior to the departure of the train, In connection with his duties about the train, he said he noticed nothing unusual relating to the condition of the train or any of its parts. SHEEHAN stated he has not observed an anglecock being in other than its proper position and added he did not believe the jarring of a train on the roadbed could close or open an anglecock, 33, Boston Informant T-2 Boston Informant T~2, of unknown reliability, he has been employed by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad for eight years, advised that during this service he has observed angle~ cocks in a partially open condition. He stated this is not an-unusual occurrence in that from time to time he sees trains coming into Boston with some of the anglecocks partially closed, This informant advised he believed the finding of partially closed anglecocks,which has re- ceived a great deal of newspaper publicity'recently, is due to the wreck which occurred on January 15, 1953 in Washington, D, C, Further, in this connection, informant said he was of the opinion this wreck had caused a great deal of pressure among rail» road employees, and for this reason the recent reporting of partially closed anglecocks has been made public, He indicated that heretofore when an anglecock was found in a partially closed position, the angle- cock was merely opened, and no official report was made pertaining thereto, 3h, Boston Informant T«3 \ Boston Informant “T-=3, of unknown reliability, who has been employed by the New Haven Railroad for more than ten years and has technical knowledge-of anglecocks, advised he has observed on numerous occasions,while trains were being made up in Boston, anglecocks in a par- tially open or partially closed position, This informant stated he merely returned the anglecock handle to its proper position but was not aware of any procedure of reporting these incidents to railroad officials, He further advised that prior to the occurrence of the current series of inci~ dents involving partially closed anglecocks, it was not the practice of car inspectors at Boston to report such incidents to railroad officials, T=3 said that on such occasions the inspectors would merely return the anglecock to its proper position, LL? WFO 98~523 35. Mr. Frank Pistorino, Coupler and Car Inspector FRANK PISTORINO, who resides at Sh Gates Street, South Boston, Massachusetts, advised he has been employed by the New Haveh Railroad for approximately eleven years. He informed that during the course of his experience with the railroad he had on various ec~ casions observed cars which had come into the Dover Street Yards with the anglecock handle ;jost1ed out of a locked position. He stated he had never seen an anglecock which had been vibrated to a completely closed position, but he did believe that such closure would be possible. He pointed out that a blow of the steam hose chain which hangs loose under- neath the car could strike the handle of an anglecock and cause it to move from an open to a closed position. 0. Yard workers (South Station — Boston) 1. Mr. John Joseph Brown, Car Inspector JOHN JOSEPH BROWN, who resides at 17 Atherton Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised he was employed at the South Station from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on January lh, l9S3. He said at 9:30 p.m. he began the car inspection of Train #173, at Whidl time he inspected the left side, or fireman's side, of the train. He said his duties are to see that all brake beams, brake beam shoes, brake rods and anglecocks are in their proper positions. He informed he also examines the connection on the signal line to see that it is properly open. He stated all anglecocks are to be open with the exception of the anglecock at the rear end of the rear car which should be in a closed position to prevent the air from escaping into the atmosphere. Accordingvto BROWN, Train #173 was composed of thirteen cars, the first three being coaches, the fourth car being a combine car and the last nine being sleeping cars. He said this train was positioned on track sixteen in the South Station, after having been brought there by a switch engine from the Dover Street Yards. BROWN said at 9:30 p.m. when he started his inspection he used a carbide light, and by visual inspection found all anglecocks-between the cars on the fireman’s side to be properly open and in a locked position. He said he completed his inspection at 9:50 p.m. and observed nothing unusual during his inspection. BROWN said while conducting another phase of his in» spection on this train the road engine was coupled to the train. He said h8 WFO 98-523 after the engine was coupled, one of the inspectors called for a brake test. He said he was standing beside the seventh car at this time and “ checked all brakes from the seventh car to the head of the_traino Ac- cording to BROWN, all brakes applied and released properly. Again at 10:50 p.m° BROWN stated te engineer again applied brakes on the train, and the brakes on the fireman's side worked properly this time. He said he gave the engineer four blasts on the signal line which indicates to the engineer to release the brakes. According to BROWN, the brakes re- leased properlyo BROWN said the other car inspectors thereafter gave the engineer an okay that the brakes were functioning properly, and according to established prcedure, BROWN gave the brakeman on the train an okay pertaining to the brakes for the whole traino BROWN said he completed the final phase of his inspection at 10:55 p.m., and the train departed from Boston on schedule at 11:00 puma BROWN said he was unable to understand exactly what had happened to the buses on this train prior to its crashing into Union Station at Washington, Do Co He said he was positive the brakes were’ functioning properly wen the train left Boston on the evening of January y 1a, 1953 0 20 Mrs Paul Frederick Kelhy, Gar Inspector PAUL FREDERICK KELLY, who resides at 756 Broadway, South Boston, Massachusetts, advised he had assisted the aforementioned JOHN BROWN in ﬁle inspection of the Federal Express which left Boston at 11:00 p.m. on the night of January lb, 1953c He informed that a thorough inspection was made, and the braking system was found to be in good ordero He stated all anglecocks were in an open and locked position prior to Train #173 leaving the South Stationo According to KELLY, it is not unusual in connection with the inspection of brake systems on trains to find an anglecock in an unlocked position. KELLY said he believed this was due to carlessness or neglect on the part of railroad personnelo KELLY stated that during the aforementioned inspece tion of Train #173 he inspected the engineer's side of this traino He said that in the event an anglecock had not been in its proper position he felt certain it would have been readily detected. He said when the Federal Express left Boston on that evening there was nothing to indicate the possibility of any brace troubleo A9 WFO 98~523 3, Boston Informant T-u Boston Informant T-h, of unknown reliability, who was in a position to observe the Federal Express at the South Station Tenminal on the evening of January lh, 1953, stated he had observed only one—man inspecting the braking system before it left the terminal. Twh expressed the opinion that the inspection crew at the South Station Termi- nal is undermanned, h, Boston Infonnant T—S Boston Informant T—5, of unknown reliability, who was in a position to observe the Federal Express at the South Station on the night of January lb, 1953; advised the inspection crew at South Stan tion is undermanned, The infonmant said a thorough inspection of all outgoing trains was impossible due to this shortage of personnel; however, he did advise that two men had actually inspected this particular train prior to its leaving Boston, D, Station Wbrkers (South Station - Boston) 1, Mr. Kenneth-R,.Faulkner, Assistant Superintendent KENNETH R. FAULKNER, an anployee of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, advised that Train #173, the Federal Express, was assembled at the Dover Street Railroad Yards on the evening ‘of January lh, 1953, after which it was switched to the South Station prior to its departure for Washington, D, 0, He said the train left South Station at 11:00 p,m. and its first scheduled stop was Back Bay Station in Boston, According to Mr, FAULKNER, no change was made in the consist of the train between Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven, Connecticut, 2, Mr, John M, Jones, Baggage Clerk JOHN M, JONES, who resides at 80 Franklin Street, Framingham, Massachusetts, recalled he had loaded baggage on Train #173 on the evening of January lh, 1953, He stated he noticed nothing unusual during the time he was engaged in his duties, SO WFO 98-523 3, Mr. George Grastorf, Mail Clerk GEORGE GRASTORE, a.resident of 68 Adams Street, Holbrook, Massachusetts, advised his duties in relation to Train #173 on January lh, 1953 consisted of carrying mail from the South Station toathe mail cars of this train. He stated he noticed nothing suspicious during the course of his duties on that evening. i he Mr. George Coleman, Redcap GEORGE COLEMAN, who resides at 193 Clapp Street, Milton, Massachusetts, advised he recalled handling some baggage on Train #173 on January lh, 19530 He stated he was unable to recall anything un- usual occurring in connection with this train. 5. Mr, Alvin Jackson, Redcap ALVIN JACKSON, who resides at 179 Glapp Street, Milton, Massachusetts, advised he observed nothing of an unusualﬂor susa picious nature on ﬂ1e_evening of January lh, 1953 while engaged in load- ing baggage on Train #173. ,\6o Mr. Martin J. Walsh, Baggage Clerk V MARTIN J. WALSH, who resides at 3h Henry Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts, advised he operated the baggage tractor ahich ‘serviced Train #173 on the evening of January lh, 1953, He stated he did not observe anything unusual during that eveningo 7° Mr, Granville Perkins, Redcap GRANVILLE PERKINS, who resides at 50 Windsor Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised he was anployed at the South Station on the evening of January lh, 1953, He stated he did not observe anything of an irregular nature with reference to the Federal Express on that evening, ' 8. Mr. Horace Greeley Jefferies, Redcap,C§ptain, HORACE GREELEY JEFFERIES, a resident of us Catawba Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised he was employed on the evening of .51 t we 98-523 January lh, 1953 at the South Station but could not recall if he carried any baggage to the'Federa1 Express that night. He said.he did not notice anything of an unusual nature regarding the Federal Express at that time, 9. Mr. John'W; Jackson, Redcap JOHN'W, JACKSON informed he resides at 162 Chilton Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.’ He stated that on the evening of Janu- ary lh, 1953 he may have placed luggage on Train #173; however, he said he recalls nothing unusual concerning this train, it 10. Mr. Hosea M. Lewis, Jr., Redcap HOSEA M. LEWIS, JR., who resides at 73 Sterling Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised during the course of his duties of carrying luggage to Train #173 on January lh, 1953 he observed nothing of an unusual nature. llo Mr. Peter W} Zaniboni, Assistant Station Master PETER W} ZANIBONI advised he was on duty at South’ Station in Boston, Massachusetts on the night of January lh, 1953 when the Federal Express left from track fifteen enroute to Washington, D, Go He stated he noticed no unusual incidents of any kind and none were re» ported to him that night conerning any of the trains leaving the terminal, E. Back Bay Station — Boston lo Mr, Chester McKay, Assistant Station Master CHESTER MGKAY, 23 Edgar Road, Scituate, Massachusetts, advised Back Bay Station is the first stop of the Federal Express after leaving the Souﬂh Station Terminal enroute to Washington, D, Go This sta- tion is slightly over one mile from the South Station. McKAY said he was on duty'uhen the Federal Express entered the station on January lh, 1953 at 11:05 pom. He said nothing unusual occurred, and no incidents were re» ported to him.concerning faulty operation of the brakes on this train, He infonmed that the Federal Express had stopped at Back Bay Station to pick up passengers, and no inspection of any kind was made at this station, ‘ 2, 'Mr, William Walker, Baggageman ’ WILLIAM WALKER, h7 Humboldt Avenue, Eoxbury, Massam chusetts, advised he was on duty when the Federal Expressvpassed through 52 WFO 984523 the Back Bay Station on the night of January‘lh, 1953a WALKER related he observed nothing unusual concerning ﬂnis train while he was performing his duties of loading baggage on to ﬁne train. 3» Mro William Henry Phillips, Porter Captain WILLIAM HENY PHILLIPS, 8? Harvard Avenue, West Medford, Massachusetts, advised he met the Federal Express on the night of January lh, 1953 in connection with his duties. He stated he observed nothing out of the ordinay concerning this train. be Mro George Allen Verter, Porter GEORGE ALLEN VERTER, 18 Greenville Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised he was on duty handling luggage for passengers boarding the Federal Express on the night of January lb, 1953» He said he did not observe anything out of the ordinary during the course of these duties. 1 5° Mro Walter Owen Conners, Railroad Policeman WKIEER OWEN CONNERS, 1 Alfred Terrace, Randolph, Massachusetts, stated he was on duty when the Federal Express passed through the Back Bay Station on the night of January 34,1953. He said a part of his duties required him to observe every incoming train. In cone nection with his duties he stated he observed nothing which would cause him to gain the impression that anything was wrong on ﬂuis traino Fa Union Station - Providence, Rhode Island 1. Mr. Frederick Claver McDonnell, Relief Chief Dispatcher FREDERICK CLAVER McDONNELL, 537 Main Street,‘Warren, Rhode Island; made available a dspatch or report regarding train #173 which arrived at Providence, Rhode Island on the early morning of January 159 1953. This report revealed the brakes were sticking on Train #173 and had passed Kingston on times The report indicated H. HKWTHORNE had given a stop mo» tion inasmuch as the brakes were sticking on the rear trucks of the rear care The train was reported to have stopped west of track siding West Five Kingston. The report also related to the routing of additional traffic past this train. ‘ 53 WFO 98~523 2. Mro Harold Francis Sawyer, Train Dispatcher HAROLD FRANCIS SKWYER, lh Providence Avenue, River- side, Rhode Island, advised he was on duty on the night of January lh, 1953. He said the iirst notice he had indicating trouble with the brakes on this train was when he received a call from LEWIS BARBER at Davisville, Rhode Island. He stated BARBER notified him the brakes on the rear car had not been properly released inasmuch as sparks were flying from the wheelsc SAWYER said he gave this information to the chief dispatcher and the train dispatcher at Union Station and also notified the operator at the Kingston, Bhode Island, Tower. SAWYER stated the train eventually left his district, or, in other words, it passed Kingston, Rhode Islando 30 Mr. Antonio Loredo Maccarone, Car Inspector ANTONIO LOREDO MAGGARONE, h8 Harmony Court, Hbxie, Bhode Island, stated that when the Federal Express arrived at Union Sta- tion at 11:51 pom. on January M4, 1953 he was on the platform awaiting the arrival of this train. He said upon arrival of the train he immediate» ly started his usual duties of an inspection of the train, These duties consisted of looking for hot boxes, examining anglecocks, checking brake beams, etco He informed he inspected the first six cars of the train and observed another inspector approaching from the rear of the traino At that time he said he turned away from Train #173 and began other dutieso He recalled Train #173 was on track three at Provi— dence and another train enroute from Boston to New York was on track fouro He also said another train enroute from Boston to New York was on track one. According to MACCARONE, he saw no suspicious persons or happenings in the vicinity of the Federal Express nor did he notice‘ any mechanical defects about the train. He said none of the train person» nel had commented to him regardng any mechanical operation that may have been out of order upon its arrival. MAGGARONE said he had never observed an anglecock in the wrong position on a train coming into Providence, Rhode Island. He expressed the opinion the only way an anglecock could change its posi- tion from an open to closed position would be by’ exerting.hand pressure on it for the purpose of closing it. 91: mo 98-523 h. Mr. Charles Anthony Taft, Car Inspector CHARLES ANTHONY TAFT, who resides at 96 Burns Street, Providence, Rhode Island, advised he was on duty on ﬁie night of January lh, 1953. He said when the Federal Express arrived he went to the P1at— form.where this train had stopped. He advised he looked around and noticed nothing unusual, so he immediately left platform three and proceeded to platfonm four where‘Erain #178 had entered. He said he Federal Express left Providence prior to his noticing it again. Thereafter, he recalled that no report had been received by him indicating any difficulties on Train #173. ' — TAFT advised that track three on which the Federal Express passed through Providence on the night of January lh, 1953 is not readily accessible to the personnel conducting inspections of trains on track four. He said this inaccessibility is due to the fact that tracks’ three and four are separated by two iron fences running the length.of Union Station. He said one of these fences is between tracks four and two and the other between three and one. He pointed out further that tracks three and four are separated by intervening tracks one and two. He explained for a person to proceed from track four to track three it would be necessary for that person to leave the platform of track four, proceed down the staire way through a tunnel, and then up a stairway to platform“four.. TAFT pointed out this inaccessibility of track three to the other tracks for the purpose of indicating the difficulty one would have in getting to track three in the event he desired to close an anglecock on a train on this track. 5. Mr. Robert Tillman, Redcap ‘ ROBERT TILLMAN, who resides at 156 Howell Street, Providence, Rhode Island, advised he was on duty on the night of January lh, 1953, and his duties consisted of assisting passengers with baggage on Train #173. TIIIMAN stated he did not observe any suspicious persons or events on the evening of January lh, 1953. 6. «Mr. Romeo John Quattro,_Car Inspector HOMO JOHN QUATTRO, lh8 Piaze Avenue, Pawtucket, Rhode Island, advised that on the night of January_1h, l953.he was on duty and made a spot inspection of Train #173 from the fireman's side of the txain. QUATTRO stated that by spot checking a train.he meant he was stand~ ing about two feet from the train as the train pulled into the station. 55 WFO 98-S23 He said the train was moving about ten miles per hous, and he shined his light on the underpart of the train as it passed by him. He said this train passed him slowxy enough for him to observe the brakes, couplings and anglecocks. He informed after ﬂiis train had passed his position he returned to other duties on another track. He said he did not observe anything out of the ordinary in connection with his inspection of the fire- man's side of Train #173.. ” Z ' . QUATTBO related he has never observed an anglecock on an incoming train in a closed position, and he did not believe the jarring of the train while in transit could cause the anglecock to move from an open to a closed position. ’ ‘To _Mr.-Joseph We Derosier, Baggageman ’JOSEPH'H. DEROSIER, who resides at b9 Toronto Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island, advised he was on duty at Union Station when Train #173 arrived on the evening of January lh, 1953. He stated when the train stopped he immediately took his tractor to the baggage car located near the front of this train and placed the baggage he had on the tractor on the train. He said he also removed baggage and newspapers from the Federal Express to his tractor. He infomed he talked with no one except the baggage» man and said he saw no other train personnel. DEROSIER stated he left the baggage car immediately upon receiving the newspapers and baggage and re- turned to the baggage room at Union Station. He said he did not notice anything of an nhusual or suspicious nature while engaged in his dutieso 8. Mr. Lewis Lillybridge Barber, Signal Station Operator LEWIS LILLYBRIDGE BARBER, who operates the signal tower at Davisville, Rhode Island, advised that Train #173 passed his sta- tion at the usual time of approximately l2:2h a.m. on January 15, 1953. He said as the train approached his station, he observed sparks flying from the wheels of the last three cars. He said he made an effort to signal the brakeman on the rear platform but was unable to do so, after which he telephonically contacted the dispatcher at Providence, Rhode Island, for the purpose of advising him of his observation. 99 Mr. Hawthorne Howland, Signal Station Operator HKWTHORNE HGWLAND, 70 Armistice Boulevard, Eawtucket, ’> Rhode Island, advised his place of employment is Kingston, Rhoda Islando 56 WFO 98-523 7 He said on the evening of January la, 1953 and early morning of January 15, 1953 at Kingston Tower §tabout12:l§ acme he overheard a telephone conversation of Mro LEWIS BARBER who was on duty at the Davisville Signal Towero He said BARBER was talking with some dispatcher whose identity he could not-recalls According to HOWLAND, BARBEﬁ advised this dispatcher he had just observed Train #173 pass his tower with the last car of the train ﬂirowing sparks” He said thereafter the dispatcher telephonicaily contacted hiW9 ROWLAND, and advised him to observe this train carefuily and to signal the train to stop if it appeared it was having brake troubles HCmL«ND said sham the train passed his tower he notieed the last car throwing a steady stream of sparks and gave the brakeman stationed on the platform of the last car the signai to stopo He said the train stopped at a point beyond observation of his signal towero _ He stated he next heard a conversation between someone on the train and someone at the New Haven Station, at whic‘:h time it was reported the train had stopped just south of dingston, Bhode Island, where it was found it was having brake trouhleo 100 Boston Informant Twi . 2 Boston Informant Tmi, of unknown reiiabiiity, ad- vised he has been employed by the New Haven Railroad over forty yearso He stated he has, on numerous occasions, observed anglecocks that have become partialiy closed as a result of strain placed on the couplers at crossovers and sharp curves on the railroado i As a result of these crossovers from one track to another and other strains on the dranhead and couyler, T~i advised the iniiecook handle could be moved by contact with several portions of a r“ no 57 WFO 98-523 V. INVESTIGATION ~ NEW HAVEN TO NEW YORK A. Train Crew 10 Mr, John uonaldson Rowland, Engineer vs‘ JUHN DONALDSON ROWLAND, 26 Cedar Street, Milford, Connecticut, has been employed as a railroader for the past forty~two years and has been on he New Haven to New York run for the past three years, The Federal Express, when it leaves Boston, is pulled by a diesel, and at New Haven the diesel is cut off and an electric engine used in the trip from New Haven to New York City, Everything apw peared to be in nonnal operating condition when he coupled his electric engine on to the thirteen cars at New Haven, His air pressure gauge indiw cated there was llO pounds of air pressure in the train line and lhO pounds of pressure in the main reservoir, Shortly after he had hooked on to the thirteen cars, Conductor RALPH WARD came up to his engine, at which time he inquired of WARD the reason that the train was late on arrival at New Haven, WARD infonned him the brakes had stuck on the two rear pullman cars at Kingston, Rhode Island, and that the sticking of these brakes had caused the delay, E .* Shortlfi after he {hooked his engine on to the thirteen.cars, a switch engine in the New Haven Yards put three more pulln man cars on the rear of the train, making a total of sixteen care. When the switch engine coupled the last three cars on to the train, he felt a slight push and he knew the rear three cars were being hooked on to the original thirteen cars, He watched his air pressure gauge when the last three cars were coupled on, and the air pressure gauge indicated that the last three cars were charged with air due to the-fact that his gauge dropped only about five pounds, 3*, After these cars were attached, he got a signal from the car inspector to try the air brakes, He applied the brakes, and he thereafter received four blasts on the communicating whistle to release the‘brakes,which was an indication that the brakes were in nonnal operatm ing condition, ‘ After the last three cars were coupled on to the train, it was about five minutes before the train pulled out of the sta— tion at New Haven toward New York City, The distance between New Haven 58 V NFC 98-5 23 and New York is seventyufive rail miles, and he made no stops on this trip, He used his brakes fourteen times and found them to be in normal operating condition, It has been his practice,_in an effort to afford the passengers a more comfortable ride,'to apply the brakes on the train and to keep the engine pulling, By operating the air brakes in this manner, it eliminates sudden starts and stops and affords a more smooth operation, ROWLAND made his first brake test at West New Haven, and he could tell from the operation of the train that the brakes were working in a normal condition, If the brakes do not work properly, the engineer can feel’the cars bumping along toward the rear of the train, He also stated that whenever a turn in the track is made, he looks out the window of the cab and Watches the wheels of the train to determine if any brakes may be sticking, During the hours of darkness, it is easy to detennine if the brakes are functioning properly on the train, due to the fact that sparks will be flying from the wheels as a result of the appli— cation of the brake shoes, and all the wheels have the appearance of a spinning pin wheel, ROWLAND advised the trip from New Haven to New York is one and a half hour run,and on the day of the accident, he made up eight minutes of the lost time, and his maximum speed limit was 70 miles per houro At all times the brakes were working normally, and he did not note any brake shoes sticking, , Concerning the accident, ROWLAND advised that if the anglecock was closed at the end of the third car, and the conductor or engineer had pulled the brake valve, the brakes would have set on the engine and the first three cars, If the anglecock on the rear of the third car had been opened enough for air to pass through, and the ralve had been pulled, all brakes on the train would have set, The engineer should have been able to tell from the operation of the train if the angleeock on the rear of the third car was closed, The engine would have been bumped by the cars behind the closed anglecock, and the air exhaust in the engine would have been below normal, It was his opinion that had the train at the time of the crash been going at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour, and even though the grade was approximately one degree downhill, the engineer should have been able to stop the train in a distance of one mile if he had been receiving proper braking on the engine and the first three cars, -» 59 WFO 98-5 23 2° Mro Alexander Dupuis, Engineer ALEXANDER DUPUIS, h5 Henry Street, East Haven, Connecticut, was the fireman on Train #173 from New Haven to New‘Yorko He has been a fireman on the New Haven road since 19230 He stated the Federal Express was late in arriving, and that when it did arrive, the diesel was out off, and the electric engine was backed up and hooked on, No one told him anything about the brake trouble from Boston to New Haven, and the train departed New Haven and had a usual run to New York, Upon arriving at the Pennsylvania Station in New York, he spoke to no one of the Pennsylvania Crew, B. Yard Workers 1, Mr, William Pannebaker WILLIAM PANNEBAKER, lb Lester Street, Eest Haven, Connecticut, has been employed for thirty years by the New Haven Railroad and has been a foreman of car inspectors since 19280 when the Federal Express arrived at New Haven, he inquired of Conductor RAIPH WARD what made the train late. WARD replied the train had experienced brake trouble on the two rear cars, and PANNEBAKER personally inspected these cars, The remainder of the cars were inspected by his crew, and everything was found normal as far as the braking condition was concerned on the entire train. He gave the signal for the brake test personally and stood beside the Minnesota Club and the City of Gary, the two cars that had experienced sticking brakes earlier, and watched the application and release on the brakes, PAENEBAKBR advised he has found anglecock levers in an up position and not locked down and that this is not too uncommon an experience, He further advised that approximately one month ago he found one in this condition, and all that was done was to push the lever down and lock it, He advised this is the function of a car inspector to cor» rect any such condition and does not require any report to be made to anytme. Upon ﬂieorizing on instant wreck, PANNEBAKER stated he thinks it is possible the anglecock lever could vibrate toward a closed position due to the movement of the train, 60 WFO 98-523 2, Mr, Simon Aldrich * - SIMON'ALDICH, 7h Asylum Street, New Haven, Connecticut, has been employed as a car inspector for thirteen years, He was on the car inspection crew handling the Federal Express at New Haven, and it was his job to out off the diesel engine and hook on the electric engine, After accomplishing this, he Walked up to the fifth head car to await the brake tests The brake test was made and all the brakes up to this point were in perfect operating condtion. He advised that at no time did he hear from anyone of any angleeock difficulties ex» perienced at Kingston, Rhode Island, AEDRICH stated he has found anglecock levers in an up position and not locked down but that he has never found any angle- cocks in an improper position nor in a slightly closed position, 3, Mr, Thomas Pinsonneault THOMAS PINSONNEAULT, 52 a 1st Avenue, that Haven, Connecticut, has been employed on the New Haven Railroad for twelve years and as a car inspector for the past eight years, He inspected the Federal Express on the engineer's side midway of the train to the rear and found everything in order, He personally checked the anglecock on the rear end of the last oar added at New Haven to make certain it was in good condim tion, He watched he brakes on the rear car during the brake test, and everything operated normallyo PINSONNEAULT stated he has found anglecock levers in an up position several times and further that he found anglecocks that were not in a fully locked on position but required the anglecock lever to be pushed one to two inches to a fully on position, be Mr, John J, Fitzpatrick JOHN J. FITZPATRICK, 133 Lafayette Street, New Haven, Connecticut, has been employed with the New Haven Railroad for fifteen years and has been a car inspector for the past seven yearso He inspected the train from midpoint to the rear on the fireman's side and found nothing wrong. FITZPATRICK advised it is not too uncommon to find anglecock levers in an up position and not locked down, He found ‘this 61 WFO 98-523 condition on Train #389 at 12 mo a,m, on January 23, 1953, He notified the railroad police who came out and looked at it, and all that was done was to push. the lever down in a locked position, This was verified by Captain JOHN MCAULIFFE, Railroad Police, New Haven, , ‘ 5, Mr, Basquale Merola PASQUALE MEBOIA, 103 Liberty Street, New Haven, . Connecticut, has been employed with the New Haven Railroad for five years and has been a car inspector for the past four and a half years, He in- spected the Federal Express on the firemarﬂs side from the head and down to the center of the train, He found nothing in an improper condition. MEROLA stated that occasionally he finds anglecock levers in an up position and not locked down, He also stated some of the levers that he finds requires them to be moved about one inch to a fully on posi=ti*on, He corrects the condition, putting ‘chem in position and locked down and does not have to make a report to anyone, 6, Mr, James Davitt JAMES DAVITT, 63).; Boulevard, New Haven, Connecticut, has been employed on the New Haven Railroad for the past six years as a car inspector, He worked the engineer's side from the head end to the middle, He found everything in proper condition, and he checked back along the train until he met the rear end man on his side, DAVITT stated he saw no one else around the train, no loiterers, and no unauthorized persons, During his term on the rail- road he has never seen an anglecock lever in an up position, not being locked down, He stated, however, that on some of the old equipment on the railroad sometimes an anglecock may be one inch towards an off position and that he would merely push it to its full on position, He was standing at the head car on the engineer's side during the brake test of the train and all were in proper working condition, 0, Other New Haven Employees 1, Mr, ‘Paul R, Goulette, Assistant Vice-Jresideit of New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad PAUL R, GOULETTE advised he had been told by W. J, PIARLOW, General Mechanic and Superintendent, that the Federal Express on 62 WFO 98-5 23 January 114, 1953 had been observed by railroad men inasmuch as the rear two cars ‘were throwing sparks from the wheels, indicative of sticking brakes, The train was brought to a stop outside of Kingston, Rhode Island, at which time the engineer had found the anglecock on the rear of the third car partially shut off, This condition was corrected and the train proceeded in an uneventful trip to New Haven, _ GOUIETTE advised that the only information he had ‘concerning ‘the wreck of the Federal Express was that which was furnished him by Mr, HARLOW who went to the scene of the acciderrb in ‘Washington, D, C. 2, Mn William Smith, Assistant Head Mechanic of the New Haven ‘Railroad WILLIAM SMITH advised that if the cars on the Federal Express behind the anglecock on the rear of the third car were bled at Kingston, Rhode Island, pressure would have to be built up in the entire system or the engineer would know it, He stated that even if it had not been built up at Kingston, he would not have had a nonnal stop at New Haven, which he did, SMITH continued that the engineer could tell, as an experienced engineer, the difference in sound of the "blow exhaust" in his engine and also the "feel" of the train in braking, SMITH stated that furthermore when new engines and cars are added as they were in New Haven the entire systeng of brakes is checked, and this was done by the foreman of car inspectors, ‘»‘!ILLIAl»I PANNEBAKER, and his crew, This same bralcatest if again made by the Pennsylvania Railroad crew at Pennsylvania Station in New York then the engines are changed again, 3., Mr», W, J, Harlow, Superintendent, Mechanical Division, New Haven Railroad W. J, HARLOW advised that levers on anglecocks have been found in an "up" position, that is, theyvere not locked down, He stated the equipment on the New Haven Railroad-has a double lock feature, and when this condition is found, the handle is merely pushed down into the double lock position, He_ advised further that car inspectors upon finding any such conditions correct same and are not required to make any report about their findings, It is their job to correct any such condi- tions, and it is hard for him to see how an anglecock could move towards an "off" position by vibrations, but added that anything is possible, 63 WFO 98~§23 Jﬁﬁzsjr VIG INVESTIGATICN f NEW YGRK CITY T0'WAS?INGTON, Dc Go A. Train Crew le meg Herry'ﬁil1iam BTUWET9 Engineer EAER3'$ILLIAM BRGSER3 850 Se 56th Streets Philem delphieg Pernsyﬂveniag advised he was originally emplcyed by the Pennsylr vanie Railroad in 39069 He stated he wee made a fireman in 1907 and hem came an enginewen in 19170 He said he has been employed in that capacity elnce 19179 ERCWER stated he picked up the electric engine number L876 for Tra”n #1339 the Federal Expresss at the Sunnyside Engine House; Long island‘ ﬂew :0 kg at 3:17 ﬂames January 159 1953c He said he has eéerel Express on frequenﬁ occasioneo According to BROWER9 upen rveeh'ne the aunnyside Engine House he examined and tested the dieeel ‘ 3 used by hime He said the exeminaeion was performed by use t5 and he went over all working porhione of the engineo BRGWER stated he tested the automatic brakiug dew vice by se“ting it and leaving the cab and ebserving the brakesg pigeons» and englne trucks or guiﬁe wheelso He stated he also tested his sand and lights and found everything about the engine to be normelg He then lef the Sunnyside Engine Heuse and went ﬁe Stahiang New Yorks where he was supposed to pick up the Federa? Tenneylveniz “ = run ﬁ0‘%esh;ngtono Upon reaching the etationg he had to Sxpreee 10? < wait £03 "he we . 35 it was lateo The train was being brought into Eew Kerk by an angnne zrem the ﬂew Yerkg New Haven and Hartford Reilroado Upen the train?s arrival in.Hew York? he stated he had M0 conversation with anyone on the inceming train concerning its late arrival endxma nee me e aware of the cause for the trainﬂs late arrivalo $e.he backed hie engine to the traing it was hooked up by a car inspector whose name is unknown to him but who he believes was the regular man emm ployeﬁ for this eperetiono when the train'was connecteﬂs he pumped up its eir ﬁe its nermal pxeesure of 110 poundeo He estimated this eperation to have taken ebeun one minuteo He estimated the trainﬂs air pressure had dropped €a'e or pcssibly seven poundeo WFO 98-523 He advised he saw a car inspector two or three cars back from the engine and another flashiight toward the rear of the traino At this time he heard a signal blast of four whistles to release the brakes. He then kept the brakes on the engine and reieased the brakes on the train by means of the automatic deviceo At this time he was advised by a car inspector that the brakes and steam were okay on the sixteencars. BROWER said that shortiy after this he began his trip to washingtono His scheduled departure time was h:O2 aamo, and his actual oeparture time was h:38 aomog thirtywsix minutes lateo - Shortly after leaving the yard proper, BROWER said he gave the train a running brake testo This running test was conducted by using the automatic brakeso At this time he felt no bumps from cars of the train, indicating to him that braking was proper. He estimated his speed at the time he gave the-running test to be twenty miles per hour, and he appiied only Light pressure to the brakes to effect this testo He advised at this time it would have been possible all the cars did not have brakes and those that did could have given him the reaction be felto He then took the train into the tunnel toward New Jersey, On several occasions he applied brakes to the train, using the automatic brakes each time. His normal speed on the entire trip between stations is eighty miles per houro Upon approaching the portal drawbridge, he braked down to fortyafive miles per honro A mile and a half later at Hudson, he braked down from sixty to fortymfive and at the Newark Station he slowed down to thirtyufive to go through he stationo He did not stop at Newarko BROWER continued that upon approaching Elizabeth, New Jersey, he siowed from seventy to tirty miles per houro Fro Eliza~ beth to Rahway, he siowed from sixty to thirty miles per hours Around Menlo Fark he got up to eighty and at Trenton be slowed to thirtyo Leavu ing Trenton; he got up to seventyafive and slowed at North Philadelphia to forty'miles per houro At 33nd Street, Philadelphia, he was slowed to thirty miles per hour,and on approaching the 30t Street Station, he made a first’ comylete stop since Leaving New Yorko This stop was made from an estimated speed of fifteen miles per hours He stated his stop seemed to be normal in every way, and he had no indication of any brake troubleo BRGWER said shortly after ieaving Rhiladelphia, be» cause he was kites he pulled np behind the lose; trainfand was forced to proceed at a greatly reduced speed into Wilmington, Delaware; “hich sta- tion he approached at a speed of only twenty to twentywfive miles per hours He experienced nothing unusua1.in making his stop from this speedo 65 WFO 98v523 Upon approaching Baltimore, and at North Point, he_ slowed to fortymfive miles per hour, and coming into Baltimore he reduced speed from fortymfive to about twelve miles per hour, which speed he was making when he made his stop, He entered the Balthnore Station on track four, 7 7 BRGWER said he stopped at Baltimore for about four minutes, "While the train was in the station, he put on the engine brakes and released the mechanical brakes on the train, This procedure was also followed previously at Philadelphia and Wilmingtono He explained this is normal procedure as through this procedure he can then take his hand off the soccalled dead man's throttle, BROWER claims to have seen no car-inm spectors around the train in Baltimore and was not advised of any inspection or repairs made on the train, He was unable to see the rear end of the train from his position, He had no conversation with anyone while in Baltimore and did not leave his seat at the controls, he noticed nothing unusual here either in regard to the train or the station. He requested no inspections or adjustments of any kind and felt the train to be operatw ing in a normal condition at this time, BROWER advised at Baltimore the fireman did get out of the train and check the sand on the engine and also checked the panagraph, ‘ He stated that after leaving Baltimore he had a clear track on the way through, and reached a speed of eighty miles per hour, which he held to Landovero At this time he cut off his engine and began drifting into~ﬁashington, He crossed the Eastern Branch Bridge at seventywfive miles per hour, and he advised fro this point to Ninth Street Bridge is uphill, He passed the distance signal at Bhadensburg Road,”which is between the Eastern Branch Bridge and the Ninth Street Bridge, at a speed of sixty to seventy miles per hour, and here he got an approach signal to slow to thirty miles per hour, BRUWER advised at this point he applied the brakes for the first time since leaving Baltimore, Maryland, Shortly past the distance signal, he advised there is a speed control device, and upon passing this device he began to observe the in» struments in his cab in connection with this device, These instruments in the cab consist of two gauges and a signal box which receive electrical impulses from the track, It is necessary for him to closexy observe these gauges and to apply sufficient pressure to the brakes within a six second Iinterval if traveling over thirty miles per hour, or otherwise an auto~ matic device will cause his brakes to go into an emergency position inasmuch as the speed of the train is in excess of that allowed by the speed control device, " WFO 98«S23 BROWER said when he next looked out he expected his speed to be greatly decreased from the time he applied his brakes; however, he found it to be in excess of the thirty mile speed allowedo He said he immediately threw all brakes into the emergency position and blew his horn until he crashed into Union Stationo ’ BEOWER recalled he had dumped sand from his engine on to the tracks upon putting his brakes into the emergenby positiono He said this would allow better traction on the-rails and thereby get better braking resultso BROWER stated it was only after he looked out after passing the speed control device that he realized he had insuf~ ficient brakes to stop the traino After going over the various speeds at which he ’stopped at Philadelphia,’iilmington and Baltimore, BROWER advised the a stop at Washington was the only stop he made where he had to make quick braking from a high rate of speed within a comparatiwdy short distanceo He had plenty of room on his other stops as his speeds were being reduced gradually until such time as he approached the stations where he was to make scheduled stopso ‘ BROWER claimed he would have known before he left the tunnel in New York if there had been no brakes on any cars in the train except the engine and the first three cars. He said he would have been aware of this because the back cars would bump each time he stoppedo He did not mention any such bumps upon applying the brakes approaching hash» ington, howevero He advised the makemup of the cars on the train was not unusual9.and he had pulled similar trains on many oceasionso BROWER was asked if he had ever before in his experw ience encountered a closed anglecook on any of his trains, and he replied he experienced one in 1928 upon coming into the station in Philadelphiao On this occasion the anglecock was the old type without double lockingo BROWER further advised, however, that at the time he reported to the Philadelphia Station with a closed anglecock, he was advised he was the fifth engineman to have found a closed anglecock on that train at that stationo ' BREWER advised the only engineman he knows to had trouble wit a closed anglecock was one ED BROWN, R°F.D. 3, Oxford, Pennm sylvania, a retired engineman who also experienced this in 19280 BROWER did not know whether this man was one of be five who reported to the Philadelphia Station. ‘67 WFO 98-5 23 2.. Mr. John William Mojver, Fireman JOHN WILLIAM MOYER, who resides at Rathton Road, York, Pennsylvarxia, advised he was fireman on Train #173 which crashed into Union Station in Washington, D. Go -on January 15, 1953:; MOYER said he had boarded the engine involved in the wreck at Sunnyside Yard on Long Island, He said he rode with Engineer HARRY BRQWER through the East River Tunnel to Pennsylvania Station in New York City, MOYER stated they were supposed to switch engines with instant train which originated in Boston, and he and BROWER were scheduled to bring the train on in to ‘isfashingtono The train was due to arrive at New York from Boston at 14:02 a.mo but was about thirty-six minutes late, MOYER said when the train came in and the other engine crew disconnected, BROWER switched over to the track the train was on and hooked on to it’ with the aid of the inspectors who make the actual connections, He advised he nor BROWER had any conversation with the engine crew that brought the train down to New York, and they received no instruca tions from this crew. He said there were no additional cars or pullmans added to the train in Newlfork or at any of the three scheduled stops be-— tween New York and Washington, " MOYNR advised after the engine had hooked on to the train he got out of the engine and walked back about three cars along the platform to get the starting signal from a device located .on the platform at that point, He said it was not possible for him to- observe the angles cocks at this time, inasmuch “as it was night time and the raised platform in New York would have prevented his observing them even in daylighto MOYER said he returned to the engine and the train left New York at l.;:°8 acme ‘ * He stated there was a terminal test of the brakes v " made by the engineer prior to leaving New York, and a running test was made immediately after the train got in motion, He stated that between,New York and Baltimore the brakes on this train had been applied at least “ twenty times, According to MOYER, the only stops were at Philadelphia (30th Street Station), Wilmington, Baltimore, and Washington; however, it is necessary to reduce speed on occasions due to restricted areas such as passing through cities, passing through tunnels, over bridges, cross- overs or switches, approaching curves, etco 68 WFO 98«S23 _ MOYER said on curves to the left he looks out his window at the train following behind, and he had actually observed sparks from the cars all along the entire length of the traino Similarlyg, he said that on double curves or 5 curves, he watched from near ﬂue center of the engine and observed sparks from each side of the train on instant tripe This, he said, was proof the train was braking properlyo In additiong he said if the brakes had not been operating properly or if several cars had not been braking, each stop or slowdown would have been "rough" or "bumpy" caused by each car bumping into the one ahead of ito He said such "bumpu ‘ ing" did not occuro. I According to MOYER, he noticed no one tampering with the train at any of the stops after leaving New Yorke He said no trouble was ekperienced on instant trip prior to reaching the Washington areao MOYER recalled upon leaving Baltimore enroute to Washington there were no restrictions or slowmdowns prior to reaching Bladensburg Roadg all the signals having been clears He said there is an upgrade prior to reaching Bladensburg Road, which caused the train speed I to have been reduced to an estimated sixiywfive miles per hour at Bladense burg Road. .At this point MOYER said he heard exhausting air which would have been Engineer BEOWER hitting the brakeo He stated around the engine house or nearer te Ninth Street Bridge, he estimated the speed of the train around forty miles per hour, and BREWER told him he could not hold the traino MOYER said he looked over and saw the brake lever in emergency position as the brakes were all the way one He said he then noticed the engineer's independent brake was also in the braking positiong and he, MOYER, then threw the fireman's emergency valveo This valve, MOYEB said, is a stop cock valve located on his side of the engineo He said there was no ex- haust at all when he opened his emergency'valve9 and he recalled he had heard such exhaust when the engineer had applied the train brake and the independent brakeo In view or this he said there should have been no ex» haust when he opened the fireman“s valveo After opening his valve, MOYER said he walked over nearer the engineer an noticed the brake pipe gauge hand was at zerog and the brake cylinder gauge hand was about seventyo MOYER said that immediately after the crash he got out of the engine and was taken to the hospitalo He said when he niurned to the station, the train had been moved and the space around the engine was boarded ups ‘ 69 WFO 98-523 ' MOYER said his only explanation as to the cause of the wreck is that an anglecock was closed, or an obstruction of some type in the brake pipe along the train”had prevented proper braking, ,3, ,Mr° Thomas Joseph Murphy, Conductor THOMAS JOSEPH MURPHY, who resides at EAO8 Hamlet Avenue, Baﬂtimore, Maryland, advised he boarded Train #173 at NewYork on the early morning of January 15, 1953, for the remainder of the trip to Washington. After the engine was added, a test was made of the brakes on the engine and the sixteen cars before the train was in motion, and one of the car inspectors informed him the brakes were all right. The train left shortly thereafter enroute to Washington, D. C. MURPHY advised after this train left New York, stops were made at 30th Street Station, Philadelphia, Wilmington, Delaware, and Baltimore, Maryland, All these stops were scheduled stopso, There were no unscheduled stops, In addition to these stops, MURPHY advised there were about twenty slowdowns or reductions of speed between'New York City and Baltimore, MURPHY stated the train stopped in Baltimore at 735a aam, and departed for'Washington at 7259 aom, When the train stopped in Baltimore, he stepped off the rear of the second car and walked to the front of car four from which a corpse was being removed, MURPHY advised that approximately eighty people boarded this train in Baltimore, and dur- ing the five minutes while in Baltimore, he was on the platform in the proximity of te third and ﬁourth cars, While there, he discharged his duties from the platform with regard to the signals being received and given by him which indicated all was clear for the departing of this train at 7:59 aomo He advised at at no time did he see anyone off the platform attempting to turn any anglecocks or otherwise make any adjustments on this train, He advised that the fireman on Train #173 came out on_the platform side of the engine and made his usual checks and, in his opinion, would have been in a good position to notice anyone handling anglecocks or other adjustments on these cars, "According to Mr, MURPHY, if anyone had turned the anglecocksat the rear of car three, he believed such a per» son would have had to approach it from the other side of the train and crawl under the train, and he felt he still would have noticed such a person, - - 70 .WFO 98--52 3 {After the train left Baltimores MURPHY related he walked from the front of car one back to car four, collecting tickets, and afterwards he and F9 En KING in car four took care of the miscellaneous paper work recuiredo After passing Landover, Maryland, which is approxi~ mately eight minutes out of Washington, he left car four and returned to car three where he stayed until the wreck occurredo MURPHY said at the time the train hit the switches near New York Avenue in'Washington, due to its speed he was thrown through the door to the ladies room. MURPHY advised this was the first time he realized the train was going too fasto He said the next thought he had was to open up the emergency valve-0 He went to the platform at the front end of car three, and at this time he heard the train whistleo He opened up the backmup valve, or emergency valve, which is located on the left side of the car when facing the engineo He noted there was no escape of air as there should have been: His conclusion then was that the engineer had used all the air in the train lineo At the time the train hit the switches MURPHY éstim mated the speed to be about thirty-five miles per hour, and stated that due to the downgrade, he felt te train increased its speed as it neared the terminalo He estimated it was between "C" and "K" Tower which he said would be less than a mile from the stationo Because of the rough ride- which caused the car to swing from side to side after hitting the switches, he was unable to make his way to another emergency valve which is located in car three or to make his way into another car to try an emergency'vaLveo He advised the passengers to brace themselves because of the situation,’ and he then laid on the floor to protect himsdfc When the impact occurredg MURPHY checked his watch, and according to his statement, it was 8:38 acme Concerning anglecocks found in partially closed posiw tion, MURPHY advised he believed an anglecock could vibrate on the cam to a partially closed position, but he had never heard of this happeningo He stated he has never known of a situation where an angiecock was found’ in a partially closed conditiono In response to a question asked MURPHY stated he did not believe it'would be possible for anyone to close an anglecock while the train was in motiono he Mro John Howard.Meng, Rear Brakeman JOHH'HOWARD MENG, 261 Wynciiffe Avenue, Clifton Heightsg Pennsylvania, stated on instant trip he boarded the train at WFO 98-523 New York City just a few minutes prior to the train‘s leaving New York City at h238 a.m,, January 15, 1953, thirty-six minutes behind schedule, MENG advised he was not aware this train had any previous brake trouble nor did he speak to any of the train crew he relieved in regard to any , brake trouble, MENG stated Train #173 has stops at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Wilmington, Delaware, and Baltimore, Maryland, He stated the three stops were normal stops in that the train slowed down.and came to a complete stop, He considered the stops as being perfect station stops because the coaches were in the right position when they came to a stop in all three stations, To his knowledge, there was no dragging of brakes on the trip from New York to Washington, D. C, MENG advised that at various points during the trip when rounding a curve where he could see other portions of the train from the window, he checked to see if there were any “hot boxes" or brakes dragging on any of the coaches, He said no such difficulty was noted by'himo ‘ MENG stated that from Baltimore to Washington Termi- nal, the normal speed is approximately eighty miles an hour, and to the best of his knowledge, this was the speed the train was traveling; that this speed was maintained going through Landover, Marylad; that the speed was reduced to approximately forty miles an hour at New York Avenue; and that at this point he was in the ﬂaird car from the rear checking tickets, MENG advised that the first time he was aware of any trouble on the train was when they crossed the "K" double interlocking tracks, and at no time did he hear the warning horn of the locomotive, When the train passed this point, he was in the last car which lurched violently throwing him off balance, At this "K" double interlocking, MENG stated he had about thirty seconds to reach the emergency valve to stop the train; however, he was in the center of the car, and people were in the aisle; therefore, he had no chance to get to the emergency valve before the train crashed, He stated.he was in the last car of the train when it stopped, and there \ was no lurching or "banging" of cars; that the car came to such a normal stop that he thought the engineer had made a “perfect station stop"; and that he was not aware there had been an accident until he left the coach, MENG advised as he left the last car, a car in~ specter told him the train had crashed into the‘Washington Terminal, ‘He stated he looked at the brakes on the last two cars only and found the pistons to be in "full release" position, MENG was unable to identify the car inspector he talked to outside the coach, = ‘, 72 WO%%8 A MENG stated, in his opinion, it would be impossible for vibration of the train to open or close an anglecocko He further stated that if the anglecuck had been closed in any of the stops at New York, Ehiladelphia, or Wilmington, this conition would have been noted due to the fact that leakage would have caused the pressure to decrease and automatically cause the emergency brakes to applye If the anglecock was closed in Baltimore, MENG stated it would be possible for the train to travel to‘Washington Terminal without the condition being noted before the train crashed into the station in the event brake pipe leakage was slow enough. ' So Mr, Fred E0 King, Brakeman FRED E, KING, who resides at 8502 Greenwood Avenue,’ Apartment 5, Takoma Park, Maryland, said he boarded Train #173 at Pennsyl- vania Station, New York City, and rode in the fourth car as brakemanwbaggage .man. The fourth car was a combination baggage-coach care He said the train made scheduled stops at Ehiladelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and no’, unscheduled stops were made, KING said he heard nothinr concerning any trouble the train.had prior to arrival in ﬂew York. He said he noted no indication of brake trouble zrior to arr 3;; in Wasnin;ton, J, Ge IV KING said he first sensed some difficulty when near “Q” Tower in the Washington Yards because he was being bounced about due to the excessive speed of the train'Which he estimated to be at legst thirty~five miles per hour, He said the normal speed at this point is fifteen miles per hour, K33? advised upon sensing this unusual speed he went out the rear door of car four and on to the vestibule or platform, He did this in order to look out ﬁlﬂ door because he could not obtain a good view through the window inside the care KING said he glanced quickly out the door, noted the train was not slowing and turned the handle on the backwup valve, He said openihy ‘ this valve dumps the air in the train line which causes the brakes to be ayylied on all cars, This valve has the same ef« fact as the conductor's cord located inside the car. KING said he did not hear any air escape when he at~ tempted to turn this valte, and his effort did not slow the train. He said since the time of the accident he has wondered whether or not he acw. tually turned this valve, and now he cannot say he dsfi.:ﬁely did. At this time the train was stitching frvm track fortyhone to track sixteen, WFO 98-523 and due to the excessive speed, KING said‘he had a very difficult time keeping his balancea He did not recall the time that elapsed from the _ moment he glanced out the door until the crasha He said the time seemed »-’ very shorto KING said_he did not hear any distress signal from the engi- neer such as the sounding of the horno = Following the crash, KING said he did not check to see if he had actually turned the handle on the backnup valve. He. thought he then opened the door to allow the passengers to get out, but he was not sureo° He said he walked through car four and attempted to enter , car three but was unable to do so because the cars were sitting at an angle to each other. -KING said he got out of the car and for sometime was engaged- in helping.passengers out of the carso KING said that at no time did he -Q d look at the wheels, brake shoes or anglecocks on any of the carso KING recalled there were numerous applications of the brakes during the time he was on the train, and everything seemed in order before reaching Washingtono He said he thougnt the brakes on the entire train were functioning properly in Baltimoreo He based this opinion on the fact that the distance used to stop in Baltimore is shorter than the distance used in'Washington, yet the train did not overshoot its stopping -point in Baltimoree He said Baltimore is normally approached at about seventy—five miles per hour; however, he was unable to state definitely that the train did approach Baltimore at this speedo KING said he has never known an anglecock to be—in other than the proper positiono He informed it was possible some person had closed an anglecock while the train was in Baltimoreo He was unable _ to explain whyg if such.was the case, Train #l?3's brakes had not gone into emergency application prior to reaching Washingtono Bo Pennsylvania Railroad Station lo Mro Thomas F0 Shea, Airbrake Inspector THOMAS F. SHEA, who resides at 93 Bhode Island Avenue, East Orange, New Jersey, advised he was standing on the westbound platform at Pennsylvania Station when Train #173 entered the station on track eleven on the.morning of January 15, 19530 He said the train made a normal stop and came all the way to the westbound platform, thus plate forming all sixteen carso He informed when the train stopped he walked to the rear of the train or to the sixteenth car, from which point he 7h WFO 98-523 started his inspection, He stated he walked forward from the rear of the train toward the front of the train on the fireman's side and in- spected the last eight cars, SHEA related he and other inspectors in- spected all safety devices on the cars and especially checked the anglecocks, pistons and brake shoes. He said a flashlight was used in checking the anglecocks. According to SHEA, the inspection of this train found everything to be in perfect condition, Also, according to SHEA, the engine which brought the train to the Pennsylvania Station was dis- connected and a Pennsylvania engine was hooked on, ‘ SHEA pointed out that the engine which brought the train into New York was a New Haven engine and stated ﬁuat inasmuch as the train changed to the Pennsylvania Railroad in New York, ‘inspections conducted are thorough, He said in the event any portion of the train was found to be out of order at this inspection the Neﬁ Haven line would have the duty or expense of making necessary repairs, He indicated a train must be in perfect condition before it will pass an inspection made at a point such as New York, SHEA said the only member of the incoming crew he actually saw'was the conductor, the flagman and two porters who stepped off the train in New York, He said no one mentioned the previous brake trouble nor did anyone mention that any part of the train.was not in _proper working order, He said in the event anything was known by the train crew to be out of order upon arrival in New York, it would have been the duty of the conductor or the engineer to notify the assistant station master or the gang foreman, SHEA informed the last eight cars inspected by him were known by him to be in good condition, and he heard nothing nor saw any report indicating difficulty with any of the other cars, He said he saw no unauthorized personnel around the last eight cars while this train was being serviced in New York, 2, Mr, Frank Myskajtys, Car‘Inspectorw FRANK MYSKAJTYS, 231 Gator Avenue, Jersey City, New Jersey, advised he was on duty at the Pennsylvania,Station on the morning Of January 159 1953» He said the Federal Express pulled into the station somewhere around h32Q aoma about twenty or twentymfive minutes behind schedule, He said the train made a normal stop upon arrival, He said he began an inspection of the last eight cars on this train immediately after it stopped, According to MYSKAJTYS, he inspected the braking shoes, pis~ tons, anglecocks, air hoses and made certain checks to be sure none of this equipment was out of order. He said he found the braking system to be operating properly, He stated no one from ﬁne train crew mentioned any trouble that the train may have had prior to arriving in New York, Accord~ ing to MYSKAJTYS, no suspicious persons or unauthorized personnel were ob» served by him around the last eight cars during the time he made his in: spectiona 75 WFO 98»-523 3. Mn, Ruggiero Fe Caidararo, Car Inspector RUGGIERO Fe cenoeneeog use Emory Avenue, Trenton, New Jerseys, advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 19530 In connection with his duties CALDARARO informed he inspected the north side of the train, having started his inspection on therest end of the train, CALDARARO said during the course of his inspection he observed nothing out of order nor did he observe any suspicious activities. he Mre 1% Mo Ropper, Superintendent Po Me R0};-‘PER, who is superintendent of the 'Pennsy_L—~ Vania Railroad with offices located inthe Pennsylvania Station, advised his records revea Train y:a4".'.‘ffé arrived at 14:29 some, at which time a train crew of the Pennsylvania Railroad took over the train and made’ the custom mary inspections and changed enginese He said at E;-aw York ﬂity, Pennsylw Vania engine 14876 was attached to this train which consisted of sixteen carse Mre HOPPER advised this train was inspe=m‘.:«-ed in New York, and zzrutlging had been reported wrong with the traine He said the employees of the New Haven Railroad *r:}1o brought the train into New York li1«:c'r'ise had made no report of any ma}.-i’x-2nctioni.ng>; of any portion of the train.. — Se Lire Aristides George Harris, Gang Foreman ARISTIDES season HARRIS, S510 - 18th Avenue, Brook» lyn, New York, advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 when Train 9%-‘3.?3 arrived at Eennsylvania Statione He said he assigned in» spectors to this train but had conducted no actual inspection himselfe He stated if anything had been found orong with the train, this matter would have been reported to him in connection with his duties as gang ibremane He saids however, no such report was made to him he recalled the train was approximately forty minutes late upon arriv;.«.".‘, Zmt no one from the inn» coming train had reported a reason for their b53133; latee 6° Mre ‘fiiiliam Joseph Gorcoran,, Gar Inspector WILLIAM JOSEPH GORCO‘l?;!kI~I,, 56!.) Eagle Avenues, Bronx, New York, advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 3.953 when Train #173 arrivedo He recalled this train arrived on track eleven and was some thirty-«~five to forty minutes late, In connection with his .;3o.ties GORCORABT said he was assigned to inspect the first eight cars on the firee-= mania side of Train #1730 CORCOERAN informed he conducted this inspection and found everything to be in good or-dero He said he heard no re-mark nor saw any report made by the maintenance crew to the effect there was anything wrong with this traine '36 WFO 98-523 70 Mro'Walter Bo Kreahers Car Inspector WALTER Bo KREAHER, 2hl W} 22nd Street, New York City, advised he was on duty when Train #173 arrived on the morning of January 15, 19530 According to KBEAHER, he inspected the first eight cars on the fireman's side of this train and noted the brakes functioned properly and the anglecocks were in an open positiono He said he noticed nothing unusual about this train and was not told this train had experienced previous brake troubleo * 8° Mro John'Wo Pampinella, Car Repairman Helper JOHN‘Wo PAMPINELLA, 2&0 Jefferson Street, Brooklyn, New York, advised he was on duty when Train #173 arrived at Pennsylvania Station on the morning of January 159 19530 He said in connection with his duties he checked all steam lines and found them to be in good orders He said he also made necessary connections between the engine and first car after the new engine had backed up to this traino He said he was still in the vicinity of the train after the signal was made that the brakes were operating properlyo He said the train moved out under normal conditions, and he saw nothing which would indicate anything was wrong with Train $1730 90 Mrs Morton Lo Lichtenstein, Brakeman HORTON Lo LICEEEHSTEIN, who resides at 512 Rosedale Avenue, Bronx, New York, advised he was on duty when the Federal Express arrived on the morning of January 15, 19530 He said upon arrival he'Went between-the engine and the first car and proceeded to cut the engine 100390 He said this was the only job he performed on Train #173 and assumed other duties immediately after making this disconnectiona ‘ 10° Mro Conrad 80 Kratky, Airbrake Inspector comm S. 1<.R_ATK'5(, u3=~09 - lﬂth Avenue, Long Island City, New York, advised he was on duty when Train #173 arrived from Boston on the morning of January 15, 1953c He said he was standing in the middle of the platform.when the tnain came in on track eleveno He said he in» spected the last eight cars or the train on the fireman‘s side of the trains During this inspection, he stated he checked the anglecocks and various other things and found them all toebe in proper conditiono He said he had no contact whatsoever with the train crew'which brought the train into New York, and he had no indication that the brakes hadgreviously operated 77 WFO 98wS23 improperlyo He said during the brake test at the Fennsylvania Station, the brakes on the rear eight cars operated in a satisfactory'mannero Co Thirtieth Street Station » Philadelphia 10 Mro Ho Ho Hauptp General Superintendent of Motive Power ~ E; Ho HAUPT, with offices located in the 30th Street Station, Pennsyixtais.€a1lroad, advised when he first learned of the train wreck in Washington on the morning of January l5, 1953, he left Ehiladelw phia and arrived at the Washington Terminal at approximately 11:30 acme‘ HAUPT stated his purpose in coming to Washington was to determine ﬁle most expeditious means of removing the wreckage inasmuch as his department is concerned with the replacement of the locomotive damaged in the wrecko HAUPT informed he was present “hen,the anglecock at the rear of the third car was removed from that care He said this anglecock was in a closed position which would prehibit the passage of air through the brake lineo He stated thisg of course, would prevent ﬁle brakes from operating correctly on all cars to the rear of this closed anglecock when the engineer applied the brakeso HAUPT informed he also noted the locomotive wheels and the Muscle on the first three cars were burned; which indicated to him the brakes did function up to and including the third care - ex 20‘ Mr°—William Burton Weightmang General Airbrake In» specter WILLIAM BURTON WEIGHTMAN§ who resides at.3l7 Khchols Street, Bottsville, Eennsylvania, and is employed in the Eastern Region of the Pennsylvania Railroad, stated he arrived in Washington, Dc Co dur» ~ ing the early afternoon of January 159 19530 He said he had learned of the wreck that morning and proceeded immediately to Washingtono He stated he went to the Ivy City Yard shortly after arriving for the purpose of making airbrake tests on the rear thirteen cars which had been removed from.the scene of the wrecko ” _ According to WEIGH’I'M‘AN,, various Westinghouse Air-= brake, ﬁennsylvania Railroadg and Washington Terminal officials and emu ployees, as well as other persons, accompanied him for these tests. WFO 98~523 WEIGHTMAN informed the tests were performed in conformance with the Code of the Association of American Railroads, As a result of these tests, he said it was determined that the brake pipe leakage on the last thirteen cars was about one pound per minute or slightly over, He=said this amount of leakage is well within that permitted by te Code. I WEIGHTMAN also advised tests were performed regard- ing the application and release of the brakes, and it was found they were in appropriate operating condition, In addition, each of the thirteen cars was given the single car test as prescribed in Westinghouse Airbrake Company instruction pamphlet, The thirteen cars were found to pass this single car test,according to WEIGHTMAN, He said in regard to cars one, two and three of Train #173, and he locomotive, all operating parts of the airbrake equipment were removed and tested on the test rack at Ivy City and all such parts functioned normally, Included in tests conducted by'Westinghouse was the anglecock from the rear of car three of Train #173, He said this anglecock was removed from Train 758.73 and placed on a similar car used in the tests, WEIGHTMAN related this anglecock operated properly with the anglecock handle in the position in which it was alleged to have been found after the accident, Mr, WEIGHTMAN reported as a result of these tests, no condition was found on these hirteen cars which would prevent the brakes from applying in a service or emergency application, * He also advised additional tests were conducted on January 19, 1953 on a simulated train, consisting of sixteen cars which had the same normal leakage as the cars on Train #173, This train was charged with air pressure to a gauge reading of one hundred pounds per square inch at the rear of the sixteenth car and ninety~eight pounds per square inch at the front of the first car, The air supply was cut off ‘ by closing the anglecooh on the outside ends of cars one and sixteen, with the cars in this condition,at the end of nine minutes brakes auto- matically set on three cars equipped with Universal Control valves, He stated the same tests were conducted again, this time charging the train to one hundred and two pounds air pressure ;ez'square inch, According to WEIGHTMAN, the brakes set on six cars in nine minutes, Euriug these tests workmen and employees were using air by opening pneumatic doors and using water on the train, He stated similar tests were conducted on a fifteen» car unit, On this later test, Mr. WEIGHTMAN informed.the pneumatic doors were not being used, and no workmen were aboard the train to use any 79 WFO 98~523 supply of air, WEGTMAN stated after ninety minutes no brakes had ap- plied, and it was found the brake pipe air pressure had dropped from one hundred pounds per square inch to sixtystwo pounds per square inch, WElGHTMAN commented that in his opinion these latter tests regarding elapsed time prior to automatic application of brakes were of no signific canoe inasnuch as the brake action which took place at the end of nine minutes was very light and would not cause sufficient braking to stop the train, He also pointed out it is practically an impossibility to simulate actual conditions that would exist while a train was in motion and passen- gers aboard, K 3, Mr, Harold Mo Jones, Flagman HAROLD M. JONES, who resides at 6Shl Winsor Avenue, advised he was aboard Train #10? which arrived in Washington, Do G0 at ?:hO aomo, January 15, 19530 JONES stated he departed from Washington on an 8200 aomo train and was not in Washington at the time of the wreck, be Mr, Elmer Garner, Car Inspector ELMER GARNER, who resides at 2hh3 Linden Drive, Havera town, Pennsylvania, advised he arrived at Washington, Do 00 at ll:u5 acme on January 15, 1953, after having been advised of the wreck, He said he inspected the brake shoes and wheels on the first three cars and found every indication the brakes had been very hot from hard usage. He said he brake shoes were discolored, and the wheels showed burn.marks, GARNER stated cars four and five showed no evidence of recent braking. He stated he observed tests conducted on a simulated train in which thirteen cars taken from Train #173 were used, He informed these tests proved the brakes to he in good ordero In addition, he related he had observed examination and tests conducted on the individual cars making up this train, He said also these tests proved the individual car braking system to be in good order, _ GARNER advised he had never heard of an angleeock closing on a train while the train was in motion, He stated he was unaﬁﬂe to understand the brake failure on Train #1730 So Mr, George Stanley'Webb, Superintendent of Motive Power GEORGE STANLEY WEBB, who is employed by the Pennsylw vania Railroad Company at Philadelphia, advised that after learning of \ 80 WFO 98--5 23 instant wreck he proceeded to Washington, Do Co He stated he arrived at Washington, Dc Co at approximately 11:50 am., on the morning of the wreck. At that time , according to WEBB, he inspected various parts of cars of this train as well as the engine, He advised the anglecock from the rear of car three . was taken off and removed to an office in the railroad sta- tiono WEBB said when he saw this anglecock at about 2:00 pomo that afternoon, the handle was in a one-nhalf closed position‘, He said he also examined the coupling hose and noticed there were no obstruc-== tions in ito WEBB related that about 7:00 pomo he was standing at the north end or rear end of car 8663, which was car one of Train #173, at which time a car repair foreman named SCHIEGEL called his attention to an anglecock near the rear of car one which was in a closed and locked pow sitiono He said SGHIEGEL brought this angileoock from the debris and in- dicated he had found it in a pile of debris which was under the rear end of car one., He said this anglecock was removed to the office of Mro KERL in the ‘Washington Terminalo According to ‘.‘d'I1‘.BB, the individuals taking it to mRL‘s office were told the anglecock was not wanted in that office, after which it was removed to the automobile of one of the gang foreman of the Washington Terminal Company named 0RABTREE° WEBB indicated the anglecock remained in the back of ORABTREFHS car for about one and a half hours when it was again taken to Ivlro KERL9s officeo WEBB said it was later removed by Captain PEAL of the Washington Terminal Police for safekeeping, According to WEBB, he thereafter assisted with the direction of removal and clearance of the wreck, He mentioned that cer«- tain tests were made by the Fennsylvania Railroad, Washington Terminal and the Interstate Commerce Commission, These tests were not observed inde-= tail by ¥IE.BBo 6° Mr.. Joseph We White, Mechanical Engineer JOSEPH ‘fie ‘WI-IITE, who resides at 350 Bellrose Lane , Radnor, Pennsylvania, advised he is the Assistant Foreman in the Office of the Mechanical Engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Philadelphia, He said after learning of the train wreck on the morning of January 15, 1953 he proceeded to Washington from Philadelphia, arriving at about 1223.5 puma Upon arrival he said he went to the office of the Washington 81 WFO 98-523 Terminal Manager, at which time he observed an anglecock with the connectu ing hose which was said to have been removed from the rear of car three. He said he recalled that the handle of ﬂiis anglecock had been turned ap~ proximately fortyhfive degrees, pointing out the handle turns through ninety degrees in moving from a completely open to a completely closed positiona At about 1:15 pom. WHITE said he observed the condition of the brake shoes on cars one through five of Trah1#l73o He stated the shoes on the first three cars appeared to be red, which indicated heavy braking, He said the brake shoes on cars four and five were normal in color and did not indicate heavy brakingo He informed it was not possible for him to determine whether the brakes on cars four and five had operated at allo WHITE said he next examined the anglecock taken from the rear of car three and with the anglecock handle turned to a forty—five degree angle the air passage opening through the anglecock measured slightly less than threewsixteenths of an incho He said in the full open position or wih the anglecock handle parallel to the hose this opening is approximately one inch in widtho At 5:30 pomo WHITE said he and other interested individuals made up a train consisting of the last thirteen cars from the wrecked train and three substitute cars and a substitute engineo He said the anglecock removed from car ﬂiree of the wreckﬂtrain was placed in a position at the rear of car three in the simulated or made up traino WHITE said tere were various tests conducted thereaftero In these tests the brake pipe leakage on the simulated train was found to have been one pound per minute, according to WHITEO he said also the brakes were applied from the engine with this simulated train standing stillo According to WHITE, the brakes on all cars applied normal- ly, thus indicating air was passing through the anglecock'nhich had been at~ tached to the rear of car three with the handle in the position in which WHITE originally noticed it in KERL's officeo WHITE pointed out it is posn sible the handle of this anglecock could have been moved one way or another after it was taken from.the rear of car three on Train #173 and prior to his observing ﬁ;that afternoono ‘ WHITE said the last thirteen cars on this simulated train were given the single car tests which he described as a standard test approved by interested bodies in the railroading business. He said each of these thirteen cars tested normallyo On January 16, 1953 all brake pipe coupling hoses and all intermediate brake pipe hoses that were not extensively damaged 82 WFO 98~523 in the wreck were removed and examined for internal obstructiono ‘WHITE said these hoses were found to be free from any obstruction, 'WHTTE said the anglecock from the rear of car three was later placed in a vise for further visual inspection, He said the handle of this anglecock was turned manually and advised it "worked hard" which is normal, He said a defect was noted in the anglecock, and he described this defect as a broken pivot pin, He said the anglecock handle pivots on this ping He stated the break in the pin was very rusty which indicated to him it had been broken for an extended period of time, According to WHITE, this break did not in any way affect the operation of the anglecock handle, He said it would absolutely not have caused the anglecock to change from an open to a closed position, WHITE advised he later examined the shoes and wheels on the trucks of cars one, two and three, In connection with the examination of the brake shoes he stated the shoes were brick red, and soe of them had been worn through as a result of severe braking, He said melted metal caused by this severe braking had flowed over the edges of some of the shoes, He stated the shoes are normally about two inches thick, and several of them were com» pletely worn through, He stated there was evidence of built up metal on the tread of some of the wheels, He stated this melted metal was found on the edge of all shoes which were brick red in coloro WHITE said he next checked the brake equipment on the first three cars on what is known as the rack test, He described the rack test as the most severe test that can be given air brake equip» ment, lhese tests were said to have proved that with proper air pressure the brakes on cars one, two and three would operate normally, WHITE advised he next tested various brake equipment from engine h876 of the wrecked train, This equipment was placed on a similar engine, h896, and WHITE alleged they were found to be in normal working condition, i WHITE said as a result of tests conducted he was satisfied air pressure leakage would not be sufficient between Baltimore and Washington to cause more than a brake drag, assuming the train left Baltimore with apropriate air pressure, He said he was also convinced that if the anglecock from the rear of car three of his train was in the position he had first observed it in Mr, KERLVS office, it could not have caused the wreck, WHITE said a man knowing anything about air brakes 83 WFO 93 -5 93 wou3_d not close an angleeock to cause an accident, gsointing out that with such closure an individual familiaz with air brakes would assume that automatic applicatioxa of the brakes would be made in a short timeo He pointed out further the anglecock at the rear 01" car one or three was not closed Y'3I'£€~’:n the train approached stops at Ehiladelphia, “iilmington or Baltimore: He said. had the angleeock been closed at these points the train would have overshot the station, and the engineer would have noticed bu:;.;:ing oi‘ the ears in making the stopso Do .Pennsy1vanj.a Railroad Station «u Wilmirigton, Delaware 10 hire Leonard Flail, Relief Assistant Station Master LEONILRD FLAIL9 2507 Washington btreet, Wilmington, advised he was on duty from midnight until 8:00 name on the morning oi‘ anuary 15, 19530 fie said he observed the i‘ireman's side of Train #173 during»; its arrival, stop and departure from the “'fi;Lming_, ton Stationo He advised the train appeared to be nczrmal in every respect, and ion.-."£’€.= ;:..,:. nothing to indicate the engi neer had any difficulty in bringing the train to a stopo He also ini‘ozs:ae<:.1. none of the train crew was known to him to have made any reiport or oomplaint regarding the proper functioning of this train.» 2.. Mro William E0 Wilson, -‘Ear Inspector V€ILLIM-3? E. ‘:'e’ILE30N, S2 K6118 Avenue, Nenrarkg Delaware; advised he was employed as a car inspector on the morning.; of January 3.5, 1953 ntzen the federai Express entered the statiom He said the Federal ?3xp1'ess arrit ed tvrexitywfixre to thirty minutes late,, and it err;~_v's.:'. in normal 3‘£1:5135.€211 and a;.»peared to stop normallyo its stated he heard no com-i plaints end stoke to no member of the train crew. He informed he made no irzsp-eetiozi of any part of the train which was in the station only about two 1-;ainutes.,. He info:-med he recalled having seen no one touch the train has no reas on to believe anyone tampered with the brake system of this train ‘while it was in ’:E4'il.min{.;tono Lira Jonald ‘Va Merritt, Car Inspector BO.-‘IALD ‘=‘I.. EIERBITT, 31.9 Itartin Drive, Collins Parkg Dela;-rares advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 at the time Train 37173 passed through Eiilmingtono He advised he observed the 81:. WFO 98~S23 fireman's side of this train from the point where he was standing and stated he observed nothing unusual in the arrival or departure of the train or during the time it was stopped in Wilmington, be Mr. John L, Greenhaugh, Car Inspector ‘ JOHN La GREENHAUGH, 209 Delaware Avenue, Harringu ton, Delaware, stated he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 at the time the Federal Express was at the station in Wilmington, He said Erom.the position where he was standing he observed the fireman’s side or the train and advised_nothing unusual was noted by him concernm ing this train, He said the ?edera1 Express had made a usual stop at the station, and he had observed no one inspecting the train or touching any part of it, So Mrs Samuel Macey, Baggage Handler SAM EL MACEY, who resides on Route 3, Townsend, Delaware, stated he handled the baggage from the Federal Express on te morning of January 15, 1953c He said he observed the firanan's side of the train and noted nothing unusual or abnormal during its arrival or departurec He said he had no contact with any portion of the train other than the baggage car and heard no reports from the train crew con» eerning mechanical difficulties of any kind, He advised he noticed no unauthorized persons ahnut the train or platform, and to his knowledge, no one made any mechanical adjustments or repairs to Train #173 in‘Wi1~ mingtono 6, Mr, Ho Go Walrath, Baggageroom Foreman, Kimblesu ville, Pennsylgania 70 Mr, John in Fitch, Baggage Handler, hi8 Bethune 80 Mro Richard Jefferson, Jro, Baggage Handler, 810 No DuPont Street 9, Mr, Edward Duncan, Baggage Handler, 838 Bennett §treet 100 Mr, M. 3, Richardson, Baggage Handler, hh3 More» house Drive 85 ﬁFO 98~S23 11.. Mrs Jack Godwin, Baggage Handler, h?2 Rogers Road, Millside, Deiaware l2, Mr, Robert N, Gore, Bag§;ge Handler, , 1113 Yo Sth.Street N 130 Mr, L, B, Quinn, Baggage Handler, nos Taylor Street WALRATH, FITCH, JEFFER50d, DUNCAN, RICHARDSON, GODWIN, GORE and QUINN advised they did not observe the Federal Express during its arrival, stop or departure at Wihmington on the morning of January 15, 19530 They also informed they had no information believed by them to he pertinent to this investigation, lho Mr. James Po Walling, Postal Transportation Foreman ‘ JAMES P.‘%ALLIG, 830 So Broom Street, advised he had no Contact with the Federal Express on the morning of January 15, 1953, He stated he did not see this train when it passed through Wilmington on that day, 15, Mr, Henry R, Strzalkowdd, Eostal Transportation Clerk HENRY R. STRZALKOWSKI, who resides at lS0h W; Latimer Place, advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 when the Federal Express passed through Wilmington, He said he was unable to recall ‘whether he had seen this train at that time, He informed he has no direct or indirect knondedge of anything which he feels to be pertinent to this investigation, 16, Mr, Leonard Campbell, Night Agent, Railway Express LEONARD CAMBELL advised he and seven other employees were on duty on the morning of January l5, 1953 when Train #173 passed through Wilmington, He said there was no freight loaded on to Train #173, and there was no freight removed from this train, In View of this he stated none of his crew would have had contest with the train crew of the Federal Express, CAMPBELL stated he spent the entire morning on the Rail» nay Express Company dock beneath the passenger p1atform,end he did not ob» serve Train #1730 s WFO 98-523 l7, Mr, Preston Sines, Railway Express Company 18, Mr, John H, Williams, Railway Express Company 19, Mr, Henry Stanwiski, Railway Express Company 20, Mr, Phillip Hastings, Railway Express Company SINES, WILLIAMS, STANWISKI and HASTINGS stated they were working on the Railway Express island on the morning of January 15, 1953 when Train #173 passed hrough Wilmington, They advised they could not see this train from this island and consequently were unable to fur» nish any information concerning it, 21, Mr, C, H, Carpenter, Railway Express Company 22, Mr, James Eaton, Railway Express Company 23, Mr, Edwin W, Lewis, Railway Express Company \ CARPENTER, EATON an LEWIS advised they were working on the Railway Express dock on the morning of January 15, 1953 at the time Train #173 passed through Wilmington, They informed they did not observe 'this train and were unable to furnish any information concerning its arw rival and departure, 2h, Mr, David B, Cox, Sr, DAVID B. COX, SR., who resides in Wilmington, advised he overheard an unknown individual in an eating establishment state that the train which smashed into Union Station in Washington, D. C, had a faulty brake condition, COX said this individual had advised this train had been brought to the Wilmington, Delaware shops of the Pennsylvania Railroad for repairs a short time prior to the accident, This individual was also alleged to have stated the engine made no trips after its repairs prior to the trip on which the accident occurred, COX stated he did not observe this individual and could furnish no information that would assist in identifying this person, 25, Mr, Albert R, Marsh, Master Mechanic ALBERT R, MARSH, 823‘Woodsdale ﬁoad, who is employed at the Wilmington, Delaware Yards of the Pennsylvania Railroad, advised he ‘87 WFO 98~S23 arrived at the scene of the accident at 12:20 p.m., January 15, 19530 MARSH stated he inspected the brake shoes on cars one, two and three and observed they were badly burnedo He said he inspected the brake shoes on cars four and five and observed no evidence of burningo MARSH stated he was told the anglecock on car three had been found half closedo He said he Went to the rear of car three and inspected the anglecock and hose for obstructions and found noneo He informed after inspecting the hose and anglecock he went about the business of getting the wreckage cleared. He said he supervised the removal of the brake equipment from the wrecked locomotive to another locomotive that was at the Ivy City Yardso He was asked for the shop record on locomotive M876 which was the locomotive involved in the January l5, 1953 wrecko MARSH made available a recent history of this locomotive nhich revealed it last received monthly inspection at the Wilmington Electric Locomotive Shop on December l9, 19520 According to this record, all necessary repairs to the locomotive were made at that timeo The report revealed that locomo~ tive h876 received its last air brake periodic attention at the locomotive shop on October 2h, 19520 According to hese records, after the aforeu mentioned monthly inspection, locomotive h876 arrived at the Wilmington Engine House at 6:15 acme, December 20, 19520 The engineman's work report showed the condition of the brakes as goodo The report further revealed that on December 29, l9S2 this locomotive was again at the shop inasmuch as the water tank was leaking and bus bars groundedo According to MARSH, these conditions had no connec~ tion with the operation of the air brake equipmento The records further reveal that on January 5, 1953 the locomotive returned to the shops for a full PR relay operationo This was said to have been caused by the burning of a relay auto transformer and to have had no connection with the operation of the air brake equipmento The report also revealed this locow motive arrived at Sunnyside (Long Island) Engine House at 12:20 acme, January 15, 1953, with Engineman R0 Ac CARROLL and Fireman Ho Jo MUMCKO The report revealed te engineer's work report showed the condition of the brakes as good with the main reservoir pressure 130 to lhO pounds and the brake pipe pressure as llO poundso There was no report of any repairs being needed to the brake equipment at that timeo MARSH said it was his opinion that all salvage from the wrecked engine and train would eventually be shipped to Wilmington where it will be appropriately returned to service or junkedo He said 88 WFO 98~523 the transformers and the air compressor from engine HS76 have been re- ceived at Wilmington, and no other parts have been received as of the last of January 195 , According to MARSH, these items were tested and’ proved to be operating satisfactorily, 26, Mr, Thomas J, McSweeney, Sr,, Machinist THOMAS J, McSWEENEY, l8l3 Levering Avenue, advised he is a machinist (air brake specialist) for the Pennsylvania Railroad, He stated he proceeded to Washington, D, C, after learning of the wreck in which ﬂue Federal Express was involved and arrived in Washington about 11:00 or 11:30 a,m,, January 15, 1953, He infonned he examined the brake mechanism and brake control in the number two end or operating end of the engine, He said he found the automatic brake valve was in the emergency position, and the independent brake valve was in the quick~acting posiw tion, He’advised there are five gauges on the brake panel, and these five gauges were found to be intact, According to McSWEENEY, the entire braking system and controls of engine h876 appeared to be in order in the operating end of the engine, He said he did not check the nonmoperating end or any other part of the éhgine, * McSWEENEY stated that on January 16, 1953, under the direction of the ICC, he had boarded the wrecked engine in the after- noon and assisted in dismantling various valves, including the independent brake valve and automatic brake valve, He said no gauges were removed, and he noted all brake mechanism gauges were still intact on the brake panels, According to MCSWEENEY, these valves which were removed were in» stalled on Pennsylvania hailroad engine L896 for testing, He said they were found to be operating satisfactorily, and after having been tested, were brought to the Wilmington shops where they here cleaned, checked and placed back in general service, ’ McSWEENEY recalled that on January 15, 1953 he had examined the brake shoes on the second and third cars behind the engine, he informed ﬂiese brake shoes and the wheels were'found to be hot on both cars which indicated to him they had been effectively applied, He said when he conducted this examination, he noted the anglecock on the rear of the third car had been removed, He stated he applied air to the brake pipe on the fourth car to check it for possible obstructions and found none, In connection with this fourth car, he informed the brake shoes and wheels were found by him to be cold, which indicated there had been no heavy brakw ing on that car, ‘ 89 WFO 98-52 3 27° Mro Walter Graff, Machinist WALTER GRAFF, Route 1, Newark, Delaware, advised he is employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad and proceeded to Washington shortly after learning of the wreck of Train #1730 He said he boarded theiwrecked engine at about 2:00 pom», January 159 3.953, for the purpose of examining the air brake equipmento He stated this equipment was found to be in good orderc He pointed out that the anglecock on the engine ap-» peared to have been smashed in the wreck and that the wheels of the engine were flat, indicating to him the brakes had been applied on the engine prior to the wrecko GRAFF said he made no examination of the train carso 280 Mrs’ Paul J ., Devincentis, Jro, Machinist PAUL J o DeVII\}CEN‘I‘IS, who resides at 1706 Maple Street, advised he had boarded the wrecked engine of Train #173 on the morning of January 23, 1953 for the purpose of removing portions of air brake equipment and to salvage any equipment possibleo He advised he had assisted in the removal of certain valves and gauges from the non-operat— ing and of the engine‘, He stated he had assisted in the removal of four gauges from the brake panel of the operating end of the engine and had noted one of the gauges was missing from the panel at that time, He was unable to state which gauge this was and likewise was unable to furnish any information concerning what had happened to that particular gaugeo According to BeVINCENTIS, the parts removed by him from the wreckage were placed beside the engine in a roped off area, and he does not know what disposition was made of theme 290 Mr., Robert Jo Gamble, Assistant Foreman ROBERT J 0 GAMBLE, 2305 Pennsylvania Avenue, advised he is employed at the Electric Locomotive Department of the ’*.1'ilmi~ngton shopso He said he came to Washington on January 23 , 1953 to_ direct the salvage of the wrecked engineo GAMBLE said he instructed the ai'orementioned DeVINCENTIS to remove the gaugesfrom the damaged engine and said he later saw these gauges lying on the floor near the wrecked engineo GAMBLE stated Mro J 0 Ag LONG of the Washington Termi-= nal Company had asked him for various gauges which had been removed from the wrecked enginea GAMBLE said he turned these gauges over to Mro LONG 90 WFO 93mS23 and was later advised by LONG that the brake pipe gauge and brake cylinder gauge (one gauge) was missing from the operating end of the engine, GAMBLE said he had no information concerning this gauge or any of the gauges removed by his crew, 30, Mr, William.P,'Walsh, Firemn and Engineer miilln“ P,‘WALSH, 1222 Lancaster Avenue, advised he is employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad, and on the morning of January 15, 1953 boarded Train #173 at Wilmington, Delaware. He said he traveled on this train to Baltimore, Maryland, and was riding in the third car he» bind the engine, WALSEI said the stop at Baltimore appeared to be entire-a ly nonnalo He stated he left the train at Baltimore on the engineer's side and walked toward the rear of the train, According to WALSH, he ob» served no suspicious persons or any activity in the vicinity of the train, E0 Pennsylvania Railroad Station « Baltimore, Maryland l. Pennsylvania Railroad Station Employees a Tr, William A0 Dobson, Station Master WILLIAM A0 DOBSON, 2911 Oakcrest Road, advised the Federal Express arrived at Baltimore at 7:55 aomc on track fours He said it deyarted at 8:00 a.mo According to DOBSON,this train was scheduled to arrive at 7:39 aomog therefore, it was sixteen minutes late, He ex~ plained the five sdzmtsz this train was stopped in Baltimore was the normal station stop necessary to take on and discharge gassengers and baggage, he stated he nor his office received any complaint concerning the braking system on the Bederal Exmresso Inasmuch as there had been no complaint he advised there was no inspection made of the Federal Express in Balti» more, DGBSON said he did not personally observe the arrival of the train but he did personally witness the departure of the train at 8:00 acme He stated he noticed nothing unusual concerning the train. DOBSON furnished records which indicated track one in Baltimore was clear while the Federal Express was on track four be» tween 7:55 acme and 8:00 aim, On track two Train #58 arrived at 7:h9 aomo and departed at 7:55 aqmo On track three Train #122 arrived at 7:59 aomo and departed at 8:05 aomo As stated previously, Train #173, or the Federal Express, arrived at 7:55 acme and departed at 8:00 a,., Track five was 17 V WFO 98-523 clear between 7:55 acmc and 8:00 acmc The records show that on track 31; Train RHOH arrived at 7:Sh acmc and terminated in Baitimorec It was inw dicated that track seven was clear between 7:55 aomc and 8:00 acmc DOBSON also furnished the names of various emw ployees who were on duty at the time Train #173 was in Baltimorec bc Hrc James Lc Fahey, Station MasterVs Office JAMES Lo FAHEY, 1510 Eentridge Road, advised he arrived at the station to report for work at about 7:50 acmc He said he went to the enmloyeesi locker TGCm and returned to the Station Master¥s Office as Train #l73 was departing at 8:00 acmc He informed he noticed nothing unusual about the departure of this train and added he noted no unauthorized persons in or around the vicinity of track fourc cc Mro Edward Ec Wallace, Porter, 1317 Edmondson Avenue dc Mrc William Bc Robinsonc Eorterc 2320 Druid Hill Avenue N_, ec Erc John Ee Gittings, Jrc, Porter, 2h2h Brentwood Avenue fc Ere John Ho Lee, Porter, ll25 Riggs Avenue TEALLACE, ROBINSON, GITTINGS and EEE advised they were on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 and serviced Train #l?3c They said when this train arrived in Baltimore,.they were on platform four, and the train appeared to have stopped without diffioultyc They informed after hanvling the baggage of passengers they returned to the first floor level prior to the departure of the Federal Expressc They stated they noticed no unauthorized or suspicious persons in the vicinity of the tracks around Train #173 while it was in Baltimorec go mTr John Fc Clements, Porter, .« :,;2 Arunak Avenue he Mr“ John G; Welling, iorter, 26 Homewood Avenue WFO 98~S23 CIEMNTS and WELLING advised they were on duty at the Baltimore Station when Train #173 arrived on January 159 19530 They stated they were engaged in servicing other trains and paid no particue lar attention to the Federal Expresso They stated that prior to the arrival of Train #1733 they did not notice any suspicious or unauthorized persons on or around trackofouro .- ic Mro Harvey W. Spencer, Captain of Police HARVEY W. SPENCER, an employee of the Pennsyl- vania Railroad, advised he was on duty when Train #173 arrived on the morning of January 159 19530 Captain SPENCER furnished information con~ cerning the make up and route of Train #173, which information is reported elsewhere in.this reporto jo 5 o‘Valter Yost, Lieutenant of Police WALTER YOST, who is employed at the Pennsylvania l;.} cad Station, advised he had made an investigation regarding Train iii; which wrecked on tie morning of January 15, 1953. YOST informed his ‘_ investigation had failed to disclose that any person or persons had wilfully tampered with any of the equipment on Train $173 causing the wrecko kc Mro ﬂilliam Paul Primm, Road Foreman of Engines WILLIAM PAUL PRIMM, S106 Burnwood Road, advised he arrived in Washington, Dc Co sometime after 10:00 acme, January 15, l953, after having learned of the wrecko He said sometime after his arm rival at Union Station he and Ho Go GUYTON entered the cab of the locomotive involved in the wreck for the purpose of determining the position of te various valves and operating controlso He stated all valves and controls were found to be in a normal condition, or, in other words, he found the engine crew had done everything possible to bring this train to a satis~ factory'halto According to PRIMM, shortly after he left the cab of the loconotiwe he then inspected the brake shoes on the locomotive as best he coui; under the conditionso He said his examination indicated the brake shoes had been used to full capacity in an effort to retard the momentum of the train., He also informed he checked the brake shoes on the first three cars behind the locomotive and found they showed excessive heavy brakingc He said cars four, five and six were likewise inspected 93 WFO 98-523 and he found brake shoes on these cars had no indication of recent ap- plication of the brakes, He advised no further inspection was conducted by him inasmuch as the remaining cars had been moved to the railroad yards, PRIMM related that following his inspection he discussed the accident with various officials, He said he and others had questioned the crew later and he had stayed at the scene of the accident until about 5:30 pone, after which he returned to his headquarters, PRIMM said it was not possible that Train #173 might have traveled from New York to_Washington, D. G. with braking power only on cars one, two and three, He said in his opinion vibration could not open or close an anglecock if it was properly locked, He stated, how» ever, on some of the older equipment used on freight trains, vibrations could alter the position of the anglecock in the event it was not properly locked, PRIMM said,in his opinion, if someone had changed the position of the anglecock in Philadelphia, the train would have either dragged to a standstill or wrecked before it reached Baltimore, He pointed out also if the anglecock had been closed in Baltimore the possibility existed that the accident could have occurred as it did on January 15, 1953, 1. Mr, Richard Warren Grig, Division Superintendent RICHARD WARREN GRIG, 311 Dixie Drive, Towson, Iaryland, advised he is employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad with head» quarters in Baltimore, Maryland, According to GRIG, after receiving noti« fication of instant wreck, he assembled a crew on a wrecker train and left Baltimore enroute to Washington where he arrived at approximately ll:hO a,mo After arriving in‘fashin§ton, he said he contacted Mr, KERL in order to make his men and equipment available to work with the Wasington Terminal crew, He said he thereafter assisted KERL in bringing plans up to date and preparing a program for a twentyafour~hour operation in clearing tn the wreckage, GRIG said he made no detailed examination of the wreckage inasmuch as he was concerned maiiy'with removal and clearing of the wreckageo ma Mr, Mo F, Spindle, Sr., Traveling Engineer M. F, SPINDLE, SR., who resides at lOh3 No McKinley Road, Arlington, Virginia, advised he has headquarters in Baltinnre, 934 1 WFO 98-523 Maryland, where he is employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad. He stated he was in Washington at the time of the wreck and arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 8358 aom. He said at about 9:lO~aom. or 9:15 a.m. he felt the wheels on car three and found them to be warm. He expressed the opinion that the warmness could have been due to the normal travel of the traino He said he observed car six and saw no visable evi- dence of heavy braking on the wheels of this caro J SPINDLE furnished other information regarding the operation of brakes on a trana which infonnation is being reported elsewhere in this report as having been furnished by other individualso no Mr. Elmer Steinmetz, Railways Examiner — EMER STEINEEZ furnished information concern» ing the operation of the air brake system as used by the railroads. This information is not being set forth at this point inasmuch as it is being reported in detail elsewhere in this report as obtained from an air brake specialists 20 Car Department Employees an Mro‘Wi1liam S; Simms, Assistant Car Foreman WILLIAM S. SIMMS advised he was on duty at the time Train #173 arrived at the Pennsylvania Station in Baltimore on Janu- ary 15, 1953; however, he stated he did not observe the arrival or departune of this traino SIMMS stated he has checked with other employees of the car department and learned from them that no report was made to them con» cerning any defect on the train. Likewise, he stated he learned none of the employees of the car department had conducted any inspection of this train 0 . h be -Mro John'G° Mo Lippey,_Gang Foreman JOHN G. M. LIPPEY advised he was standing on track two when Train #173 arrived in Baltimore on track fouro He said this train came to a normal stop, at which time he was about five or tix cars from the rear of Train #1730 He pointed out he was standing on the fire~ man's side of the traino LIPPEY said he observed an inspector named LEROY ZIMMERMAN closing the steam valve at the rear car on Train #173, and no 95 other inspection or work was conducted by the car department employeeso LIPPEY informed he noticed nothing unusual on the station platform and ~ there were no strangers in the vicinity observed by himc LIPPEY informed that in his opinion no anglecock was eiosed on Train #173 while it was in Baltimoreo He said he based this opinion on the fact that the train was in his view during the time it was in Baitﬂmoreo LIPPEY also advised during the course of his enployment he has found many angleoocks in a defective oonditiono He said he believed it was possiole an angleeock could become loose or otherwise defective so that it might close while the train or car is in motiono co Mro Frank Joseph Strickline, Car Inspector FRANK JGEPH STRICKLINE advised he was on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 when Train #173 entered the Baltimore Stationo He stated this train came to a nonmal stop at the stationo Ace cording to STRIGKLINE, he was engaged in other duties upon the arrival of Train #1739 and shortly afterwards he waiked over to Train #173 where he crossed in front of the engine and walked down the engineer‘s side oi the traino He said he observed the anglecocks on the first five or six cars and found them to be in a normai position. He said he also noted that the brake pistons were in a released positiono STRICKLINE said after reaching the fifth or sixth car he turned away from Train #173 and resumed other dutieso STRICKLINE said he noticed no strangers or any unauthorized persons in the vicinity of Train #173, and he received no complaints eonw eerning the operation of this trains According to STRIGKLINE, he has removed many den feotive.angieooeks from passenger cars and freight carso He said when these anglecooks become defective they‘are “loose”, and the angleeook looking device operates inefficientlyo STRICKLINE informed that in his opinion it is possible for a defective angleoock to vibrate through reguw lar train motion from an open to a closed positionc do M 0 Edward Peter Berry, Car Inspector EDWARD PETER BERRY, who resides at h2lh Parkside Drive, advised he was standing on the number two platform on the morning of January L59 1953 when Train #173 arrived on number four tracko He rec called this train had made a normal stop. He said he resumed other duties after the train stopped and did not notice it again until immediately prior to its departureo He advised he noticed nothing unusuai about this train, and he noted no unauthorized persons in the vicinity of the train. 96 ‘NFC 98-623 eo Mm Lerogr Hamilton Zimmermarx, Car Inspector LEROY HAMILTON ZIMME‘RM.ﬁ.E-J, 3.51:6 Holbrook Street,-, Baltimore, advised he was on the platform at track -two when Train ii*].73 er--= rived in 1~3altimo1'e on «January 159 1953. He said he completed his duties at track We vmemhe walked down the 1‘ire:aan’s side toward the rear of Train if}.'?_3o He scivised he would have passed the last four or five cars on the .ﬁ‘ire1::en’4s side prior to reaching; the rear of the £33:-aino ZIta1MER‘M¢‘2 said as he turned behind Train ,v,5.|.73 he noticed an unusual, amount of steam escaping frcsnx the rear oi‘ the last care ﬁe said he partially ciosed this steam valxre with his harm, after which he continued up the engineer's side of Train ,;5.L'?5 for five or six carso ZI{1vIIvI}t"*1fiMMI stated he then left. rain $53.73 and cczmrmued other duties, He informed the steam valve on the rear of this train would have abselutely no rxonneetion w.’Lt.h the air pressure train line ‘9ff.ic.‘D. controls the brake system., is Eire John Beno Them-es,, Jro, Car Inspector JOHN BENO THERREES, JR” 321? zssilloughby Reed, advised he was on track two when Train #173 entered ‘cine Beitimore Stab ion on January 15,, 19530 He said when he completed his duties at ‘break two,, and after Traizx .5173 had made a normal stop» he walked toward. the rear of Train/V1.73 to cross over to another ‘c.rac'£«:_'o He said he noticed ZINFMEREMEI tighten the steam valve an‘: the rear of the last car r.m.’oh.is tr sine THERRES said he then proceeded to other duties and did not reeail having seen Train 7}‘J.73 depart f‘rc*m Baltimoreo He ad- view,-:1 he has r-emuved many defective angleeoczks 1‘ mm trains but has never heard of an :,m_;gl eeoek beeomirzg; closed while the train in motiono go Mrs John Robert Cunningharzi, Gar Inspeoter J01-IN f£OBI§R’1‘ CUTJNIMEHAM, vrrm resides at 2028 Eiisxmm Land .é'&'vemze,., advised he heard Train .—’,él73 making .2 rmmai stop in Baiumore on January 2.55,; 1953‘. He said he was engaged in «duties on ‘crack two and did not actually see ’1'raj.n 7fJ.2’.3 when 31?. stopped, 3:111". he pointed out that an experienced railroad man can readily tell by staurzd that a stop is no1*rna.%.o GUBWIIEHAM related after Leaving track two he vreiked toward the rear of Train 225313 along the f;Lremen°s side 9 at which time he casually inspected the rear five cars of this tra:';.n° He stated ‘ engineer's side, after which he stopped. I WFO 98-523 he crossed the rear of train #173, Walked past about two cars on the CUNNINGHAM advised he was at this position when the Federal Express left Baltimore. He said he noticed nothing unusual in his observance of this train and noted no strangers in the vicinity of it.- CUNNINGHAM informed he has observed numerous defec- tive anglecocks on_trains. He said he has observed defective angleoocks that could possibly have openﬁior ciosed by themselves in the normal opera- tion of the train. He could not recall any specific instance wherein he had observed such an anglecocko ' ho Mr. Anthony Daniel Santello, Oiier ANTHONY DANIEL SANTELLO, 1701; N. Wolfe Street, advised he was on duty when the Federal Express arrived on the morning of January 15,'l953. He said after this train had arrived he walked along the last six cars to the rear of the train where he crossed over and walked up the engineer's side about three cars prior to turning away and resuming other duties. SANTELLO said he observed no one working on Tran #173 nor did he observe anyone loitering in the vicinity of this train. io Mamie Ruby, Gar Cleaner ‘3202 Chestnut Avenue ‘jg Gladys Knox, Car Cleaner 2uhO-So face Street k. Mr. James Elise Jones, Oar Cleaner 1903 N. fayson $treet 1; Mr: Luther Townsend, Car Cigener 82? McDonough Street ma Mr. Largest Ruffin, Gar Cleaner S68 W}’hosher Street n. Mro John Tater, Car Cleaner lhl\N. Patterson Fark Avenue , o. Er. ﬁgy Phares, Gar Cleaner 236Q.Eutaw Place p. Beatrice Bashore, Car Cleaner 59 Riverside Drive,:Edgemore, Maryland 98 WFO 98»b23 The above individuais each advise they were em» ployed in various yards at the Baltimore Station on the morning of January 15, 19530 Each of them stated they did not recail observing Train #173 arrive or depart from Baitimoreo They informed they noticed no strangers in the vicinity of the railroad yards on that morning, nor could they re» call any unusual incidents that might have occurred. 3° Baggage Roam Emplcyees ac Mra John B9'Wyatta Sgpervieer of Mails JOHN Be WYATT, 610 Dunkirk Road, advised he was on duty when the Federal Express arrived on Janurry 15, 19530 He stated he noticed nothing unusual about its arrivalo ‘WYATT said he noticed no unauthorized persons on or around the tracks at the time this train an» rived and he did not personally observe its departureo be ﬁre Paul R0 Screggins,_Baggageman RAUL R0 SGRORGINS, 625 No Schroder Street, adu vised he was assigned to unload baggage from the Federal Express on Januw ary 15, 19530 He said upon arrival of this train he immediately proceeded to remove the baggage from the baggage car which he said was the third or fourth car on the traino. He advised that during the course of his duties he noticed he one tampering with any of the controls nor did he notice any suspicious persons in the vicinity of the traino He recalled there was a coffin unloaded from this train which stopped only about five minutes in Baitimoreo ’ Go Mr, Charles So Qhilcoag, Baggage Feremag 537 Allegheny Avenue, Towson, haryiand do Mr, herein In Wilsen, Baggage Foreman 705 Beaverbrook Road eo Ego Frank Jo Suliivan,»Baggageman 1503 ﬁe3§ord Road £0 %ro_Caivin Go Screggins, Baggageman 7?? ﬁZ“?rank1:n Street 99 WFO 98~523 go he io ly observed the arrival of Train #173 in Baltimoreu Mro Frank A, Cramp, Baggageman 1616 Edmondson Avenue Mro Joseph E0 Thomas, Baggagemen 808 George Avenue hire 3>Tamue.l. Dennons Bagézagemazz ' 1217 No Strioker Street The above listed individuals advised they personalw They stated it appeareé to stop in normal fashion, and they noticed nothing unusual in the viciniy of this train which they also observed when it departeda 30 kg I lo mg no Go qa Po Mrs ﬂilliam Q0 Weiker, Baggageman 3on3 Southland Avenue Mr°_Clarenqe.EixmQ, Beggegemen 202? Eanvale Street Mro Arthur Le Algrittgp Baggagemen 1203 Ghathsm Street 9 Era JQhn’Ao Makelj Baggegemsn 171? No Carey Street Mrs Robert Do Bowling, Baggageman 2131 Division Street Mro Robert Ne JQhnsQn, Bgggageman 2537 N. Howard Street Mrs Jgmes Hemgtqns Baggegemen 2612 E0 Hoffman Street Mro Everett Mo Jordon, Baggagemaq 2308 Ruskin Avenue We Stanley Mo. Rybickyg oBasgage.m.an 2020 Fountain Street ﬁe above listed employees were interviewed and they stated they did not personally observe the arrival and departure of 0. 100 VJF0 98~52 3 Train #l73 on January 159 1953c These employees advised they not1ced no unauthorized or suspicious persons in the vicinity of the track on that morningo he Track Gang Employees an Era Wilbur A0 Johnson, Féreman 35h? Elmore Avenue be Mro Cologerio Cariqtag Laborer ?302 Ashlend Avenue co Mrq Samuel Pick, Laborer n22 E0 Federal Street d. MroEEdwerd Billoups, Laborer 1613 W} Lanvale Street ea Mro William Enomas Long, Laborer 1821 Bentalou Street fa Mro Gnnalee Gibsong Laborer ?u1h kénﬁsylvanie Avenue Each of the above individuals advised tey were on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953 and observed the Federal Ex» press arrive and depart from the Pennsylvania Stationo These employees informed.the train eppared to be operating in a normal manner on that morninga They saxd nothing unusual was noted concerning the brake system and nonning,of a suspicious nature oceurxeﬁ while the train was in their views gs Era JameS“Co Davie, Laborer 6&7 Sterling Avenue ho Mro Jeff Danielsa Laborer 336 No Calhoun Street Mro Ernest Ghesley, Laborer 1719 Madison Avenue 101 WFO 98-S 23 jo Mrq, Friedgxlan, Lahore); 1350 Fremont Avenue kc }=iroW«3_1'iJ;l:i.am I-L, Sgaten, Laborer 1023. Linden Avenue 10 Mr‘, Joseph McDonald, Laborer 211;}. Druid Hill zkvenue mo M30 Joseph Dinunzio,ALLa_bor-er 11311 ‘E32, 23rd Street no Miro Charles Wesley Sykes, Laborer 562 Mcliechen Street The above iniiividuals advised they were on duty on the morning 01' January 15,, 1953 but did not recall observing the Federal, Express during the time it was in Baltimore., 5.. Railway Express Agency Employees ' : -a., MP0 John Jo Noonang Clerk JOHN Jo NOONAN, 5111 Ste George Avenue; advised he was the employee in charge of the Railway Express Office when Tr ain #173 arrived on Januwy 15, 1953.. He stated his agency had no express to load on to or uru,oad from this train; hm ever, he stated he observed the arrival and departure of Train ;*;~‘.L'?3 and observed nothing out of the ordinary at that timeo be Mro Jo Jo Zemaitisg Foreman Gibson Isiandg Maryland co Mm Lloyd Hash, Sorter 1808 No Dallas Street do Mrs F0 Jo Gaie, Warehouseman 1.1,} Glemvood aivenues Gatonsville, Maryland ea Lira Co E0 Zellsrs, Warehouseman L;8b.8 Reisterstown Road 102 ~ \ WFO 98-523 The above individuals info med they were on duty _ on the morning of January 15, 1953 but stated they paid little attention to the arrival and departure of Train #173. They said they noticed nothing unusual concerning this train.. A ‘ Postal Tr azsportation Service 6. a. William Co Parades, ~.General F;oreman b. Etrebil .4... Schaub, Foreman Co John W. Kraemer, Clerk fiillard Ac Taylor, Jr., Clerk Apartment 150, Oaklee [Village 2 do Paul E. Lynch, Clerk, 900? Old Harford Road Each of the above employees advised they were on duty on the morning of January 15, 1953.. Each stated they did not ob- serve the arrival or departure of the Federal Express on that date. They informed they. had noticed no unauthorized or suspicious persons in the vicinity of the Postal Transportation platform on that morning, 70 Block Tower Operators 7 a. Mro M0 L0 Stewart, Division Operator , Mo La STE!-VARD advised he is in charge of all Block Tower operators between the Maryland—De.Laware state line and Wash- ington, Do 0. He said the duties of these operators include keeping a record of the trainswhich pass their towers as to the train number and time it passes, ‘So far as possible, they are required to look for defects and -to observe the trains for unauthorized riderso be ‘Doris No Ilryan, Union Junction Tower 217 So Hilton Street Go Ga. M. Sterner, Union Junction Tower, 1523 Poplar Road Street 103 we 98-523 % ‘ do Go jo kc 10 m. they were on duty on the Thomas B. Robbins, Union Junction Tower Samuel Kapian, B 8c P Junction Tower 2L;39 8. George Street,“ York, Pennsylvania J, B. Maher, B éc zéfmnctionv Tower Calvin L. Blucher, B & 1? Junction Tower William J. Merryman, Fulton Junction Tower Ruxbon, Meryl and E, H, Wiedner, ‘Gwynne Falls Junction Tower 1:701 Hommer Avenue Lo E, Faulkner, Odenton Junction Tower N. S. Tracey, Bowie Junction Tower 2512 Guilford Avenue J o “E, Sibegcgue, Bowie Junction Tower J 0 A, Trimmer, Landover Junction Tower Bowie, Maryland BRYAN, STERNER and other tower operators advised» morning of January 15, 1953., In connection with their duties they advised they noticed nothing ofrb of the ordinary regard- ing Train #173. They stated they did not see anyone climbing between the cars and noticed no defects or malwfunctions of any kind. 8° Grade Crossing Attendants a, be Co Cu. Ho Rumley, Knecht Avenue Crossing 921; Ashburton Street; James E, Hawkins , Jericho Park Crossing Bowie, Maryland To Do Owens, Springfield Crossing Bowie, Maryland 101; ~WFO 98~523 d. R. A. Hunter, Glendale Crossing 1225 Hamlin Street, N. E., Washington, D. G. e. A. R. Usual, Seabrook Crossing ~ 332 H Street, 3. W}, Washington, Do O. f. H. E. Patterson, Lanham Crossing Lanham, Maryland , g. Leroy Jamison, Ardwick grossing , 3381 Blaine Street, N. E0, Washington, Dc Co . ‘RUMLEY, HKWKINS and other grade crossing atten» dants were interviewed and advised they did not notice any defects or mal—functions or anything unusual in the operation of any trains passing their crossings on the morning of January 15, 1953. 90 Interviews‘With Subjects bf Attempted Wreck of B & 0 Train Near Baltimore, January 2h, 1953 8 On January 2h, 1953 a train on Baltimore and Ohio ‘Railroad track two stopped just prior to striking a crosswtie across a rail of this track. The point where this cross—tie was found is under B~l Bridge, Curtis Bay Junction, Baltimore, Maryland. This bridge is in -the immediate vicinity of the residences of the following mentioned ins dividualso The residences are approximately a thirty-minute automobile drive fran the Pennsylvania Railroad Station in Baltimore where the Federal Express, or Train #173, stopped on the morning of January 15, 1953 at 7:55 a.m.: _a. Joseph Thomas Freeman , ‘JOSEPH THOMAS FREEMAN, 26b? 8. Pace Street, upon interview, admitted placing a cross-tie across one rail of Baltimore and Ohio track two under B—l Bridge at Curtis Bay Junction in Baltimore at about 11:00 a.m. on January 2h, 19539 According to FREEMAN, he was as- sisted in placing this cross-tie across the rail by LYNN BAILEY, who, ”’ like FREEMAN, is fourteen years of age, and RAYMOND EOWIE, who is fifteen years of age. FREEMAN denied any knowledge of tampering with the Federal Express train on the morning of January 15, 1953 or at any other time, He denied knowledge as to the actual location of the Pennsylvania Railroad Station or the route of the Federal Express, 105 WFO 98-523 be Samatha Freeman c. Ruby Freeman SAMATHA and RUBY FREEMAN, sisters of JOSEPH FREEMAN, advised they could not recall the specific whereabouts of JOSEPH on the morning of January 15, 19530 They stated, however, on January 28, 1953 that during the past three weeks they could not recall JOSEPH having departed fro home prior to 8:15 aom. do Edith Joyner, School Teacher EDITH JOYNER, Public School 123, ﬁermitted a check of the school records which revealed that both FREEMAN and BAILEY were in attendance at Public School 123 and not tardy on January 15, 19530 She advised classes start at 93003omo EDITH JOYNER advised these records failed to re~ fleet attendance of RAYMOND BOWIE on January 15, 1953» so Lynn Bailey ‘ _ LYNN BAILEY; who resides at 2603 Huron Street, advised he leaves home for school about 8:30 aom. He denied knowledge of tampering with the Federal Express on the morning of January 15, 19539 fa Fannie Bailey FANNIE BAILEY9 Mother of IYFWQ advised that LYNN leaves home for school at about 8:30 in the morninga go Raymond Seymour Bowie RAYMOND SEYHOUR BOWIE, who resides at 2619 Ridgely Street, advised he did not know why he had not attended school on January 15, 19539 He stated when he does not attend school he generally sleeps late in the morninge He denied any knowledge of any tampering with the Federal Express on any OCCaSi9Ho ho Ruth Bowie V ‘RUTH BOWIE, Mother of RAYMOND, advised RAYMOND has not left the house prior to 8:15 aom. on any morning in the recent past. 106 WFO 98-523 ‘ i. Lenore Bowie LEBDRE BOWIE, sister of RAYMOND, advised she usually goes to work between 8:00 and 8:30 am. She stated she could not recall RAYMOND. having left home prior to her departure on any morning in the recent past. . Accordingtoa. Baltimore City map, ‘the Bennsylvania Railroad Station is about a thirty-minute automobile ride from the resi- dences of the aforementioned individuals. ‘ 107 WFO 98-523 LEB:sjr 'VII. PULLMAN COMPANY EMPLOYEES ‘All-of the employees of the Pullman Bompany who were employed on the Federal Express from Boston, Massachusetts to Washington, D. C., have been interviewed. I 1. Mr. Benjamin Co Hancock, Conductor, Pullman_Company BENJAMIN C. HANCOCK, who resides at 309 Lambeth Road, Baltimore, Maryland, advised he was in charge of the last three pulhman cars on the train, two of which originated at Springfield, Massachusetts, and one from frovidence, Rhode Island. There was nothing unusual noticed during the entire trip where he joined the train at the New Haven Yards on through to Baltimore, Maryland. At Baltimore he got off the train and stood on the station platform at the head end of the third from the rear pullman. He observed no one tampering with or inspecting the cars. He re-boarded the train at Baltimore as it started to move forward. He first became aware that something was wrong because of the high speed of the train maintained through the Washington yards. The car he was in was swaying from side to side, this being the second from the rear car, and he was starting to pass through it to go forward into the third from the rear car when the train stopped. 2. Mr. Eugene M. Gillis EUGENE M. GILLS, who resides at 8ll Shirley Street, Winthrop, Massachusetts, stated he boarded the train at Boston, Massa- chusetts, and was in charge of the first nine pullman cars. At the time of the accident he was in a club car which was the eighth pullman back. He did not hear the train horn blowing, and he first became aware that something was wrong hen the train on entering the Union Station yard hit a switch very hard. He looked up and saw the train was going at a very high speed, and he noted no slow down until the train came to a halt. He did not realize the seriousness of the accident at the time. While at Baltimore he descended from the club car to the platform. He did not notice any inspection being made of the train nor did he see anything suspicious or anyone tanpering'with the cars. 108 WFO 98-523 ~ 7 3. Mr. Oscar Johnson ‘ . OSCAR JOHNSON, who resides at 630 Sterling Street, Baltimore, Maryland, stated he has been a pullman porter for twenty—nine years._ , ” ‘ JOHNSON boarded the Federal Express at Boston, Massa- chusetts. He left the train at Baltimore to stand on the platform so that he could discharge his passengers. While standing there he noticed no one inspecting the train, saw nothing suspicious, and saw no one tamper- ing with the cars. ' ‘ Upon approaching Wadiington, D. 3., he looked out of the window and3raiiZed the train was traveling at an excessive speed, and he noted no slow down. He then heard the locootive‘s horn blowing and knew this meant trouble. He took no action, and the train failed to slow down until it struck the Union Station and stopped. (‘ h. -Mr. James Merritt : JAMES MERRITT, who resides at 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts, advised he could not recall whether or not he left the train at Baltimore. The first he noticed that anything was wrong with the tran was wnen he observed that they were entering the terminal yards at a very fast rate of speed. When they hit a switch—over on entering into the Union Station, he thought the train was going about 50 miles per hour. it no time did he hear the engineer blowing a horn. 5. Mr. Carroll Staton, CARROLL STATON, who resides at 927 Westminister Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., advised he boarded the train at Springfield, Massachusetts, and his car was hooked on to the Federal Express at New Haven, Qonnectitut. When the train arrived at Baltimore he left the train to assist passengers and noticed a man walking along the train from the front, coming toward he rear looking at the cars as though inspect- ing. This was a white man, wearing the work clothes of a railroad man. He could not further identify him. This man did not go between the cars but merely walked along the line looking at the underparts of the cars as a normal train inspector would do. He did nothing suspicious nor did STATON see anyone do anything suspicious around the train, and saw no one go between any of the cars. ’ ' 109 WFO 98-S23 ’\ , STATON stated he first rsﬂized something was wrong when he looked out of the window between the Bladensburg Road and Ivy City and noticed the train was running at an unusually fast speed. He first heard _: the train blowing about Florida Avenue, N. E., and at this time he realized the train was probably going to crash, and he told some of his passengers to brace themselves or lie on the floor of the train. 6. Mr. Alexander Russell ALEXANDER RUSSELL advised he has been a pullman porter for twentyaeight years, and on the day of the accident he was on the last car of the train. This car was made up at Providence, Rhode Island, and met the Federal Express at New Haven, Connecticut. At Baltimore he descended from the car to assist the passengers leaving the train, and at the time he noted no inspection being made of the train nor did he see any suspicious persons around the platform. He first realized something was wrong when the train ap- proached Washington, Do 0. at an excessive rate of speed.‘ He estimated that when the train passed the Ninth Street Bridge, it was traveling at about 60 miles per hour, 7, Mr. Scrouger Sampson SCROUGER SAMPSON, ho resides at 39 Rose Street, Boston, Massachusetts, stated he worked the first pullman in back of ﬁne coaches. He entrained at the New Haven Railroad Yards at Boston and had a normal and routine trip from Boston to Baltimore, At the station in Baltimore he got off the train and stood on the station platform by the rear door of his car, He did not see anyone inspect,— adjust, tamper or handle the coupling or hose connections between his car and the second pullman. SAMPSON became aware that something was wrong when the train approached Washington at a high rate of speed. He could feel no brakes being applied to his car, and he warned his passengers to brace themselves for a crash as he felt that the train was going to crash. His car swayed a great deal from one side to the other and felt as though it would turn over, but it did not, 110 Q WFO 98-523 8. Mr. Theron Brown THERON BROWN, who resides at 514 Hollander Street, Roxbury, Massachusetts, advised he was assigned -to the third ppllman back ‘when he boarded the train at Boston, Massachusetts. He was unaware of any difficulty with the train at Kingston, Rhode Island, as he was asleep at the time the train stopped there. He first noticed the train was not operating normally when his car gave a sudden lurch going through the Union Station Yard and suddenly stopped. ' 9. Mr. Harry L. Brewer HARRY L. BREWER, who resides at 1226 U Street, N. ‘{4}, Washington, D. 0., advised he observed no -one tampering with the train during any-of the stops made, and he noticed nothing unusual about the operation of the train prior to reaching the Washington, D. C. area. ‘Upon approaching Washington he noticed the excessive speed of the train in passing through the switches. The sudden stop finally made by the train caused him to believe the engine had run into the station. 10. Mr. Clarence Ben Hughes CLARENCE BEN HUGHES, who resides at 2L;hh Ontario Road, N. W., Washington, D. C., stated he noticed nothing unusual about the operation of the train prior to reaching the Washington area. At the New York Avenue Bridge, he said the excessive speed of the train was noticed by him, but he thought the engineer was trying to make up time. As the train passed Florida Avenue, he again noticed the excessive speed and the next thing he noticed was the sudden stop made by the train. According to HUGHES, this stop was unusually rough, but he as usual helped his passengers off and re-boarded his pullman and started cleaning it. He was unaware of the fact that the train had crashed until he was advised of it by a pullman instructor. 11. Mr. Leroy Laughlin LEROY LAUGHLIN, who resides at 15 Rutland Square, Boston, Massachusetts, advised he was the porter on the second pullman, and he ' boarded the train at Boston, Massachusetts. He noticed nothing unusual in the operation of the train until it entered the Washington, D. C. yards. 111 wro 98-523 The train was hitting switches too fast, and at thmstime he knew something was wrong and thbught it probably would byapass Washington. LAUGHLIN told one of his passengers they were traveling too fast, and about that time they stopped suddenly. He said one of his passengers told him the car was off the tracks, and when he got off the car, he noticed the front wheels were; off the track, and the car behind him was on the tracks. 12. Mr. Edward Leon Holmes EDWARD LEON HOLMES, who resides at 5th and T Streets, N. E., Pullman Dormitory, Washington, D. C., advised he was the cook on the club car and the dining car. HOEEES stated he noticed nothing unusual about the operation of the train until it approached the Washington Station. The train hit a switch or curve at a high rate of speed and knocked him down. Some'of his dishes fell and were broken, but he continued his work, thinking that the engineer was in a hurry. When the train came to a halt, the rest of his dishes had fallen and broken. While he was cleaning up around his stove, someone cameaﬂong side his car and told him the engine had gone through the station. 13. Mr. Fred D. Fair FRED D. FAIR, who resides at 3?h2 Hayes Avenue, N. E., Washington, D. C., advised he was a porter assigned to pullman car City of Canton. He boarded the train at Boston, Massachusetts. The train made a normal stop at Baltimore, Maryland, but as none of his passengers got off, he did not open the doors at this station. The entire trip appeared to be normal except when the train crossed the eastern branch near Bladens— burg Road in Washington, D. C. At this time the car lurched to one side, but he had no idea the train was out of control. He assumed the train was just making a very fast approach to the Washington Terminal Station. It never occurred to him to pull any emergency valve as he had never re- ceived any instrdctions regarding the emergency valve. lb. Mr. Richard A. Colbart RICHARD A. COLBART, who resides at h633 Benning Road, N. E., Washington, D. 0., advised he boarded the Federal Express at Boston, Massachusetts. COLBART was aware that the train had stopped thirty minutes out of Providence because of brake trouble, but he did not know what the trouble actually was. Nothing else unusual happened until the train approached the K Tower near Washington. At this time the train was going very fast and dishes were beginning to fall on the 112 WFO 98-523 floor. He estimated the speed_as being about 60 to 70 miles per hour. There was no warning of the impending wreck, and the passengers kept their seats. At the time the train hit the station COLBART laid down on the floor, and he was the only one who was on the floor at this time. 15. Mr. Robert Edward Person EOBERT EDWARD PERSON, who resides at 2351 Pitts Place, 8. E., Washington, D. C., advised he was the pater on the car City of Gany, He was aware of the fact that when the train was between Erovidence, Rhode Island, and New London, Connecticut, the brakes on the rear car began to stick, This situation was corrected, and the train continued. Nothing further took place that would be considered unusual by PERSON until the train was coming into K Tower near Washington, D. C. where he thought ﬂue speed of the train was faster than usual. At this time he was collecting the luggage of the seventeen passengers on his car fdr their departure from the train. Neither he nor any of his passengers received any warn— ing the train would possibly wreck, He did not feel any appreciable jar when the train stopped inasmuch as he still had one of the bags in his ‘" hand after the train stopped, 113 WFO 98-S23 LEB;sjr VIII. INVESTIGATION — msumarov, 13., C. A. Switch Tower Employees l,_Mr. Harry 8. Ball, Assistant Train Director, C Tower HARRY S. BALL, 521 ~ 68th Place, Seat Pleasant, Mary~ land, Assistant Train Director, Station C Tower, which is located next to the New York Avenue Bridge, is employed by the Washington Terminal Gompanyo BALL first became aware of the fact that the Federal Express was in difficulty due to a roar it made as it passed under the New York Avenue Bridge. BALL looked to see what was the cause of the roar and observed the train heading toward Union Station. He immediately picked up his microphone and advised the next signal tower, the K Tower, to give the oncoming train green lights and open switches into an open track as it was obvious to him from the speed the train was making that he would be unable to stop in the distance he had remaining. BALL advised he could not see the running gear on the train as there was a train between it and the tower, and he could only see the upper portions of the Federal Express. BALL heard no whistle or horn, and it was only the roar made by the train passing under the bridge that called his attention to the train. BALL estimated the speed of the train upon passing his tower as 60 miles per hour. 4 2. Mr. John Wyight Feenay, Train Director, K Tower JOHN WRIGHT FEENEY, 10529 St, Paul Street, Kensing— ton, Maryland, is Train Director at K Tower, this being the last tower in the yards prior to reaching the station, 1 FEENEY said the first report he had in K Tower on Train #173 was when G Tower told him over loudspeaker it was approaching, Upon learnng from 0 Tower that Train #173 was somewhere around Bladens— burg Road, he assigned it to track sixteen and so advised a fellow em- ployee who_routed the train from track fortyuone to track sixteen, He next heard the air horn wide open and looked up the track where he saw Train #173 obviously out of control. FEENEY llh WFO 98-523 mhmdwmsmmsmmfwmgﬁmtmewmemmkamtmrak. The engine was about five hundred feet from K Tower when he first observed it. He was unable to observe the wheels of any of the cars at that time, and he did not recall noticing any sparks other than from the engine wheels. ‘He pointed out that at no time was he able to get a good view of any wheels other than the engine wheels. ' FEENEY, upon realizing the train was out of control, called the station by direct telephone and advised the station master that a runaway train was coming into the station. He said K Tower is about fifteen * a hundred feet from the station. He remained in K Tower and did not go to the station to observe the wreck. 3. Mr. Ray Salmon, Senior Switchman, K Tower RAY SALMON advised he first noticed the Federal Express as it approached his tower at a distance of about two hundred yards. At this time there were sparks flying from under the train, and it was approaching at a considerable speed.‘ He did not have the oppor- tunity to switch the train to one of the two southbound tracks as there was insufficient time to note first whether or not the tracks were vacant, and second he must have two minutes in which to-throw the automatic switch devices which are present at the Washington Terminal Yard. SALMON was unable to estimate the speed of the train as it passed his tower; however, he did state it seemed as though it were going 90 miles per hour. B. Witnesses to the Accident 1. Mr. Oscar C. Swanson, Air Brake Instructor, Southern Railroad, Charlotte Division OSCAR O. SWKNSON, who resides at Milford Hills, Salisbury, North Carolina, advised that at ﬁle time of the accident he was standing near stop block number fourteen when the train came in on track sixteen and crashed through the stop block. He assisted in getting the injured out of cars two and three after the engine had crashed through thefloor of the concourse. ‘After this he looked at the brake qylinder pistons on cars two and three and observed that they were in an aplied position 115 FIFO" 98-5'23 with four or five inch brake piston travel. He did not notice the piston position on car one as it was in the hole. A He then walked around the remaining cars of the train to the rear from car four to car sixteen and observed the brake cylinder pistons were not in an applied position on these cars. He ad- vised he was tempted to open the anglecock on the rear car to see if there was!‘-‘air in the braking system, but he did not do so because it was a Penn- sylvania train, and he was an employee of the Southern Railroad. He stated it was impossible to determine whether there was any air pressure on the braking system of cars four to sixteen by mere observation. 2. Mr. Emmett v. Letts, Fireman on Train #176 MMETI‘ V. IETTS, North East, Maryland, fireman on Train #170, which was on track seventeen at Union Station on January 15', 1953, advised that at approximately 8:30 a.m. he heard the whistle of Train #173 coming in on track sixteen and noted it was making excessive speed and that sparks were showering from the wheels of the engine, indicating the brakes were being applied on the engine. his attention was on the engine, and he did not. notice any sign of braking on the other cars. 3. Mr. John A. Scott, Engineer for the Pennsylvania ‘ Railroad ' i _ JOHN A. SCOTT, Wilnxington, Delaware, was in the cab of his engine located on track eighteen on the morning of January 15, 1953.. He said that track sixteen was to his right with track seventeen inter- " vening, arid"the're were several railroad cars parked on track seventeen, _ so that the rear of the last of these cars was almost directly opposite the cab of the engine in which he was situated. SCOTT said that when he looked up in the direction of track sixteen,‘ upon hearing an unusual noise indicating a train was moving on a nearby track at a high rate of speed, he noticed Train #173 going into the station at a speed of at least 30 miles per hour. He did not see the engine of the train as it had passed his field of vision prior to the time ‘he’ looked up. He believes he saw the first part of the train but does not know specifically which car was the first he saw. He noted that fire andsparks were coming from the‘ wheels, indicating to him that the brakes were operating on that car. 116 WFO 98-S23 After the accident, SCOTT did not leave his engine except to talk to his conductor on the platform beside his engine, and he did not go to the scene of the accident. h. Mr. Russell G. Stevens, Locomotive Fireman, rennsylvania Railroad . RUSSELL G. STEVENS, who has been employed as a loco- motive ﬂireman by the Pennsylvania Railroad for the past twelve years, ad- vised he was in the cab of his engine located on track eighteen. His at- tention was attracted by the warning signal being sounded by Train #173, and he looked toward the sound. Several cars parked on track seventeen partially blocked his view, so he jumped to.the ground and moved around rthe end of these cars so he could have a better point of observation.’ From this position he observed the entire length of the train as it approad1ed the station, and he observed sparks and fire coming only from the wheels of the engine and the first car, indicating these brakes were operating. He saw no evidence which would cause him to believe the brakes on the rear part of the train were operating. When the Federal Express stopped, ﬂue fourth car from the rear was immediately opposite his position, and he noticed the braking shoes were hanging loose,indicating the brakes on this car did not operate. ' ’ 5. Mr. Earl R. Garrick EARL R. CARRIGK, 1823 Chilton Street, Baltimore, Maryland, has been employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad since 1916. CARRICK had just left track sixteen with his train enroute to the round house, and he was in the area of K Signal Bridge when he first saw Train #173 coming in under the New York Avenue Bridge a and sounding its whistle. He saw balls of fire and smoke coming from the engine and first car. He explained the balls of fire were caused by the sparks which followed the wheel in a circular motion when brakes are ap- plying. His attention was on the engine and the first car, and he did not particularly notice the next few cars until the train had passed. After the train had passed, he noticed the rear section was not braking. He did not view the wreckage'until an houriand a half after the accident, and at this time made no close observations. M h 117 WFO 98-523 ~ 6. Mr. John S. Duley JOHN S. DULEY, 1912 Oakhill avenue, Baltimore, Maryh land, stated on the day of instant crash he was employed as conductor on Train #126 which was on track eighteen. He heard the whistle of Train #173, and by the time he looked up, the enine had passed, and he could see only the cars racing by. He could not get a good look at any of the cars; how- ever, he estimated the speed at about 50 miles per hour at this point. After the crash, DULEY noticed the pistons on the brake cylinders of the ninth and tenth cars were in, indicating that the brakes were not on. He did not cross over to_examine the air line, hows ever, and was unable to state whether or not there was actually air in the train. 7. gr. Aleck R. Carter, Traveling Inspector, Southern Railroad Company ALECK R. CARTER, 6l3h Utah Avenue, N. W.,‘Washington, D. 0., was standing atnut 125 to 150 feet from where the wrecked Pennsyl- vania train came in. He was just outside the gate on the concourse on the west side of track sixteen, talking to a friend, OSCAR SWANSON. When he first observed the train, the locomotive had already left the track and was on the concourse. It was CARTER's opinion that the locomotive was in reverse when he saw it. He based ﬂris opinion on the aount of sparks that he observed flying from the locomotive's wheels. He could not recall ever having heard the train's whistle. As soon as the ceiling and debris stopped falling, he ran.toward where the station master's office had been to determine if any of his friends had been killed or injured. Seeing these men safe, he went to the wrecked cars to ascertain if he could be of assistance. After making sure that he could be of no help there, he returned to his original position where he was soon joined by SWKNSON. SWANSON asked CARTER where he had been, and CARTER advised him of his actions. SWANSON then told CARTER he had just checked the train and the rear of the train had no air in it. CARTER stated it is his opinion the only thing that could have caused such a brake failure would be the lack of air in the auxiliary reservoirs, and this could only happen by bleeding the auxiliary on each car individually. 118 WFO 98-523 _ CARTER advised he did not see how the position of the anglecock on the third car could have caused the wreck. Had the angle- cock been closed CARTER felt the brakes on the cars back of car three would have been applied through leakage before the train arrived in Washington. CARTER also stated it'would be possible for a train of this size to come from New York to Washington with brakes operating ‘on only three cars but added an experienced engineer could tell by the feel of the train ﬂiat he had cars without brakes. 8. Mr. Wesley B. Morrison, Gang Foreman, Electric Trac~ tion Department, Pennsylvania ﬁailroad WESIEY B. MORRISON, 13% west Chester, Lancaster, Penn- sylvania, advised he got on Train #173 at Baltimore, Maryland. He entered this car at the steps located on the rear of the third car from the engine. Upon reaching the station in Baltimore, he observed the car and started to run to catch it when he noticed one of the train crew was standing near a casket which was being unloaded from the combine, the fourth car on the train with the baggage end nearest the third car, but realizing this casket would take some time to unload, he then slowed down, walked around the ex~ press car on which’the casket was being unloaded, and entered the train through the rear door of the third car. As he entered this door he noticed no one around with the exception of one of the train crew who has assist- ing in the unloading of the casket. As he got into the third car, he re- moved his coat and sat down, and the train started almost immediately. The train made good time from Baltimore until the first slow down near Bladensburg Road. He noticed the train was going pretty fast past Ivy City, and upon reaching New York Avenue he noticed it was going‘too fast to stop. MORRISON, who was sitting on the east side of the train, was then thrown from his chair to the west side of the train. At this time he went to the emergency valve and pulled same; however, he got no reaction. MORRISON replied he could not feel the brakes at all; however, hey could have been on, and he could not have noticed it, and he cannot recall hearing the engine whistling. 9. .Mr. William B. Stryker, Flagman, Pennsylvania Railroad WILLJAM B. STRYKER advised that on the morning of January 15, 1953 he was the flagnan on the outbound Pennsylvania Railroad Train #126 which was scheduled to leave Union Station at 9:00 acm. This train was located on track eighteen. Train #107, an inbound train which had arrived at approximately 7:30 a.m., was standing on track seventeen, the engine facing the station approximately fifty feet from the bumper. 119 WFO 98-523 m STRYKER heard Train #173 approach the station on track sixteen. It might have given a little whistle approaching the sta- tion, but if it had, he did not notice it. STRYKER did not notice whether the brakes were applied as his whole view of this train crashing into Union Station probably did not last more than a very few seconds. He did not go to the scene of the wreck because his train was loading in preparation for leaving and, in fact, did leave Union Station at 9:10 a.m. 10. Mr. Ross Albert Brewer, Engineer, Pennsylvania Railroad ROSS ALBERT BREWER, 2u23 — 31st Street, 5. E., Wash- ington, D. 0., was the engineer on Train #107, inbound, which was on track seventeen on the morning of January 15, L953 when Train #173 crashed into the Washington, D. C. Terminal. His locomotive was about fifty feet from the bumping block, and he was on the right side of the cab of the engine when his fireman, E. U. LETTS, told him Train #l?3 was approaching the sta- tion at an excessive speed and giving short blasts on the train whistle. At this point BREWER stated he rushed across to the other side of the cab in time to see the train crash, and he immediately went to the engine of Train #173 to see if he could be of any assistance in getting the engineer and fireman out of the wreck. BREWER stated that after approximately ten minutes, when it was determined the engineer and the fireman were not seriously hurt, he went back to his own locomotive. BREWER advised that at approximately 9:00 a.m. he again left his cab and inspected the brakes on cars four, five, six and seven on Train #173 and found them to be in a full release position. He related he did not check the reservoirs, the anglecocks or pull the emer- gency valve in any of the remaining cars on the track.. BREWER stated both the firemen and he observed water bubbling around the governor on the UC valves on cars fire and six, den noting that some air was coming out of the train line but was unable to: determine the amount of pressure. BREWER was unable to state whether or not thirty poundsik'less would be enough to cause this bubbling. 11. Mr. Paul Rusk Moore, Yard Conductor, Washington ~ Terminal Company PAUL RUSK MOORE, 2l2h B Street, N. E., was working on track forty—three, north of J Bridge, when he observed Train #173 come under the New York Avenue Bridge, traveling at a speed of what he considered 120 WFO 98~S23 to be between seventy and eighty miles per hour and with its horn going_ full blast, or a continuous whistle, which means to railroaders that the train is out of control and in need of help or brakes. The cars passed by him so fast it was impossible to discern the names of the individual pullman cars. He immediately realized that the train was a "runaway train" and imediately started running toward the station, reaching the rear end of Train #173 within six to eight minutes following the accident, MOORE mentioned he observed fire flying from the wheels of the motor for a distance back of about two and one~half car lengths, and the pantograph was a ball of fire. He mentioned it was his opinion the fire was from the wheels of the motor, and not from the following cars. * When he reached the rear end of the train, he examined the anglecocks and brake cylinders on the last ten cars ‘of the train which were all pullman cars. He-ran down on the fireman’s side of the train and found that the cylinders were in the full release position, and the anglococks were in their correct positions. In addition, on three different occasions while passing down the length of the ten pullman care he placed his hand against the wheels and found they were warm from ordi- nary-running friction, but not hot as they would have been if the vheels had been locked by the brakes and sliding on the tracks, 12. hr. Richard H, Outlaw, Telegraph Operatgr, Washington Terminal QICHARD H. OUTLAW, who resides at 208 Massachusetts Avenue, N. E., works in the station master's office, which at the time of .the accident was located on the station concourse directly in line with track sixteen. About ten to twelve seconds before the crash he was warned by RAYMOND KLOPP, Clerk, Station haster’s Office, that a runaway train was on_track sixteen, and he ran from the Station Master's Office. As OUTLAW ran east on the concourse, he heard the engine's whisﬂe and a loud roar. He glanced back and saw the engine just before it hit the block at the end of track sixteen. He turned his head, and therefore he did not see the engine hit the block; however, he did see it just after the engine hit the block, and until it dropped through the concourse floor. §UTLAW said he has a hazy recollection that while the engine was still on the track he saw sparks coming from the engine's wheels, but he was not positive of this fact. He advised the cars behind the engine were blocked from his View by railroad cars parked on track seventeen, and he therefore did not know if sparks were coming from their wheels. . 121 wro 98-523 After the train stopped, OUTLAW ran farther east on the concourse because he feared more of the floor Wculd sink. 13. Mr. Raymond A. Klopp, Clerk, Station Master's Office, .— Washington Terminal ~ 1 RAYMOND A. KLOPP, who resides at 215 Constitution Avenue, N. E», advised that about fifteen seconds prior to the accident he 'received.a telephone call from K Tower, warning that a runaway train was bearing down on the station on track sixteen. KLOPP said he warned other people in the Station Master's Office and then ran. ; KIOPP first saw the train when it was approximately ten railroad car lengths from the end of the track. He could hear the engine thistle blow. He warned people standing on the concourse of the runaway train and started running west on the concourse. He looked at the train again when it was approximately two to three car lengths from the end of the track. At this time he saw sparks coming from the wheels of the engine,and he thought he saw sparks fro the wheels of the first two or three cars. He said he was positive there were sparks on the engine's wheels, and he was definite there were no sparks fran the wheels of cars to the rear of car ﬂares. KLOPP informed the engine crashed through the sta— tion as he continued his run west on the concourse, and he could not see the crash because he had his back turned. He said he advised a telephone operator to call a fire department, and he then went to the drugstore in Union Station to get morphine to be administered to any injured passengers. lh. Mr. William_A. Nelson, Telegraph Operator, Wash- ington Tenminal WIELIAM A. NELSON, 5112 Connecticut Avenue, N. W}, advised that just prior to the crash he was in the Station Master's Office. He said he received a warning of the runaway train from Mr. KLOPP, and he ran out of the office toward the east end of ﬂue concourse. He said he stopped and turned around in time to see the engine hit the block and crash into the Station Master's Office and the newsstand. He said he could not have seen any sparks that may have been coming from the wheels of the train because his view was obstructed by railroad cars parked on track seventeen. NELSON said he did not see the engine drop through the concourse floor because there was so much smoke and dust at the time. 122 wm 98-523 He advised the incident completely unnerved him, and he went straight home without ‘going near the wreckage. ‘ '_fJ_.‘S;. ‘ Mr. Joseph D. Knott JOSEPH D. KNOTI‘, who resides at‘ 351.7 .A Street, S; E., Washington“, D. C., advised he was standing on the concourse of Union Station near the end of track twenty about'8:35’a—.m, on January 15, 1953. He heard a train whistle and a roaring noise. He said he ran to the end of track‘ sixteen and saw a train. about three hundred to four hi1ndred- feet away coming toward the station‘ at a. fast rate. He saw what appeared to be sparks under the wheels of this train, but because of the head-.-on View, he__was unable to tell whether the sparks were coming from the wheeplsof the engine or the cars. .1 i __ KNOTT stated he came back_ and Stood at the end of‘ track nineteen and watched this train crash through "the block at the end of, track sixteen» Standing at this point he was unable‘ to'see the engine until. just before "it hit the block because his view was obstructed by rail- “ road cars parked on track seventeeni He related that after the crash he knocked'out windows of the remaining portion of—the Station Master's Office to see if anyone was still inside, and hereafter helped several people standing on the concourse who appeared to need aid. He stated he was afraid that more of the concourse floor would fall in, and he therefore did not get close enough to the engine and wrecked cars to examine them in detail. 1 16. -‘Mr. A. W. Geipe, Fireman, ;t’ennsylva.nia- Railroad ' At. 1?. GEIPE, 1323 Taylor Avenue, Baltimore lh,'Mary- land, was a fireman» on a locomotive which was sitting at the ‘K ‘Bridge crossing.-.1’fhile "he was sitting at the crossing, 'rra1n‘#173 went by at a high rate of "speed. He noticedfire was ‘flying from the ‘wheels of the locomotive, this being‘ an indication to him that the ehngineeruwas apply- ing_heavy__br'akes.. He estimated the speed of Train #173 at that ‘tiine to be appr‘oxima”t‘ei”y forty to fifty miles per hour. ., J‘..__ E; _ Patters orfi;;,'¢E_‘4,cSn'c1uctor‘~ ’ 18'. Mr. J. M. Ooen, Baggage-Man,,Pennsylvania‘¥£ai3.roaid ' J. E. PATTERSON and J. M. COEN,‘ who reside at “ ‘RFD #2,'Wi1Inington, Delaware, and 220 E. 29th Street, ?§Eﬂ_m:i.rgton, Delaware, 123 WFO 98—523 respectively, both said they had been in Union Station, Washington, D. C., just prior to the time Train #173 crashed; however, they departed Wash~ ington at 8:00 a.m., January 15, 1953, on the Pennsylvania "Congressional" for Wilmington, Delaware, and were enroute near Baltimore, Maryland, at the time of the crash. 0. Switch Engine Crew That Removed Cars From Wrecked Train 1. Mr. Donald J. Dougherty, conductor ’ DONALD J. DOUGHERTY, 1218 Queens Street, N. E., Hash- ington, D. C., was conductor in charge of the switch engine crew that moved te Last ten cars of the wrecked train from trahk sixteen to the coach yard after the accident occurred. His crew consisted of WIILIAM LACEY, Engineer, BOYD LIGGETT, Fireman, LEON TROIS and F. M. COXhN, Brake- men. They were in their engine in the station yards awaiting orders when Train #173 entered the yard. DOUGHERTY went to the left side of the engine cab and saw the train coming through the yards toward the station on the next track. It appeared to be traveling about forty-five miles per hour,and fire was flying from beneath the electric motors of the engine. About this time the train went through a crossover to go into the station on track sixteen, and the cars appeared to lean on a forty-five degree angle. He knew the train was in trouble and was going to crash. After the crash, he left his engine and walked to the station where he stayed for about five minutes and then started back toward the end of the damaged train. He paid no attention to any of the anglecocks, nor did he inspect any of the cars on the train at this time. He did not hear air escaping from any of the cars. DOUGHERTY advised that when he got close to the end of the train he saw his crew'backing the switch engine down track sixteen to couple on to the last car of the train. The train was coupling on to the last car just as he arrived, and he watched TPOIS open the anglecock on the rear of the last car to connect it to the engine. No air came from the cars through the engine bleeder valve which was an in~ dication to him there was no air on the train air line hose. TROIS and COXEN then started down the train walking toward the station, inspecting ﬁie train and to close the anglecock on 12h ‘HFO 98--523 the front of the last car which was in a movable condition. The tenth car on the rear of the train was the last car that was movable. - ‘ While the brakemen were checking the train, and the engineer wasputting air into the movable cars, he walked down the west side of the train toward the station, taking the numbers of the cars to be moved. He: noticed the air brake cylinders on all ten cars were in full release, which indicated the brakes were not in operating condition, and the brake shoe had never been applied to the wheels. He felt the brake" shoes and the wheels, and none of them were «hot which was also an indication to him that the brakes had not been applied. There was no air in the air brake line on the last ten cars, and from the position of the air brake cylinders there was not sufficient air in the air reservoir tanks to auto- matically set the brakes. When he reached the end of the tenth car from the rear of the engine, he was advised by COXEN that the air was going through the tenth into the eleventh car and stated he did not know how far the air was traveling beyond the eleventh car from the rear of the train. After air had been built up in the last ten cars, he advised ‘COXEN to signal the engineer and have him set and release the brakes. The brakes were set and released several times and were found to operate in a normal condition. His switch engine was coupled on to the train for approximately fifteen minutes before they pulled the tea cars from the station. About ten minutes elapsedfrom the time the engine hooked on to the train until he gave the instructions to his engineerto test the brakes. DOUGHERTY advised he had been informed of the closed anglecock on the rear of the third car sometime after the accident had occurred. ‘a"v'hen the train came into the station, it did not have brakes on the rear of the train, and since there were no brakes on the last ten cars, it ‘appeared logical to him there were no brakes on the train from the rear of the third car. He added that if the train would have had the normal pressure of 110 pounds in the last ten cars, the brakes would not have functioned due to the closed anglecock; however, he stated that was not the condition in this accident. The train had no air at all in the air brake line in the last ten cars due to the fact no air escaped from the rear of the sixteenth car when it was coupled to the train, and also due to the fact the air could not have been heard rushing so freely through the cars after the engine started pumping air into the last ten cars. 125 WFO 93-523 DOUGHERTY did not hear any air leaking from the train, which is a normal condition, during the time he walked from the station along the train toward his switch engine which was preparing to couple on to the last.car. 1 2. Mrs W. E; Lacey, Engineman, Washington Terminal 1:. E. LACEY, S713 — 38th Avenue, Hyattsville, Mary- land, was on the next track when Train #173 came into the terminal. He saw the cars on Train #173 rocking just before it passed K Tower and after it hit ﬂue switches near K Tower. He realized.the txain was not going to stop, and as he watched it go into the terminal, he noticed none of the wheels were braking. He estimated the train was going about fifty miles per hour when it hit he backstop._ He received the impression there was a lurch in the train which would mean to him there was some sort of brak- ing on the train for a moment; however, this impression wastremoved from his mind inasmuch as it looked like none of the wheels were braking as the train came in on track sixteen and hit the backstop. ‘ - LACEY was given instructions to take the switch engine out to the H Street Bridge and back in on track sixteen. He con- nected his engine to the rear of the sixteenth car of Train #173. He estimated the time as approximately ten to fifteen minutes after the ac- cident had occurred. He advised that D. J. DOUGHERTY was in charge of his operation,and FRED COXEW later told him that ten cars back from the end of the train,which would be between the sixth and seventh care, he turned the anglecock to a closed position. According to LACEY, he believed GOXEN turned this anglecock to a closed position before any air was actually put into the train from hissmitch engine although that information would have to be obtained from Mr. COXEN; ' At the time TROIS hooked up the sixteenth car to his switch engine, he had 110 pounds pressure on his gauge. When the hookup was made, the pressure dropped to approximately thirty pouns from its former position of llO pounds. LACEY advised the air pressure in this train was down inasmuch as whenever the air pressure is below seventy pounds, there is very little braking power in the train. The ten cars on the rear of the train were on the track and COXEN, after turning the anglecock in an off position, disconnected the sixth and seventh cars. This was done so that LACEY could pull the ten cars off of track sixteen after he had built up the air pressure. He 126 wro 19845.23)‘ immediately became concerned with whether he would be able to stop after pulling the ten cars out from the wreckage, and, therefore, after pumping air into the'train for a period of about five to eight minutes and again * btaining-llO pounds pressure, he made a brake application, and the.brakes ¢ imediatelylsett’ ; _ , r In describing the operation necessary for charging the brakeline-(or filling it with air), he advised the instructions he utilized require he use one third of the throttle. He does not know whether-the engineer on a regular engine can increase the speed of the air compressor or not, but he can do this on the switch engine. If the throttle wereH¥é£t#at a position for an idling speed it would probably take fifteen or twenty minutes to fill this train. He had the feeling while charging this train that there was some air on the train but very little and certainly not enough to make the brakes work. , . LACEY advised he had never heard of an anglecock having vibrated to a closed position; however, he believed it entirely possible for an anglecock to be knocked from an open to a closed position. He stated that in an accident it could be knocked into a closed position or the hose could be pulled over it closing it. LACEY advised the brakes on the cars on the rear. of Train #173 were not set, and as previously indicated, because of the drop shown on gauge in air pressure, he knew there was very little air in these cars.. He stated it would seem to him that proof of the fact that there was not enough air pressure in these cars to set these brakes on Train #173 when it was necessary to use them is the fact that ﬂue brakes were not set when found. He pointed out that the brakes on these cars were off‘when TROIS hooked the car to his switch engine. LACEY advised it appeared to him the ten cars on the end of Train #173 came down without enough air in.them to make the brakes effective. ‘ LACEY stated it certainly did not sound like this was a result of sabotage, and instead it sounds like "no air". He stated if someone yeIled'sabotage each time they found an anglecock closed they would cértainly'have a lot of cases. He pointed out he felt this train would have needed at least ninety pounds of air before “dumping” would set the brakes. If the train had eighty-five pounds, for example, and an attempt was made to dump this air, the brakes would not set and the effect would be only to deplete what air remained in the line. _127 WFO 98—523 3. Mr. Boyd Liggett, Switch Engine Fireman BOYD LIGGETT, l2h9 Haubert Street, Baltimore, Mary—- land, advised he has been employed by the Washington Terminal Company for the past twenty-seven years. He was in the switch engine which had backed into track sixteen after the crash. As he left the engine and walked over to the damaged train, the first thing he noticed was the brake shoes on the rear part of the train were all in a released position, having never been applied to the wheels. He walked along the train for a short distance and then returned to his engine, at which time he was told the crew was going to couple on to the rear car of the danaged train and move the un— damaged cars to the coach yard. when they backed into the train, it was coupled to the engine,and after a short period, LACEY started putting air into the cars which were to be removed. He does not know if there was any air in the train as he did not see the engine gauge at the time the engine was" coupled to the last car. LACEY did not mention the air pressure, if any, which was in the cars to be moved. He advised he and LACEY got off the engine and checked the brakes on the rear car and found the air brake cylinder in an off posi- tion. It was his opinion that the rear of the train did not have air when it entered the year in View of the fact the air brake cylinders were in a released position, and the brake shoes were notagainst the wheels, which indicated to him there was no air in the rear of the train and not sufficient air in the air reservoir tanks to set the brakes in emergency. ~h. Mr. Frederick M. Coxen, Brakeman, Washington Terminal Company FREDERICK M. COXEN, 3613 Jefferson Street, Hyattsville, Maryland, advised he has been employed as a railroader for the past twenty years. COXEN furnished the sa information as DOUGHERTY concern- ing the train's arrival and subsequent crash at Union Station. When he switch engine backed into the last car of the train, TROIS got off the engine to couple the engine. TROIS told him there was no air in the train when he opened the anglecock on the last car to couple the last car to the engine. He noticed on all cars the air brake cylinder was in a released position which was an indication to him that the air brake 128 . .,...o .«..m .4... w... WFO 98-S23 line was completely depleted, and the air reservoir tanks did not have sufficient air power to set the brakes in emergency: The wheels or brake shoes were not hot which was also an indication the brakes on the rear of the train had not been applied. 1 When he got to the end of the tenth car from the rear, which has the last car still on the rails, he turned the anglecock to an off position. He added that before the anglecock was closed he could hear air rushing through the anglecock into the eleventh car from the rear. He did not know how far the air was going and at that time he did not know the anglecock on the rear of the third car from the engine was closed. He stated he did not hear any air leaking ﬁrom the train when he left the switch engine, and if the train would have had normal air pressure on the rear of the train, the air would not have run so rapidly through the rear cars. After the anglecock was turned at the frumtof the tenth car and after approximately five mmtes had elapsed, the brakes on the last ten cars were tested and found to operate'in a ‘normal condition. He did not inspect any cars other than the last ten. CQXEN advised that about twelve minutes elapsed from the time of the crash until the time his switch engine hooked on to the last car, and he turned the anglecock on the tenth car from the rear to an off position. About ten minutes elapsed from the time the switch engine coupled on to the train-and the last ten cars were'removed to the _coach yard. COXEN stated he rear of the train did not have brakes when it came into the station and furnished substantially the same informs» tion as furnished by DOUGHERTY concerning the reasons why he knew the last part of the train had no air and why the train could not have had the normal air pressure of 110 pounds in the cars behind the closed anglecocko He aiso furnished the same information as DOUGHERTY concerning the lack of ‘air in the air reservoirs which would have automatically set the brakes in emergency and also stated the air from the cars behind the closed anglecock. did not escape as a result of the crash, but rather the lack of air in the rear of the train caused the crash as a result of the tre- mendous weight pushing against the engine and the cars behind the closed anglecock. ' COXEN advised he examined the interior of the last ten cars and found the emergency valves which operate the emergency brake had not 3 been opened and the hand brakes had not been set. 129 WFO 98~523 COXEN was contacted concerning the statement he supposedly made to ROY F. KIRBY, whose interview is reported herein, that he, GOXEN, opened the drain cock on the air reservoir tank on car sixteen of the train, at which time he found no air pressure in the reservoir. COXEN stated KIRBY obviously misunderstood his statement cone cerning his inspection of the train, and COXEN stated he told KIRBY he examined the brake cylinders and found them in a released position which was an indication that the rear of the train did not have air. GOXEN added he saw the train coming into the station, and the wheels of the engine were sliding and fire flying from the train. He did not see how many cars were braking on the train due to the fact the train was travel- ing so rapidly; however, he stated he noticed the wheels on the rear cars of the train, and they were turning freely and sparks were not coming from the rear wheels. h. Mr. Leon Trois, Brakeman, Washington Terminal Company LEON TROIS, 2310 Jamison Street, Hillcrest Heights, Maryland, brakeman on yard switch engines, advised that at the time‘ of the crash he was on track fortyetwo when the Federal Express came in on track forty~one just north of K Towers, The Federal Express hit the switch on track forty-one, and switched over to track forty which later becomes track sixteen. The Federal Express was coming in at a high rate of speed, and he did not think the train would make the switch without turning over, but it did, The switch engine was then backing into Union Staw tion on track nineteen, at which time Headmaster GORAN came rushing up and told.him to come in on track sixteen and pull out the cars still stand~ ing on the track as the Federal Express had cracked up in Union Station, LAGEY took the switch engine out to the yard from the Union Station, and then shifted over to track sixteen and backed the switch engine up against the rear of the Federal Express, This was approximately ten or fifteen minutes after the accident occurreds TROIS advised he immediately went to the rear of the switch engine, started the air line, and fastened the air line to the air line on the rear of the last car, He noticed the rear wheels of ﬂue last car did not have their brakes on, The pistons were in, and the brake shoes were not touching the wheels, and to him this meant this car had no air in it. He opened the anglecoék on the rear of the last car, and he observed that no air came out of the brake line through the bleeder va1ve.on the anglecock on the rear of the switch engine. If there had been any air in 130 ,,..,,......-*...,.....u....».-........-. H... . Vh . WFO 98-35 23 - the brake line, this air would have escaped out of this bleeder valve. He stated there could not have been more than thirty pounds of air at the most in the tanks of this car because the brakes had not been set. Because of the mechanism of the air brakes, if there had been around fifty pounds of air in the tanks, the pistons would have started to come out and the brakes would have started to come on, but this did not happen. He" then opened the anglecock onihe engine, and air immediately started to flow from the engine into the last car on the train. TROIS stated that when the Federal Express passed his switch enginezcoming into the yard, he was of the opinion there was very little air on the locomotive as the air horn was not blowing loudly and thebrakes, although on tight, apparently were not working riglt. ,If the brakes had been applied in the correct manner, and there had been air in the engine and first three care, he was of ‘the opinion the train could have easily been stopped before it crashed into Union Station. The wheels appearedto be locked on the" engine, and that was as bad, in, his opinion, as leaving the wheels free to roll, as the engine would go as fast skidding as it would with the wheels‘ revolving. D. Crew Examining Cars After Removal , 3.’. Mr. John C. McPherson, Gang Foreman, Washington Terminal ' JOHN C. McPHERSON was contacted to determine what repairs were ‘necessary on the cars which were removed from the wrecked Federal Express. It was determined at this time that the last ten cars had been divided between the Federal Express leaving Washington and the Federal Express’ leaving Boston, five cars to each train. Three cars were still in the yards of the Washington Terminal té be repaired. These three cars were thethree cars which were derailed but which remained in an {ap- right position; The remaining three cars of Train #173 , the first three cars ‘on the train, were damaged to such an extent that ‘no effort was being made to repair them, and in all probability they would be dismantled. The records at the Washington Terminal Yard reflect there were repairs to be made to the India Point, high flange; the Bréslin ‘rower, adjust rod stripped, worn brake rigging, weak elliptical spring; and City of Canton, shelled and scrap wheel #8, and broken train line. MGPHERSON advised that in regard to the broken train line he was ‘unaware that such a condition had existed on the City of Ganton. 131 --.......-........—-.......... ....p..-.~......o......_... .-._.. ,,__. . . . . ..... , _ \ WFO 98-523 He also expressed the opinion, and he believed, that this was a mistake made by the clerk who made the entry on the book. e WILLIAM D/IAT'1'HE‘!IS , Clerk, afashington Terminal Com- pany, advised he made the entry on the book entitled "Shop and 0ut-of- Service Cars" reflecting the City of Canton to have a broken train Line as that information had been called in to him. = 2. Mr. Guiseppe Truscello, Car Inspector, "Washington Terminal * GUISEPPE TRUSCELLO, 328‘ - 8th Street, N. E., has been employed by the Washington Terminal for the past forty-twoyears. -About 11:00 a.'m., January 15, 1953”, he saw the last ten cars of Train #173 parked in ",A' Yard, Washington Terminal. No one instructed him to inspect these cars, but any time cars are brought to “A” Yard, it is the general policy for him to inspect them; therefore, he inspected these cars. TRUSOELLO advised that of all theseten cars, the pullman, "City of Canton", was the only which appeared to need repairs. On the west side of this car he found a thin wheel which is one that has been worn thin by ordinary travel. is he was writing a shop repair tag for this thin.wheél, Mr. RAIN! called to him from the other side of the car and told him the train line was leaking air. He also made a notation on the shop repair tag that the train line was leaking. He then crossed to the other ‘side of the car and posted this repair tag on the car. _ . RAINY did not tell him ‘exactly where the train line leak was located, and he did not observe the leak. He also said he did not hear the air leaking out. 3. Mr. Fred C. Rainey, ‘Relief Car Repairman and In-1 specter, Fiashirggtton Terminal Company FRED C. RAINEY, lL3l2 Laurence Street, Coral Manor, Maryland, revealed that on January 15, 1953 he began the inspection of a train oi‘ approximately ten cars. This train had a yard engine coupled to the north end of it, and the brakes on all ten cars ‘were in the applied position. RAINEY related when he reached neither the fourth, fifth or sixth car, the City of Canton, his attention was drawn to the fact 132 WFO 98-523 that the brakes were released on this car while still applied on the other cars in the train. Upon inspection RAINEI discovered the defect on the east side of the south end of the car. RAINEY described this defect as an air leak on the branch pipe about fourteen inches behind the cutout valve for the brake cylinder. RAINEY stated he could not examine the leak itself as it was hidden by the central gutter. RAINEY was not positive but stated.he thought it was a hole in the pipe and advised he could feel the air escaping. RﬂINEY further advised the hole was protected by the central gutter and, in his opinion, could not have been punctured during the accident. RAINEY further advised his examination disclosed there was, no object near the pipe that could have poked a ho1e,and there was no sign of a fresh break near the defect he could see; however, he again pointed out he never actually saw the defect itself. 'BAINEY revealed he put\a tag on the car to have the car put out of service; however, at this time he was joined by GUISEPPE TRUSCELLO who had already put a shop tag on the car for some other defect. RAINEY did not know what this second defect was. He stated he ten destroyed his shop tag and instructed TRUSCELLO to note the branch line air leak on the shop tag already on the car. RAINEY advised the car was taken to the shop for repairs, but he had heard the shop had received orders not to make the repairs and the car was taken out of the shop for tests. h. Mr. Joseph H. Jennings, Gang Foreman, Ivy City Shop, Washington Terminal JOSEPH H. JENNINGS, 5005 - 53rd Place, Hyattsville, Maryland, stated he reported to work at the Ivy City Car Shop at 3:00 puma, January 17, 1993, at which time he noticed the sleeper, City of Canton, was in the car shop, and the brakes had leaked off the car. He reported this fact to GEORGE LEWIS, Assistant Car Foreman, but did not make any examina- tion of the car. JENNINGS advised he is more familiar with the UC valve; therefore, he generally works with the cars which have this type of valve, and he leaves the cars which have the D-22 type of valve for the day force. Inasmuch as the City of Canton had a D—22 type of valve, he did not do any work or make any examination on the City of Canton» 5. Mr. Leroy Glenn, Pipefitter, Washington Terminal Company LEROY GLEN, lhO9 G Street, 8. E., advised the last ten cars of Train #173,were removed to the coach yard where he is employed. 133 WFO 98—523 He proceeded to make certain tests on these cars. GLENN was aware of’ the accident and ﬂiat this string of ten cars were from the tracked train. — GLENN explained that his test on the cars was to de- termine the amount of brake pipe leakage, and this test was performed in the following manner: I The empty train line was charged by means of the plant pressure line, which amounts to approximately 100 pounds of pressure, and a testing gauge was affixed between the train line and the plant line. A fifteen—pound air pressure reduction was then made and he found the brake pipe leakage from the ten care was approximately one-half pound. He stated the train line is reduced five pounds more, then after waiting several minutes, he walked the entire length of the train and checked the brakes ‘of every car and also measured the distance of the piston travel. Following this procedure, the brakes were then released and the distance of the entire train was again covered to ascertain hat all the brakes had been properly released. In this test the brakes operated in a perfectly normal and correct fashion. GLENN mentioned, however, that the hand brakes of the cars had been previously applied, so when the regular air brake was released the cars would not roll in either directions GLENN stated that on one of the cars, the City of Canton, an order had been placed to shop the car for thin wheels, and this order originated from a car inspector. He said he had nothing to do with ﬂue inspection of the car. He stated he further noticed that accord» ing to the shop order there was supposedly a break in the train line pipe, but further inspection revealed it was not the train line pipe break but was actually a brake cylinder branch pipe. He found the pipe was not even actually broken but merely loose at the joint. He explained a broken cyl- inder branch pipe nould not affect the brake operation and cited the example of the twenty—pound air pressure reduction test and the time required to walk the length of the train, and the brake cylinder branch pipe did not leak out enough air to affect the brakes. He further stated that in his opinion it would take about thirty minutes for enough air to leak out of the defective*brake cylinder brach pipe before the brakes would be re- leased, and then the brakes of just that one car only would be affected, and that one car would then become what is referred to as a free rolling Caro 1314 WFO 98-S23 GLENN explained it was his opinion that the car in~ spector misunderstood the exact terminology of the particular pipe in~ volved, and thus termed it a train line pipe which would have been a serious item, but as it was a cylinder branch pipe with a very minor defect, the consequences were minor. 6. Mr. Joe E. Lewis, Gang Foreman, Washington Terminal Company . JOE E. LEWIS, 20 L Ridge Road, Greenbelt, Maryland, supervised the repair on the pullman, the City of Canton. EEWIS stated he was told the brakes on this car were leaking off. He inspected the car and observed the branch pipe leading from the relay valves to the brake cylinder was leaking. This was leaking due to the fact that the pipe had pulled out of a sweat joint. .The repairs were made without taking the joint apart. ‘ LEWIS advised it would be impossible to state how old this defect was or how much air was leaking from the pipe. It was LEWIS‘ opinion the leak wascaused by the accident. EEWIS explained.the only time the air could escape from this leak would be when the brakes were in the applied position. . He advised the defect could not cause a loss of air in any other car as the air leaking out would come only from the auxiliary reservoir of the leaking car. This reservoir could not recharge from the brake pipe line until the brakes are placed in a released position. As soon as the brakes are released, the air is no longer free to flow to the leaking branch pipe, and the leak would stop. The auxiliary reservoir would then recharge frmn the brake pipe line and the car would not be affected by the leak until the brakes were again applied. 7. Mr. George E. Polen, Gang:Foreman, Car Shop GEORGE E. POLEN, 5009 Addison Road, N. E., explained the repairs on the ten cars that remained on the rails after the wreck at Union 3tation,which were hauled to the car shop for inspection and pos— sible repairs. The Breslin Tower, usual repairs; City of Lancaster, usual repairs; Breeds Hill, usual repairs; Surinam, usual repairs; City of Gary, usual repairs; India Point, usual repairs; Long Point, usual repairs; Minnesota Club, usual repairs; New Nicollet, usual repairs. — 135 WFO 98-S23 By usual repairs POLEN advised he meant repairs that would be made normally when a car was brought to the car shop for repairs. Inspectors would check these cars and find worn parts from usual service and would then make repairs, such as adjusting brake slack, adjusting brakes, repairing worn brake shoes, etc. As to the City of Canton POLEN advised that usual repairs were made except for parts marked brake leakage. POLEN advised as to the brake leakage, it would be neces- sary to interview RAYMOND BROWN—and R. A. SGHEUCH}, pipefitters, who did the actual repairing on the apparent brake leakage on this car. 8. Mr. Raymond Brown, Pipefitter ‘ RAXMOND BROWN, 6320 - 61st Place, Riverdale, Mary- land, made repairs to the branch pipe line of the air brake system'of the pullman car, the City of Canton. BROWN recalled his work consisted of sweating the three-quarter inch copper tubing back into a sleeve, _ It was BROWN'S opinion the tubing had pulled out of the sleeve, causing a leak. It was also his opinion it was a new leak, due to the fact that the bracket holding the tubing was also broken and the noise from the tubing and the bracket would have been heard by someone and reported immediately, 90 Mr. Ralph A, SCHEUCH, ?ipefitter RALPH A. SCHEUCH, hhl7 — 38th Street, Brentwood, Maryland, advised he checked the brakes and repaired branch line on the pullman car, the City of Canton, on January 19, 1953. He further advised it looked to him as though the three—quarter inch copper pipe had been pulled out of a joint and then sweated back in. He applied the brakes on instant car, and then put liquid soap on the spot that had been repaired, thereby visually checking for an air leak. He found the car in good condition. 10. Mr. George F. Lewis, Assistant Car Foreman ' GEORGE F. LEWIS, 815 Maryland Avenue, N. 12., Wash- ington, D. 0., advised he first noticed the City of Canton in the car shop on the evening of January 17, 19530 He noticed there was no brake set, and he presumed the brakes had leaked off. He asked JOE JENNINGS why the car had no brakes on it, and JENNINGS stated the brakes had leaked off. 136 wro 98-523 The following evening he was advised by JENNINGS there were some cracked brake pipes and that was the reason the brakes had leaked off the City of Canton. E. Master Mechanids Crew 1. Mr. James A. Long, Jr., Master Mechanic JAMES A. LONG, JR., 70lh WakeForest Avenue, College Park, Maryland, advised that when he first heard of the wreck of Train #1739 he went to the repair shops located under the concourse in the vicinity of where the engine and coach cars fell through. LONG ad- vised these men were employed under his jurisdiction at that location, Shortly thereafter, while talking with ICC inspectors, they discussed the ’possibility of an obstruction in the metallic hose of the brake line as a cause of the crash. At this time he assigned someone to check the anglecocks throughout the train, and he was later advised that a partially closed anglecock had been found on the rear end of the third car from the engine. LONG immediately went and observed this anglecock and estimated it was closed about ﬂairty percent. The anglecock did not appear to be damaged or‘bent, and the metallic hose appeared to be undamaged. The part of the car immediately around the anglecocg was not damaged enough,in LONG's opinion, to have moved the position of the anglecockc The anglecock and the metallic hose were later burned off the car and placed in the trunk of an automobile for safekeeping. Later on the anglecock was removed from the trunk of the automobile and placed in a paper bag and removed to the office of Station Manager SIDNEY KEELO Later, some Pennsylvania Railroad officials went to KERL’s office to examine the anglecock, and at this time LONG stated the anglecock appeared to be in the same position as when he originally ob— served it attached to the train. LONG stated nothing else was called to his attention by his employees nor did he discover anyﬂiing that would raise suspicion'as to the cause of the wrecked Federal Express. LONG was later contacted for the purpose of determin~ ing what airbrake equipment on the damaged train was available for inspec- tion. At this time he stated that on D. JOLLY and H. R. LONGHURST of the Interstate Commerce Commission, had instructed that some of the airbrake equipment be removed from the damaged engine and placed on another engine, 137 .- ..,......n., MI 1 . WFO 98-523 and this had been done. LONG further'stated that at the time the engine "was being dismantled,ahd parts of it had been shipped to Wilmington, Delaware Where it was placed in a general pool. LONG made available nine gauges and advised that actually there should be ten gauges as each end of the engine has five gauges. he was unable to explain where the oﬂier gauge was; however, he expressed the opinion that it had probably been shipped to Wilmington with otherpats from the wrecked engine. These gauges were examined at the Washington Terminal shops, and with the exception of one, operated normally. This gauge, the main reservoir and equalizing reservoir gauge, was sticking slightly and.was off approximately ten pounds. 2. Mr. Frank J. Nolan, Mechanic Shop Foreman FRANK J. NOLAN, 2219 U Place, 8. E., Washington, D. C., advised that even though the hand was sticking on the above—mentioned gauge, it would not affect the operation of the braking system. He advised there were two sets of gauges on the type of engine which crashed into Union Station. He explained the type of gauges and the purpose which they serve. . \ In regard to the gauge that was not operating cor- rectly, NDLAN stated it would have no affect on the operation except to give the engineer a false reading. While the gauge was normally supposed to show 110 pounds, actually the engineer would have to maintain 120 pounds equalizing reservoir pressure to maintain the gauge at the normal operating pressure. He stated that since his pressure would be greater than that which must be maintained it would not affect the brake mechanism of the train. 3. Mr. John Henry Smith, Foremanof Car Inspectors JOHN HENRY SMITH advised hpon.hearing a train whistle blowing almost continuously, he immediately contacted Train Director JOHN FEENEY and learned that Train #123 on track sixteen was running away. He departed for the_scéne of the accident, and he estimated it took from five to eight minutes to get there. SMITH advised that about ten minutes after the ac- cident a switch engine came into track sixteen, and after being attached 138‘ WFO 98—523 to the sixteenth car and charging the line, pulled ten cars off the track. He stated he believed these cars had been taken away and placed in the yard at 9:21 a.m. According to SMITH, when the engine shot air through the line from the sixteenth car, he expected the air to go through the thirteen cars and through?the;anglecock of the third.car; r, but there was no sound of-air traveling all the way through. " ‘ - _ The crew working with the switch engine walked from the sixteenth car down to a point between the sixth and seventh cars and closed“ the anglecock. SMITH stated it took about fifteen minutes to fill the ten cars which meant to him that the reservoirs and the train lines on these cars were completely empty. He was of the opinion the air could not have leaked out while the train was in the terminal because he subse- quently discovered that the anglecock at the rear of ﬂie third car was al- most completely closed. ' . SMITH stated he did not know at the time the engine changed these cars that this anglecock was closed. It was not until after the ten cars were pulled away and he started to separate the air hose be- tween the third and fourth cars that he discovered that the air hose con- tained air pressure. He knew this because it is difficult to separate the air hose connection between two cars when it contains air pressure and is not difficult when the air hose is empty. He then went inside the fourth car and opened the emergency'va1ve. When he opened the conductor's emergency valve the air was dumped and sounded like plenty of pressure. Further, the brakes went into emergency on the fourth, fifth and sixth cars when this was done. He then separated the air hose between the third and fourth cars with no difficulty and removed the.metal connectors which carry the steam from one car to another. He stated that vhile separating the hoses between the third and fourth cars he had been working on the fireman's side of the train and after completing this job he went to the engineer's side between the same two cars; It was then he discovered the anglecock between the third and fourth cars in a ninety percent closed position. He stated he felt sure he was the first one to see this and that it had not been moved or touched by anyone. SMITH then looked at the brake rigging (rods, shoe- heads and shoes), and observed they were burned up, giving the impression that intensive braking power had been the cause. He stated the brake rigging on car three was so hot that he could not put his hand within twelve inches of the wheels. He then compared that with the heat on the wheels of the 139 WFO 98-523 fourth car. He_stated the wheels, shoeheads and shoes were lukewarm on the fourth car, hich indicated that there had not been any application of the brakes beyond the third car. SMETH advised he believed it was approximately 9:30 a.m. when he reported the partially closed anglecock found on the end’of the third car to Mr. J. A. LONG, master mechanic at the Washington Tenninalo He stated LONG made a personal observation of this anglecock at about 9:32 a.m., and further instructed that SITH guard the anglecock and not let anyone touch it. LONG told the assistant master mechanic, 8. F. SWAFFORD, what had been found, and then SWAFFORD came back and viewed the anglecock. ’ 1 _ SMITH stated an individual named J. GOCHPENNA took a cutting torch and cut the air pipe ahead of the anglecock on the third car. The anglecock was then sent to the office of Mr. S. KERL, Manager of the Washington Terminal, and was carried off by COCHPENNA. According to SMITH,rD one, including himself, ever touched the handle of this angle- cock during the time he saw ito - _ ‘SMITH stated he has seen cars arrive at the terminal with the anglecocks in a closed or partially closed position but that did not uswﬂly present a problem for the reason there is no air in the reservoir. He pointed out that naturally if there is no air in the auxiliary reser- voir the brakes will be inoperative on that particular car. When asked to supply a reason as to why some of the anglecocks were not completely closed,, SMITH replied the man who closed it with his hand just did not finish it up. Further, he pointed out that ICE inspectors appear at the terminal about once a month, and if they find an anglecock partially closed or closed and not locked into position, they prepare a written report for the Bureau of Safety. He states that to see a partially closed anglecock is unusual, but he has seen them frcm time to time. According to SMITH, he does not believe an anglecock could vibrate to a closed position. SMITH advised he felt the usual effect of’a patially closed anglecock would be for the brakes on one or more cars to stick and that the auxiliary reservoir on any car which had sticking brakes could be “touched up”, which means to bleed the reservoir, In response to a question regarding whether it was necessary to replace anglecocks, MITH replied the age on an anglecock makes no difference, and they are only re- placed when they become too hard to turn, ' lhO WFO 98 -5 23 ‘SMITH concluded that the possibility exists that thirteen cars came down from Bostn1without air, He stated the possibility also exists that these cars could have laid in a yard all day before the train left Boston at 11:00 p.m., and the brake reservoirs might have been empty or partially empty before they left. He stated that tests, of course, if properly made, should Show whether the train was without air. He also pointed out a small leak in the auxiliary reservoir could cause the cars to be without air, and such leaks might draw air from the brake line into the reservoir, and air pressure under these conditions could therefore be depleted. .' h. Mr. Charles M, Crabtree, Gang Foreman _ CHNRLES M. CRABTREEL Zhlh Powhattan Avenue, Arling~ ton, Virginia, arrived at the scene of the wreck about 8:50 a.m., January 15, 1953. He was ordered by J. F. SWAFFORD, Assistant Master Mechanic, to chebk the piston travel on cars four ﬂirough sixteen. CRABTREEs8id a piston travel check is a measurement by ruler of the distance the piston is extended out of the brake cylinder which actuates the brake shoes on the cars‘ wheels. He said he was unable to check the piston travel because the brakes on cars four thrcugh sixteen were in a released or off—brake po~ sition, On arrival at the sixteenth or end car, CRABTREE said he found a Washington Terminal switch engine had been coupled to the sixteenth car, and the crew of this engine was in the process of pumping air into the train line of hese cars. CRABTREE asked one of the crew'members if they had _ released the brakes on the string of cars, The crew member replied, "No, we are charging the train line," CRABTREE did not recall to whom he talked and was unable to furnish the name of any of the crew members. He said he stood alongisde this switch engine for about eight to ten minutes before the train line had been completely recharged, The engineer of the switch engine then applied the brakes on the string of cars,and he, CRABTREE, saw the brakes apply on cars fourteen, fifteen and sixteen. Due to the dis- tance, he was unable to see wheﬁcer the brakes worked on cars ahead of car fourteeno At about 9:35 a¢m., January 15, 1953, GRABTREE telew phonically instructed B. W. WHITE, Gar Foreman, Coach Yard, Washington Terminal, to check the piston travel on cars seven through sixteen, WHITE subsequently advised GRABTREE that the piston travel on all these cars was normal, and the leakage of air per minute was one—ha1f pound. CRABTREE pointed out that when a leakage test is made, the air compressor is dis—. engaged and does not continue to push air into the train line during the lhi WFO 98-523 test, He said when a train is traveling the compressor in the engine keeps pressure in the tran line built up to 110 pounds, and it is not necessary for the engineer to turn a valve to replace air lost through leakage. . Later he went with WUODROW SMITH, SWAFFORD and A. P. SCHLEGEL, Car Foreman, Inspector’s Office, Baltimore, Maryland, to the rear of car three where he observed the anglecock still attached to the rear. He said the handle of this anglecock appeared to be in a three—quarter closed position, CRABTREE said he was positive about this position in which he noted the handle. He said he left the rear of car three and was not present when the anglecock was cut off the car, SMITH later asked him for the keys to his car. SMITH said J. A. LONG, Master Mechanic,'Washington Terminal, had in- structed him to put the anglecock from the rear of car one in the trunk of CRABTREE's car and to lock the trunk, ZSMITH did not tell CRABTREE - why LONG wanted this done. CRABTREE gave him the keys, but did not go with him to the car. GRABTREE continued with the wrecking operations until about 9:00 p.m., January l5, 1953. At this time SCHLEGEL advised him he was ‘wanted by H. H. HAUPT, General Superintendent, Motive Power, Eastern Region, Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. CRAB- TREE and SCHLEGEL found HAUPT between tracks thirteen and fourteen in com- pany with Mr. WEBB, Assistant Superintendent, Motive Power, Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia, and M. A, MARSH, iaster Mechanic, Pennsylvania Railroad, Wilmington, Delaware. HAUPT asked CRABTREE if he had the angle- cock which had been removed from the rear of car one. CRABTREEsaid it was located in the trunk of his car. HAUPT asked how it got there, CRABTREE replied LONG had instructed SMITH to lock it up. HAUPT said he wanted to 7 see it. GRABTREE said he and the above individuals proceeded to his car where they found'Washington Terminal policeman, LEWIS, guarding the care CRABTREE unlocked the trunk and found an anglecock and a connect» ing air hose, The anglecock was in a completely closed position. CRABTREE put the anglecock on his shoulder while HAUPT, WEBB, MARSH and SCHLEGEL examined it. They did not touch it, They remarked about it being ina closed position, and there appeared to be no.marks indicating the handle had been struck. (_ ._M W “Q , m..._4.... ,.,._ ,. . , ‘A .— I __ _ ‘___,,_‘,,_,,__,.. .._.—..-an-. "" ‘ 1233 FROM H I-IANDIJE IN POSITION PHOTO OF ANGLE COCK REM FEAR OF CAR #3 WIT IN WHICH IT WAS ALLEDGEDLY FOUND WFO 98-523 CRABTREE, in company with the above individuals, then took this anglecock to the office of SIDNEY KERL, Manager,‘Washington Terminal. GRABTREE said he heard KERL say, "It's funny~—all the airlines having accidents and troubles, and now with these anglecocks being closed and partially closed, the possibility of sabotage cannot be overlooked. The FBI should be notified.“ On January 17, 1953 he worked from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On the morning of this day SWAFFORD instructed GRABTREE to ' inspect theshoes and wheels of cars one, two and three. CRABTREE said he found these shoes and wheels badly burned, indicating severe braking. GRABTREE said he has never found an anglecock handle in any other than its proper position, and he has never known one to vibrate to a different position, 5. Mr. Woodrow M. Smith WOODROW M. SMITH, 302h Channing Street, N E., Washington, D. C., has been employed by the Washington Terndnal Company for the past seventeen years. While working at the scene, Mr, J, F. SWAFFORD told him to go to the north end of the third car and guard the anglecock until someone was sent to out the anglecock from the train, He added he followed these instructions, and when he first saw the anglecock, it appeared a little more than half closed. He stated he did not touch the anglecock handle at any time before or after the anglecock was removed from the car, and in working with it after it was cut off, he handled it by parts other than the handleo SMITH said that shortly thereafter an unknown person arrived at the end of the third car, and with an acetylene burner started to cut the hose holding the anglecock on the train, While this man was cut- ting the hose, SMITH stated he stooped down and watched the operation through the openings in the steps at the end of tue third care When the first cut was made, he stated he saw the hose holding the anglecock fall to the ground. He added he did not see the anglecock strike any object and does not know how the marks were made on the angledooko He advised that immediately after the anglecock was removed from the train, it was handed to him by the man who removed it. He added he did not hea any air escaping from the anglecock before it was removed and did not hear any air escape after the anglecock had been removed. Jhh WFO 98-5 23 ‘ SIvZI‘I'H continued that after the man handed him the anglecock he held it in his hands. He stated he did not blow through the anglecock and does not know if the arglecock was open and if air could ‘ have passed through. He advised he did not examine the fourthcar from the front of the train to see if there was any air'on this car; however, he stated no air escaped from the fourth car when the anglecock was removed from the rear of the third car, and such would have been the case had air been in the fourth car. ‘He advised that approximately twenty minutes elapsed before SWAFFORD instructed him to take the anglecock to the east basement of Union Station and put it in the trunk of the car belonging to G. N‘. GRABTREE. He stated he complied with these instructions and then looked the car trunk. He added he was leaving the car when J. A. LONG, Master Mechanic, came up to the car and instructed him to turn the angle- cock over to LONG. He stated he gave the anglecockto LONG, and then he returned to his gang at the scene of the accident. The time was approxi-~ mately 10:30 a.m. I In response to questions’ concerning E'MITH's knowl- edge of the anglecock from the rear of car one, SMITH stated he does not know who found the anglecock or what time it was found. He added he was working at the scene of the crash when ANDY SLHIEGEL came up to him with an unknown negro person, who had the anglecock, at which time SCHLEGEL instructed him to take the person with the anglecock to Mr. KERL's office. He said KERL advised the unknown person he did not want the aziglecock in his office and to take it out to C Yards for testing. SMITH continued that when he got back to the scene of the crash, he advised LONG of KE3FiL's instructions, at which time LONG told him to put the‘ anglecock in the trunk of'the car belonging to CR[LB- TREE. He stated he put the angleoock in the trunk at about 5:30 pm. after getting the keys to the car from the storeroom in the basement at Union Station. He stated the keys were in the storeroom as a result of a request from a policeman who, after SMITH had been in the car the first time around 10:30 a.m., asked him to leave the keys in case the car need be moved. — ’ He further advised he does not know who removed the anglecock from car one from the trunk; however, he stated he later heard it was removed by CRABTREE. ‘ ILLS WFO 98-523 6. Mr. John F. Swafford, Assistant Master Mechanic »JOHN'F. SWAFFORD assigned 0. M. CRABTREE and WOODROW SMITH to ascertain the “piston travel" on the back ten cars of Train #173. He then examined the three head cars and_discovered the brake parts indicated the brakes on these three cars must have had heavy brak- ing prior to the accident. The brake shoes were badly burned, and there were other indications which caused him to reach this conclusion. V p — SWhF‘ORD examined the brakes on cars four, five and six and found there were no indications of excessive braking on these cars. He explained this by saying that any railroad car shows certain in- ‘ dications of normal braking, and these indications were apparent on cars four, five and six, but that when he felt the brakes on these three cars, they were not hot, whereas the brakes on cars one, two and three were still hot when he examined them. He stated he felt the wheel of each truck of each car (cars four, five and six) and found none of them were hot, which meant to him there had been no braking on any of these cars coming into Washington. Upon completion of the examination of these cars he was positive at that time that the braking had stopped at the rear end of the third car on this train. He stated he then considered the possi- bility of obstructions in the train line (brake line); He then caused tests to be made of all of the armored hoses on all cars except those which had UC valves and found there were no obstructions in these cars. He explained that the cars with U0 valves do not have the armored type hose and therefore do not present the same type of potential trouble insofar as a possible obstruction is concerned. . J. A. LONG called S‘t‘LA\E‘F0RD's attention to the angle- cock on the rear end of car three and advised him he should take a look at it. SWAFFORD stated he did not question LONG concerning its condition, and he could not recall whether LONG accompanied him, but he went direct- ly to the anglecock and found it to be in a critical position. He described its position by saying, "As I viewed it, the handle was sixty to sixty~five degrees toward the full closed position." SWAFFORD stated he then assigned SMITH'to guard the anglecock for the purpose of making sure no one touched it. _According to SWAFFOD, to his knowledge, no one had touched the anglecock at the time he saw it, and he recalled asking the workmen around whether it had been 11:6 WFO 93-523 touched. He rememberedthatML5MITﬂ and JOHN H. SMITH were there and both stated it had not been touched. He stated he could not recall definitely, but possibly C. M. CHABTREE or FRANK TANK, another gang foreman, was present. SWARFORD stated that at no time did he touch the handle of this anglecock before it was ranoved. ,He advised he did not touch this handle until after the anglecock had been removed, and it had been taken to Mr. KERL's office where others moved it before he did. SWAFFORD stated after assigning WDODROW SMITH to guard the anglecock, shortly after he discovered it, he instructed Gang Foreman HENRY E. RIDGELY to have J. COCHPENNA out the air train line pipe that the anglecock is attached to. Further, he told him this should be out about twentywfour inches back from where the anglecock is actually attached. SWAFFORD stated he did not see this anglecock any more after that until it was in KERL's office in the late afternoon of the same day. He said he left instructions with WOODROW SMITH not to let anyone touch it, and he left this particular scene of activity. He stated that sometime after 10:00 a.m. WUODROW SMITH was following him around carrying this anglecock which had then been cut off, and SMITH was holding the anglecock by the pipe and did not touch the handle during the time SHAFFORD saw him. SWAFFORD told him to put it in the back of his car for safe keeping, and then learned SMITH did not have his car. He then told him to put it in the back of CHARLIE CRABTREE's car for safe keeping. He estimates SMITH left him with the arglecock about 10:30 a.m., and he did not see it again until he appeared in KEﬂL's office in the late afternoon of the same day. SWAFFORD pointed out he had not had an opportunity to talk to JOHN HENRY SMITH up to that time. He stated that had he known what the facts were as SMITH found them, he would not have issued instruc— tions to have this anglecock cut off of the rear end of car three. He later learned from SMITH that the anglecock was actually under pressure. Had he known this before, he would have issued instructions that an exami- nation be made while the pressure_was still in the train line of some of the cars. SWAFFORD explained that when the switch engine backed up to car sixteen and was attached to the sixteenth car of Train #173, the switch engine began to charge the train line. He learned from 11:7‘ WFO 93-5 23 SMITH that the air did not go all the way through car three from back to front, which meant that the air pressure was closed off somewhere in the thirteen cars. Checks showed that anglecocks were open with the excep- tion of the; partially closed anglecock between cars three and four. ‘ . ‘When the brakeman closed off the anglecock between cars six and seven,’ aﬂdisconnect was madebetween cars six and seven, and the switch engine pulled off cars seven‘ through sixteen. This left cars three., four, five and six which had been derailed from Week sixteen. SMITH told him when hestarted to separate the train line between cars 1threeu~an'ch:;i'eur’the're was pressure in the line. It should be noted at this point that cars two and three were completely separated and the line at the head .en_d;_ of car three was open as evidenced by tests SWAFFORD actually made himself later. " ’ ‘ l _ ’S‘NAFFORD advised that when the train line is full of air it-is difficult to separate the lines as SMITH tried to- do, but when the line is empty it is easy to separate them. He related that SMITH then Went into car number four and pulled the emergency valve, ‘ whereupon he‘ heard‘ the air being dumped. He further related the braI_<es went into en'1er'"ge_ncy in the fourth, fifth and sixth cars when this was ‘ done. ,SWAFF‘0RD'jstated he was on the sixth car when. this occurred, and the brakes were se‘t"on this car. He stated shortly thereafter when he examined the fifth car the brakes had also set on that car. _ . _ SWAFFORD related after he had ‘obtained all this in- formation from” SMITH, he realized he would not have ordered the anglecock at the end of the third car to be out off had he known the train line be- tween ca"r's three and six contained pressure. SWAFFORD pointed out that theopening in the anglecock on thezear of car three must have been closed or the air would have gone on through the third car and into the atmos- phere from the head end of the third car. ; _ SWAFFORD learned in connection with the inquiry he made that th'e’7ai~r' from the‘ switch engine, which was operated by Engineer LACEY, had traveled from the sixteenth car 1. forward through the train line while Brakeman GOXEN was walking from the sixteenth car to a position between the sixth-and seventh car where he turned the anglecock to an off position; therefore‘, ‘some air must have traveled into cars four, five and six before COXEN~reached the point where he could turn the anglecock be- tween jcars six and seven to an off position. According to SWAFFORD, air pumped into a’ train‘ line travels fast and tends to reach a stopping place before pressure is built up. 3148 WFO 98-523 In response to questions asked SWAFFORD advised that when'Engineer LACEY hooked up to the sixteenth car preparatory to recharg- ing the train line, his pressure dropped from 110 pounds to below 50 pounds, he believed. In explaining the possible depletion of air back of car three, if there was a stoppage in the train line between cars three - and four, SWAFFORD advised there would be the normal leakage, which would be in the neighborhood of one pound per minute, and the utilization of air pressure in connection with the operation of pneumatic doors and the use of water on the train. SWAFFORD explained that any time the pressure is above sixty pounds in the train line, then the tanks which contain air pressure for the use 6f the pneumatic doors, water and the like, except on cars having the D-22 valve, will draw from the train line to charge up the reserve if they need more air. - On cars having the B-22 valve, air; when depleted, can be drawn from the supply reservoir whether the pressure is above or below sixty pounds. He stated, however, the amount of air utilized in the use of pneumatic doors, water the like is actually small and, for example, on the trip from Baltimore to Washington in thirtyaeight minutes, probably only twelve to fourteen pounds of air would be utilized in this connection. _ SWAFFORD advised that around 9:30 a.m. on the day of the accident he had two men, a pipe fitter named DiPETRO and his helper, whose name he did not kno, under cars three to six for the purpose of re- moving metal connectors for the steam heat line. SWhFFORD's first thought was the possibility exists that these two men, who around 9:30 were work~ ing between cars three and four removing the metal connectors for the metal steam line, could have unknowingly touched the anglecock handle and moved it. He then stated since the switch was charging these cars before the pipe fitter and his helper were working under the cars, and the air dd not travel through the train line and out the head end of car three; or in other words, since it was stopped between cars three and four, he did not see how it was possible for them to have moved the handle on this anglecook before the air was stopped. It would have been possible for them to have unknowingly moved the position of the handle on the anglecock prior to the time SMITH released the air in cars four, five and six, and the anglecock was removed by GOCHPENNA. SWAFFORD related that in the afternoon WOODROW SMITH told him Mr. LONG had requested him to take the anglecock which came from the rear-end of car three to Mr. KERL's office. Subsequently, Mr. J. W. WHITE and JIM SHAW, Pennsylvania Railroad men from Philadelphia, asked 3149 WFO 98-5 23 SWAFFORD to come to KERL's office to show them: the position of the handle on this anglecock when SWAFFORD found it. SWAFFORD went to the office and learned the handle on the anglecock had been touched while in the office. SWAFFORD marked the handle in the position ‘he had found it in accordance with his recollection‘ of its position. F. Washington Terminal Employees 1. Mr. M. Joseph Henley, Chief Clerk M. JOSEPH HANLEY stated the first knowledge he had of the accident was shortly after 8:35 on January 15,1953. His re- sponsibility in a situation such as this is to call hospitals, police and other agencies such as these. He stated he immediately made the above calls and then notified SIDNEY KEBL, Manager, ’.-‘iashirgaon Terminal. “ _ HANLEY stated he has no technical knowledge concern- ing the railroad, and therefore when he did view the crash, he made no examinatidn of the train" in an attempt to determine the cause of the acci- dent, nor did he hear anything concerning the anglecocks. 2. Mr. William. O. Laycock, Trainmaster WILLIAM O. LAYCOCK stated he had seen the anglecock of the third car shortly before it was removed from the car, and he had seen the pictures which were later taken of this anglecock, and he was of the opinion that this anglecock had been changed a little to the open po- sition prior to the taking of the picture. Further, that testimony at the railroad hearing on January 23 , 1953 by air experts reflected a five percent difference in‘ this anglecock to the closed position would have caused the air to be shut off in the last thirteen cars. LAYCOCK pointed out it was his opinion that when the anglecock was moved in Kingston, Rhode Island, it was never looked again, but it was in an open position. He strongly believed this anglecock re- mained in an open position allowing brakes on the whole train until jarring and braking from a high speed just out of Washington moved this anglecock to a closed position.” lie pointed out this would account for the train hav- ing brakes all the Jray through Baltimore and further not having the emer- gency brakes come on due to leakage of air. He stated his theory would account for the train not losing enough air in the short distance from the point the anglecock closed until it reached the station in Washington to cause these emergency brakes to cause any dragging. 150 WFO 98-523 3. Mr. Howard Stanley Cramer, Car Repairman HOWARD STANLEY CRAMER, Lovettsville, Virginia, advised that at the date and time of the accident he was on track twenty- four, which is on the lower level, and upon hearing the noise, ran up the stairway to the grcnnd level and took a quick look at the wreck, though he did not get too close to it, as he had to return to track twenty—four to inspect an incoming train. CRAMER stated that approximately twenty-five to thirty minutes later, he returned to the ground level of the station and proceeded to the wreck, whereupon he ran into Mr. JOHN HENRI SMITH, the foreman of car inspectors, who instructed him and Mr. WILLIAM DAVID, a gang foreman on the nightshift of the Washington Terndnal Company, to in- spect the anglecocks. Mr. CRAMER mentioned that the pullman cars had then been pulled out. He stated he and DAVID started on the east side of the train at the first car that was completely on the graind, which would have been the.$hird~ car of the train, and examined the anglecocks which he found open down the-entire‘length of the east side of the remaining cars and proceeded down the west side of the train and found all the anglecocks open and locked, except at the tail end of the .1thi-rd:. car of the train, which was the first car he had originﬂly inspected. He stated it was a new type of car and had folding steps which were down at that time, thus concealing the anglecocks from open view, but as he crawled under the steps that were down, he was able to make a careful examination and inspection, He found the anglecocks had been shut off, which, according to CRAMER, meant that the air had been closed off to all cars in rear of this car. SMITH was standing on the platform at the moment, and he folded up the steps so Mr. SMITH could personally examine the anglecocks. SMITH immediately left the area to obtain the master mechanic. Following this CRAMER stated he had to return to his regular duties in~ specting cars of trains passing through the station, and he had no further knowledge concerning the accident. GRAMER added he was unaware of anyone else that might have examined or handled the anglecocks on that or any other car before he and DAVID made their examination. ho Mr. Roy F. Kirby, Gang Foreman, "A" Yard ROY F. KIEBY, 5210 — 27th Avenue, S. E., Hillcrest Heights, Maryland, advised that at no time since Train #173 was wrecked 151 wro 98-5 23 has he been near the scene of the crash. He said that about 10:00 a.m., January 15, 1953, he was instructed by B. W. WHITE, Foreman, Coach Yard, ‘to make a train test of air brakes on cars seven through sixteen of Train #173 which had been removed from the scene of the crash. This test consisted of connecting a testing devibe to the front end of car seven. Cars seven through sixteen were coupled together. Nothing was connected to the rear end of car sixteen. The train line and reservoir tanks were charged to 103 pounds, and two reduc- tions of ten pounds each-were made in the air pressure, according to standard testing procedures. KIRBY said the brakes were applied on all ten cars, and he found nothing which would have caused the brakes on these cars to fail provided there was sufficient air pressure in the train line. KIRBY advised that F. E. COXEN, Brakeman, Coach Yard, was one of five crew members who moved the above cars fro the scene of the crash. KIRBY said COXEN told him he was standing on track sixteen platform just prior to the accident. He estimated the speed of the train at thirty-five miles per hour, and said when_it passed him, the brakes were not being applied on the rear cars. GOXEH said he knew they were not working because there were no sparks coming from the wheels. He did not specify which of the rear cars were not braking, and he did not notice the train until the front cars had already passed him. KIRBY said COXEN further advised that before his crew charged the train line with air in the last ten cars, he opened the drain cock on the reservoir tank of car sixteen and found no pressure. He al- so said there was no pressure in the train line, and it took a long time to charge it. KIRBY did not recall that COXEN stated how long it took to charge the train line other than that it was a "long" time. KIRBY said if the information given by COXEN were true, that based on his railroad experience, he would say Train #173 ar~ rived in'Washington, D. C. with no air pressure in the train lihe or reservoirs from car sixteen forward to the point where an anglecock was closed. This would mean there were brakes on only the engine and the cars ahead of the closed anglecock. He has never heard of a similar situa- tion occurring, but it is apparently possible. He would attribute the cause of the accident to this lack of train line pressure. 152 WFO 98-52 3 G. Pennsylvania Railroad Employees l. Mr. Homer 0. Guyton, Assistant Road Foreman of Engineers, ‘ ’ HOMER C. GUYTON, l2hhA Simms Place, N. E.,_who has had thirty-five years railroad service, with offices at Ivy Uity Roundhouse, stated he and Mr. W} P. PRIMM, Road Foreman of Engineers, Baltimore, were the first two to inspect the inside of the motor cab. Specifically, they examined the brake valve which was in the emergency position, the automatic speed control device which was in normal posi- tion, the emergency valve on the fireman's side which was found open, the rotary valve was found in the passenger position at the leading end of the motor,and in the lap position at the rear end, which is the cor- rect and normal operating positions; on the brake valve which has a double heading cutéout cook, the leading end was open and the trailing end was closed which was also correct. They concluded that the engineer did all he could to operate safely and to bring about an emergency stop. GUYTON stated he personally operated the same locomotive from Phihadelphia to Washington on January 9th and found it to be in correct and normal opera~ tion. GUYTQN advised he was present for tests made on a similar type motor as the one wrecked. They removed the brake valve, dis- tributing valve, rotary valve, and some parts of the automatic speed con- trol from the damaged motor and used those parts on a good motor, and they all tested satisfactorily. These tests were.made under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Mr. WEIGHTMAEL Chief Air Brake Inspector for the railroad. 2. Mr. Andrew Po Schlegel, Car Foreman, Baltimore, Maryland ANDREW'P. SCHLEGEL, 1655 Argonne Drive, Baltimore, Maryland, advised he first became aware of ﬂue fact the Federal Express had wrecked in Washington, D. C., while he was in his ofice in Baltimore, Maryland. He immediately went to the Baltimore Station and checked with his crews at that station to determine if they had conducted any inspec~ tion on the train as it passed through that station. He was advised that they had checked the rear of the Federal Express for stean and had closed the steam valve somewhat to prevent the excessive escape of steam from that valve. He talked to the men on the front of the platform, whom he 153 .4» "ton Terminal, said he would take it up to KERL's office. WFO 98-S23 identified as ED BERRY and FRANK STRICKLINE. He said he was advised by these men at that time that they had conducted no inspection, and they had received no requests for service from Train #173. , SCHLEGEL then drove in his car from Baltimore to the Union Station, Washington, D. C. He offered his services at the scene of the wreck in Washington, and he began to assist in clearing away the wreckage. He said that about 11:00 a.m. Mr. J. F. SWAFFORD told him an anglecobk had been found on the rear of the third car, and this anglecock was in a partly closed position. He was further advised it was presently in the office of Mr. KERL, Manager of the Washington Tenninal. SCHLEGEL said he went to KERL's office where he ob~ served this anglecock, and also marked on the air hose in yellow chalk the fact that it had come from the rear of the third car. Upon examining this anglecock very closely and by blowing air through it, he was of the opinion this anglecock, in the position it was in when he observed it, could not have caused instant wreck due to the fact that there was sufficient air going through it to have enabled the enginemn to apply his brakes. Later on, upon returning to the scene of the wreck, he was asked to arrange to have wreckmen block up the rear of the first car of the train. This car was partly in the crevice caused by the engine sinking through the floor of the concourse of Union Station and the rear was about twenty feet in the air. In order to accomplish the blocking up of the rear‘of this car, it was necessary to remove a great amount of debris located at the point where the blocks were to go. Upon removing the debris, the wreckmen came across some armored wire which appeared to be hooked on to something in the debris, Upon reaching the end of the annored wire, he observed the anglecock which came off the rear of the first car of the train. He observed this anglecock was in a closed posio tion. He removed the anglecock from the debris to take it At this time Mro G. M. CRABTREE, Gang Foreman, hashing- It was taken up to KERL's office by a workman named BUTLER, and it was brought back down to the scene of the wreck, and SGHLEGEL was advised KERL did nbt Want the_ anglecock in his office. He was then directed to put it on the Washington Terminal wreck train, so CRABTREE and BUTLER walked away with it, and SCHLEGEL said be presumed they had put in on this train. to KERL's office. 1514 PHOTO OF ANGLE COCK FROM HEAR OF CAR # 1 ‘*-tjr-F — ~———~——— V 1 WFO 98~S23 Later on H. H. HAUPT asked him for the anglecock and was told it was on the Washington Terminal wreck train. HAUPT came back and said it was not there. They found CRABTREE, and he said it was locked up in the trunk of his car. They then went to CRABTREE's car, and CRABTREE unlocked his trunk and recovered this anglecock, and it was then taken to KERL‘s office. SCHLEGEL stated he was unable to give the exact times in» volved in the various transactions in connection with this anglecock; how» ever, he believes it was after 6:00 p.m° when he first observed it in the debris. He stated he lost all track of time at this time and could not even estimate the other times involvedo SCHLEGEL advised in regard to the anglecock which came off of the rear of the third car that he estimated it was in a posi- tion of one-third closed and two—thirds open and that as a result of his blowing this valve and getting air at the other end, he was of the opinion that if the valve was in the same position on the train, the brakes should have operated through this valve.. ' 30 Mr. Holly Va Smith, Wreck Master in Charge of the Pennsylvania Railroad Wreck Train HOLLY V. SMITH, 3l5h Remington Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, arrived in Washington, D. 0. at approximately 12:30 p.m., January 15, 1953. He stated that about dusk on the day of the wreck he noticed an anglecock lying on the walkway near the rear of car three. It was in a closed position and was apparently locked in that position at the time it was observed by himo Attached to it was an air hose and a short piece of train line. He did not notice any apparent damage to the anglecock and did not again see it subsequent to this time. He cannot be certain from.which car the anlecock was removed. SMITH advised that other than the above anglecock being closed he did not see anything else at the scene which appeared suspicious or unusual to him. ho Mr. Elwood Ho Cross, Assistant Derrick Engineer EIMDOD H. CROSS, 3310 Beech Avenue, Baltimore 11, Maryland, advised he worked as assistant wreck foreman in the removal of the wreckageo When he first observed the anglecock on car one he was helping crib up the car to prevent its falling and causing further in~ juries in the wreck. At about 7:00 or 8:00 pom. on the day of the wreck he said he first saw tie anglecock from car one still connected to the 156 WFO 98-5 23 rear of the car by a wire. He is not certain whether the anglecock was hanging in the air or was in the debris on the ground below the rear of car one; however, he thinks it was in the debris on the ground, The Wire was out near the anglecock and was tied back to the car to prevent injury to workmen moving about the vicinityo He noted the anglecock was in a closed position. Other than this anglecock being closed he did not see anything at the scene which looked suspicious or unusual, 5. Mr, Theodore P. Maggie, Jr; THEODORE P. MAGGIO, JR,, 16 N. Front Street, Baltim more, Maryland, stated he started working on the engine of the wrecked train, and during the course of his work was assigned to work near the rear of the number one car. While working there, he noticed a wire hang» ing down with an anglecock attached, Inasmuch as a nuber of fellow workers were walking around this, and it presented a hazard, he obtained a chisel and hammer and cut the wire holding the anglecock. In cutting the wire he had to press it against the metal part of the car and nick it with the chisel after which he bent it back and forth until it broke and the anglecock fell to the ground. He then picked up the anglecock and gave it to Mr. SCHLEGEL. MAGGID never saw it again. 'The anglecock did not look as if it had been damaged, and he definitely noticed that before it was cut off the wire it was in a closed position. This was he only unusual thing he noticed while clear- ing the wreckage, 6, Mrs Robert Clarence Johnson, Jr. ROBERT CLARENCE JOHNSON, JED, 252 Edgevale Road, Baltimore, Maryland, advised that about 2:30 pom. someone mentioned to him that the anglecock on car one had been cut loose by'MAGGIO and had been laid on the platform near the number one car, He later observed the angle» cask and the handle was in a closed position, He did not notice that it was damaged in any way, Zn Mro William S. Schaeffer A _ T.‘?lI;LIAI*.i 5., SOHAEFFER, 10 Circle Drive, N; ‘Linthicum, Maryland, advised that shortly after his arrival he started carrying blocks and assisted in taking the trucks off of car two, Later that evening or "early the next morning he was asked for his hammer and chisel so it could 157 WFO 98-S23 be used to cut off the anglecock at the rear of car one. He watched while this anglecock was cut off the armored wire which was hanging _down in the debris. He noticed the anglecock was in a ’closed position. SGHAEFFER stated he did not observe any other anglecocks while working on the train, and he did not see anything unusual or suspicious surrounding the wreck. . 8. Mr. Lewis M. Novak LEWIS M. NOVAK9 311 Grove Park Road, Baltimore, Maryland, arrived in'Washington, D. 0., and started carrying blocks for cars four and five to put them back on the rails. it was later brought to his attention that one of the anglecocks was broken. At this time he observed the anglecock at the rear of the number one car lying on the ground and the handle was in a closed position. He does not recall if a wire was attached to the anglecock at that time; however, he did observe a wire hanging down from the train line. He did not observe any other anglecocks and did not notice anything unusual or suspicious other than the closed anglecock. — 9. Mr. Vance M. Walker VANCE M. WALKER, l70h'W. Madison_Avenne, Baltimore, Maryland, advised when he saw the anglecock on car one at about dusk on the day of the wreck, it was suspended from the rear end of the car by the wire wrapping pulled from the broken train line. The anglecock was shut crossdwise, indicating it was locked in a closed position. He ob» served MAGGIO out it down and that it was apparently undamaged. 10. Mr.‘ ”William- T. Butler WILLIAM T. BUTLER, Sh N. Payson Street, Baltimore,‘ Maryland, advised that 8:00 or 9:00 in the evening of January 15, 1953 Mr. SCHLEGEL called him to take an anglecock upstairs. When he first saw this anglecock, SCHLEGEL, MAGGIO and others were standing over it and a chisel and hammer were lying on the ground. BUTLER picked up the anglecock by a piece of train line, placed it on his shoulder and carried it upstairs to an office. ‘ When they arrived at the office with the anglecock,’ the man accompanying him said to take it downstairs and'put it in his car. BUTLER then carried the anglecock to the car and placed it in the trunk; 158 WFO 98-523 The lid was then closed and locked. BUTLEB.was certain this anglecock was the anglecock from car one, and it did’ not appear to him to be damaged. He noticed no other anglecocks on the wrecked train. 11:, \' Mr. William Hughes ' WILLIAM I-IUCHLES, h61O Holabird Avenue , Baltimore, Maryland, arrived in Washington, 1). C. at about 2:00 pm. on the day of the wreck. At about dusk he saw one of the men standing on _some cross ties taking down an anglecock which was hanging seven or eight feet from the ground. This man was being given instructions by Mr. SCHLEGEL. When the anglecock was cut from the car, it was laid down on the ground, and he walked over to it, and as he reached over to touch the handle, he was told by SCHLEGEL to take a walk, meaning that he was to return to his work. 1 12. Mr, Johnny K. Jackson JOHNNY K. JACKSON, 1629 1.2!. Lexington Street, Balti- more, Maryland, advised the only angle cock he noticed during the clean up of the wreckage was the anglecock of the engine which was removed at about 8:30 am. on the morning after the wreck. He said he removed this angle- cook and placed it on a small truck, and it did not app ear to be damaged and had a length of air hose connected to it; however, he did not notice whetherit was in a closed or open position. JACKSON observed nothing of a suspicious nature during ihe entire time he assisted in removing the wreckage, 13.. Mr. John Svigos JOHN SVIGOS, 29 S. Kresson Street, Baltimore, Mary-= land, worked at the scene of the wreck and did not observe any anglecock either opened or closed, nor did he observe anything else which might be considered pertinent. 11;, Mr, Victor JO hiatarozza VICTOR J . MATAROZZA, 921; Belnord Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, advised that while working on the train wreck he observed an anglecock which was in a closed "position lying on t_he platform sometime during the early evening; however, he did’ not know from which car the anglecock had been taken. He noticed nothing suspicious in regard to the Week» 159 WFO 98-523 150 Mro Wro ‘.MaS0n WILLIAM W. MASON, 3303 Falls Cliff Road, Baltimore, Maryland, advised he was assigned to help other crews block up the cars to help get them out of the way and to cut off the trucks on the number, two car} He first observed an anglecock which he believed was located at the intersection of cars two and three, and it was in a closed posi— tion at that time. He observed this anglecock at aboutvh:OO p.m. He ob- served nothing else of a suspicious nature; however, he did notice that the shoes of the brakes on car two were red,_and from their genral apu pearance he would believe the brakes on this car had been applied.hard. He did not notice ﬂie brake shoes on any other cars. 16° Mr. McLaurin C. Dawson, Gang Foreman MCLAURIN C. DAWSON, Bangert Street, Fullerton, Many— land, advised that during the time he was working on the wrecked train he did not observe. either of the anglecocks or anything of a suspicious natureo 17. Mr. Frank B. Gallant FRANK B. GALLANT, l2lh Willow Road, Baltimore, Mary- land, advised he did not observe any of the anglecocks and noticed nothing suspicious during his work in clearing up the wreckage of Train #173, 18, Mr. Melvin C. Englert, Cook MELVIN C, ENGLERT, 37 N. Kresson Street, Baltimore, Maryland, did not observe the wreck of the train, ‘ 19, Mro’W. D, Lombard, Cook M, D, LOMBARD, 2559 Garrett Avenue, Baltimore, Maryh land, was employed as cook on the Baltimore wreck train and did not ob» serve the wreck; ' 20. Mr, George H, Sheppard, Derrick Operator 1 GEORGE H. SHEPPARD, 2h N. Kresson Street, Baltimore, Maryiahd, advised he worked until about 11:30 a.m. on the day'following the wreck. He saw nothing of a suspicious nature during his work at the scene of the wreck. 160 wro 98-52 3 21. Mr. John Capino aka Cochpenna, Repairman Helper, Washington Terminal ,_ JOHN CAPINO aka Cochpenna, Linden Avenue, Bruns- wick, Maryland, advised that at the time of the wreck he was at work in the stop located under the concourse in Union Station. He advised that when the portion of the engine came through the ceiling from above, he left the shop immediately and went to the floor above away from the wreck. He stated he did not go near the wreck again, and the only part of the train he saw was that part of the engine which came through the ceiling where he was workingo * H. .Experiments Conducted in'Washington Terminal Yard 10 An examination was made of cars two and three of the wrecked train which were located in Yard A of ﬂue ivy City Yards of the Washington Terminal. This examination was made to determine whether it was possible for the anglecock on the rear of car three to be forced from an open to-a closed position by its striking against the center end sill of the coupler framing or any other inanimate objects located on the care ’ ‘ _ An examination of the rear of the number three car disclosed that ﬁle anglecock from this car had been removed and ﬁ1ere =had been no anglecock to replace it. An exanination of the bottom part ' of the center end.si1l, however, did reflect that there were some abrasions ‘which could haveibeen caused by the anglecock striking against the bottom part of the center end sillo Inasmuch as the anglecock on the number three car had been previously removed, tests were conducted on the rear tnd of ﬂeas two,.a car of identical construction as that of car three, ...I ‘-.:-«~ . It was determined at this time that by moving the ‘ coupler on the nuber two car in an up and down motion, the coupler frame would strike the anglecocko It was noted that the anglecock support is anchored to the coupler, and when the coupler is moved in any position, the anglecock will therefore follow it. when the coupler was in its highest position, and the anglecock was open but with the handle in the unlocked position, the center end sill struck the handle of the angle— cock. It was determined that by combining a vertical motion with the horizontal motion to the coupler with the handle of the anglecock in the open or unlocked position, it was possible to strike the handle of the anglecock and to actually move the anglecock from.the open position toward a closed position. 161 LEB:msb WFO 98~523 With the anglecock forced to a position toward the closed, it was not possible to determine what the actual affect of this partial closing of the anglecock had on the air flowing through it as no source of air was available for the test, and also the car had been damaged to such an extent that it could not be moved to a source of airo A FBI Laboratory examination of the anglecock from the rear of car three reveals indications that some object had been rubbing against its handle prior to the accidents The pin which hinges the handle to the valve had been broken, enabling the handle to be depressed, raising the top portion of the mechanism to such an extent that the "stops" did not engage the lower portiono In this position the locking mechanism is inoperativeo 20 On Jgnuary 29, 1953 the Washington Field Office was advised by the Pennsyivania Railroad Police, Washington Terminal, that the anglecock on the car “Philadelphia County“, which was part of the second section of Train #173, was found to be threemquarters closed at approximate= ly 2220 acme on the same day at New Haveng Gonnecticuto A visual examination of the anglecock located on the rear of the car, "Fhiladelphia County", reflected abrasions on the top ' portion of the housing covering the trigger mechanism on the anglecock handle as well as on the lower portion of the handle itselfo 1 At approximately 9:15 acme Train #173 was moved from the Union Station Terminal to the Ivy City Yards where car number eight (Orange Bay), car number nine (Philadelphia County), and car number ten (Samuel horse) were detached as a threeaoar unit from the remainder of the traino Under the direction of JOHN F0 SWAFFORD9 Assistant Master Mechanic, Washington Terminal Company, tests were made in the presence of Bureau Agents to determine if the partial closing of the anglecock was due to mechanical failursa \ SWAFFORD advised that a close personal examination of the instant anglecock reflected metal abrasions on the housing of the locking lever spring and handle of the anglecock which corresponded to marks on the inside of the carrier end castingo SWAFFORD added he was ad» vised by We Bo WEIGHTMAN, a Pennsylvania Railroad official, that abrasions were also noticeable on the trigger mechanism portion of the anglecock handle 0 The initial test with the three cars still attached consisted of a "snatch“ or "jerk" test which embodied the following: = 162 = WFO 98-523 ‘ "Wooden blocks were placed under the wheels of car number ten (Samuel horse) to prevent movement. By use of a locomotive pulling from the front end of car number eight (Orange Bay), a sudden jerking movement was simulated. The purpose of this test was to determine if any_portion of the anglecock would strike against the carrier castingo » j ’ From visual observation the sudden motion of the cars caused ﬂne handle'of the anglecock to move towards the rear of the car and appeared to strike the inside edge of the carrier casting. It ’is noted the carrier casting is the end portion of the frame of the car which supports the coupler allowing it to traverse from left to right with the motion of the car.‘ ' 1 i — , n 7 Following.the jerk test, the car 5Phi1adelphia County" was uncoupled fro car number ten, "Samuel Morse", and the follow- ing test conducted: The aglecock handle was placed in a slightly off locked position. A coupler was raised approximately-one'inbh by placing a board between the carrier frame and the coupler to simulate the coupler's position during the operation of the train. The coupler was then moved from left to right by the use of a wheel stick,whibh movement caused the anglecock handle to strike against the inside portion of the carrier cast- ing, resulting in the anglecock handle moving from an open position to a ‘position where the air supply was completely shut off. ‘With the anglecock in this position an air pressure gauge was placed on the air hose on the, opposite end of the "Philadelphia County“, and air was pumped into the hose at the rear of the car which led to the instant anglecock. The gauge ‘registered no pressure, indicating the air was completely shut off between 'the anglecock on the rear of the car and through the air line to the gauge Ff, at the front of the car.‘ _ When interviewed following the completion of the above test, SWEFFOD stated that from his position in the pit underneath the "Philademphia County" car during the initial jerk test, the sudden motion caused the aglecock to move towards the rear of the car and come within close proximity of the carrier casting. He added he was unable to determine if the anglecock actually struck the casting inasmuch as the motion of the cars was so swift it could not be followed by the naked eyeo H M _; . i In connection with the second test mae; whereby the motion of the coupler caused the anglecock to strike the carrier lei WFO 98~523 casting, S%AFFORD stated this motion caused the anglecook hanéle to be moved from a slightly open but unlocked position to a position where the air flow was completely shut of 0 7 He stated the anglecock on the ”Fhi1adelphia Gcunty”_ car was located in the relatively same position as the anglecock at the rear of car number three Whigs was perﬁ of the train involved in the ac» cident at the Union ﬁtation Terminal on January 15, 19530 He explained that both were located at the rear or vestibule end of the car; and the angleoocks were in the proximate position in relationship to the carrier frsmeo S%A?F%ﬂB advised that from the evidence presented in connection with the wreck oa January 15, and from tests which he had conducted on January'293 l95?g it was his opinion the wreck was caused by mechanical failure; that is, that the same ﬁhing had happened to the sngleccck on car number three on January 15, 1953 as had happened to car number nine on January 299 L9§3o He commented he did not believe the in- dividual who had placed the anglecoek in its open position had looked the handle in that positiono Es stated each time a human hand opened or closed an angleeockg there was 3 possibillty it would not be locked open or closedo he added that in ﬂze past hes himself, has observed anglecocks on both freight and passenger trains which were in an opened but unlocked con"~ ticno He stated when ﬁie anglecock is in a full locked position, the handle is depressed to its full extent, and he stated when the handle is degressed only half wsyi the engleeook appears to be fully locked but is in an open but unlocked yositicno swnrsoso related tk*t Ho To COVER, Chief of the Motive Fewer Section, Pennsylvania aailrcsd, had directed a mechanical engineer to draw up plans for fee maxing of necessary changes to move the anglecock on all Pennsylvania lroaa cars, such as the "Philadelphia County"9 from its pxesent gositirn to a position where there would not be a possibility of the angiscock striking against the underfrsme of the care GEORﬁE S. WEBB, Superintendent of Motive Power, Pennw sylvania Railroad, who was presenﬁ curing the above tests made under ﬂue direction of SWKFFORD, stated that after viewing the tests he was "con» vinced now that when a little bit off the locked position, the anglecock handle can be movede“ He added that when slightly off the locked open positiong the handle appeared to be in a locked position; and it was shown it could be moved from thax slightly off locked positiono %EBB stated he has instructed the position of the snglecock on the “Philadelphia County" car be changed so there woooi be no gossibility of its striking the under— carriage of the care pl: 93.‘: Au ‘ Anglecock on the Philadelphia cqunty shown striking the center end sill. Close up of the anglecock on the Philadelphia sounty showing the extent to which the handle has been moved to a c1osed'oondition. Air coumd not pass thru with the handle in this position. . ,. ,_ H? ,4 A — ~ . .~ ‘:5 _ I ~ . ._;.~v««u.=-.-..2;v:,»su~..~.:x.~2,-a- .,._..-4. _ ,\ .~,......_._..¢ x....._. a._..... .r-..._.. , _ 4 __.. __j.._....._...___.... P ’ ;] Anglecock on the Philadelphia County showing it's normal position under the center end sill. Note the handle position 4 toward closed caused by movement. I WFO 98-S2} WEBB advised that the Pennsylvania Railroad was getting so far away from the idea of sabotage in instant case that it is no longer of consideration to them. He stated in view of the evidence which has been presented to them as a result of the investigation in in~ stant case and of the inquiry of the ICC, they are at the present time putting out instructions for mechanical manual locks on all of the angle- cocks on any of.the bars which are in a position where any possibility " exists of them striking any other portions_of the caro WEBB further related that when instant wreck ocw curred, he and the other officials of the Pennsylvania Railroad were of the opinion, in view of their experience, that there was no possible way‘ for an anglecock to be moved from the open to the closed position except‘ by human hand; howevezgfrom the testimony they have heard and from actual demonstrations which they have observedg they are now convinced that anglecocks may be opened in certain instances by their striking against parts of the care He stated for this reason, the Pennsylvania Railroad has put locks on anglecocksc 168 WFO 98»523 JRH:obs IXD INTERSTATb COMHEHCE COMMISSION A0 ORVILLE Do JQLLX9 Locomotive Inspector ORVILLE Dc JOLLY, M512 Livingston Road, 30 E09 advised he arrived in Washington from Baltimore at about 11:00 Ac Mo on the morning of the wrecks He said his inquiry was confined to the locomotive or engine #h87éo He estimated he first entered this engine at Union Station at about 123MB Po Mo, January 159 19530 He said WALTER GRAFF had entered the engine with him and they removed the air compressor governor valve {S=l6), the automatic brake valve (D$m2u), the independent braxe valve (S=hOuF), the feed valve (D»2h), the rotary valve (K~2)9 and the distributor valve (#8}o He said the exhaust pipe bracket was checked for stoppage and found to be all righto JOLLY said he learned that an employee of the rail» road named WILLIAM Pﬁlﬁn had been on the engine ahead of himo According to JOLLY? the aforementioned valves were removed from the wrecked engine and placed on engine #n896 which engine was used on the simulated train tests and experiments. According to JGLLY9 these valves were found by him to be in excellent condition and could not have had any bearing on the cause of he wreck“ Bo JAMES no Fdlﬁnbg Locomotive Inspector JAMES E0 FRI ﬁbg 1583 Mount Eagle Place, Alexandria» Virginia, advised he proceeded from his office in the I06 Building to Union Station immediately upon learning of the wrecko He'wae unable to state his time of errival but said he had gone to the scene of wreck and looked into the hole through which the locomotive had falleno He said he was unable to get close enough to the locomotive to inspect ito He said during the time he was at Union Station he heard nothing concerning the noesihility of train #173 having had any brake troubleo Co HOWnRD R0 LONGHUBST, Safety Inspector HQWARD R0 IQEGHURSTS MZOM 30th South, Fairlingtong Virginia; on January Bu, 1953, advised that on a 169 = wpo 98=523 the morning of January 159 1933» he had received information from an unrecalled source to the effect that a train had run into Union Station, in Washington, Dc Go Mro LONGHURST said he immediately proceeded to Union Station, arriving there at 9:15 AuMo He’advised he first went to the Railroad Gffices located upstairs in Union etations where he inter» viewed crew members, including the engineers fireman, cen= ductor, and brakemen, questioning each as to what had happenedo Mro LSNGHUEST stated that when he talked with the engineer at this time the latter had informed him nothing unusual had been noticed when the brakes were first applied on this train as it neared the first approach signal in the vicinity of Washingtona He also advised as he pro» ceeded on into the Station and neared the stopping point he then noticed that he received no reaction when the brakes were applied on the loeomotiveo At the time the accident occurredg it was said he estimated his speed at approximately thirty five (35) miles per hours Mro LONGHUEsT informed that at 9350 A0 he he began a physical check of the brakes on the cars of train #173“ He stated that the front portion of the train through car number 6 was the only part of the train which was still in the Stationo he advised the last ten cars had been removed by Pennsylvania Railroad employees when he arrived at the scene of the wreck at 9350 An No he stated he felt of one or more wheels of each ef the first six ears for the purpose of ascertaining whether there had been anylaraking on these oarso Mr. LONGHURST said there was a definite\indieation of heat on both the brakes and wheels of the first three carso He stated the brake shoes and the wheels on cars I, S, and 6 were of normal temperature, thereby giving indication there had been no brakes applied on these earso an the other hands he pointed out the wheels and brake shoes on the first three ears were “soaked” with heats thereby giving definite indication the brakes had actually been applied on these cars prior te the wrecko Mro L%NGEUE$T explained that the brake shoes on the cars have steel plates at the back side and the actual == 170 =A WFO 98~523 shoes are built around or into these plateso He advised he found these metal plates to be in a molten state, indicating the brakes had been under terrific pressure and high heat; He estimated the degree of the heat as "cherry redo" Mro LONGHUE&T said at this original exami= nation he noticed the brakes on cars A and 6 were in an applied position. The brakes on car 5 were free or had not been appliedo He pointed outg however, he subsequently learned air had been pumped into the last thirteen (13) cars by the Pennsylvania Railroad employees within a few minutes after the accidento He pointed out further that he also has sub= sequently learned from Assistant Master Mechanic SWAFFORE that brakes on car 5 were not on at the time of his examin nation inasmuch as the brake cylinder cut out cock had been closed by one of the Railroad employees shortly after the accident to prevent air going to the brake cylindero Mrs LONGHUBST related he made no thorough examination of the engine at this time; however, he did note numerous skid marks and “burnt up molten metal“ on the wheels of the engineo He explained the wheels had apparently been under such intense heat they had reached a molten stateo Relevant to the anglecocks from the rear of cars #1 and #3, Loﬁﬁhbﬁél stated he did not see either the anglecock which had been on the rear of the Iirst car or the anglecock from the rear of the third car until later that nighto ﬁre LQKGEUEET continued that he later learned that the angleooek from the rear of the #3 car had been removed by Railroad employees through the use of an acetylene torch; furthers that the angleoock had dropped to the ground after it had been out off, although the employee ~ who had removed same stated it had landed on the hose portion rather than on the handle portiono In addition, he learned the anglecock had been handled by several individuals, one of whom had placed it in the rear of his automobileo Mrc LOEGHURST informed he subseouentl - Y learned in the testimony of Railroad employees that the Washington Terminal employees had attached an engine to the = 171 — WFO 98~523 rear of train #173 and pumped air into the brake line of this train immediately after the wrecko He stated that,after pumping air into the brake line, the terminal employees had closed the anglecock behind car #6 inasmuch as it was derailed and they wanted—to clear the other cars from the tracko An employee was said to have attempted to disconnect the air hose between'cars 3 and A but found he was unable to do so in View of the air pressure in the hose» Mro LGNGHURST said this employee was JOHN SMITHO Mrs LQNGHURST said with the anglecock behind car 6 closed after the rear ten cars were disconnected, the air pressure remained between the number 3 and h car: and prevented disconnection of the hoseo He said this, of course, proved that the air was not escaping through the front of car #3 or the anglecock located at that position despite the ﬁact car #3 was separated from car #2 in the crasho He informed that it had been necessary for SMITH to enter car #h and open the conductor‘s emergency valve to release the air pressure which enabled him thereafter to disconnect the air hoseo Mro LONGHURST advised testimony had revealed that by 9:15 A. Mo cars A, S, and 6 had been cut off from the rear portion of the train and that it was some thirty (30) minutes later, at about 9zh5, that SMITH had tried to disa connect the air hose between cars 3 and M9 According to LONGHURST, this definitely indicates that the air was trapped between the rear of car #6 and the rear of car #3 for a period of thirty (30) minutes, 1080 anglecocks were closed at both ends of these carso ﬁre LONGHURST commented there was no question in his mind that within the one half hour period, had the anglecock located at the rear of car #3 been open, the remaining cars would have been bled completely of airo He added that in the event the anglecock was open to the extent of 3/16 of an inch, under which condition tests were later mades that the air would have been exhausted from the brake pipes in a matter of minuteso He stated,to the best of his knowledge, no tests had been made by Railroad employees as to the amount of air pressure remaining in the cars prior to the time the air lines were recharged shortly after the accidento wro 98=523 Mro LONGHURST informed his examination of the wreck had revealed the following significant points: (1) The worn, heated, and molten condition of the brake sh6es and wheels of cars #1, #2, and #30 (2) Cold wheels (unapplied brakes) on cars #h, #5, and #60 Bearing these facts in mind, LQNGHURST said the only possible conclusion is some obstruction in the brake pipe or train line between cars #3 and ﬂu was obviously presento Another factor was the inability of JOHN SMITH to disconnect the air hose between cars #3 and #ho He pointed out SMITH9s testimony revealed,after he was unable to disconnect the air hose between cars #3 and #h, he then opened the emergency valve in the front of car #h after which he uncoupled the hose with no difficultya LONGHURST reasoned that this proved to him that whatever obstruction was in the brake pipe was ahead of the point of coupling between cars #3 and #ho He further statedginasmuch as brakes had applied prior to the accident on car #3 and had not applied on car #h, the point of the obstruction was, therefore, in the air hose or anglecock at the rear of car #30 LONGHURST recalled the removal of the angle» cock and coupling hose from the rear of car #3 and dropping of same prior to performance of tests and appropriate exami» nationo He said at the time the anglecock was dropped or some time prior to using it on the simulated train several hours later the handle was obviously moved to a more open positiono Mro LONGHURST commented that the stress being placed on the anglecock at the rear of the first car is merely "clouding the issue" and that he, himselfg attaches no sigw nificance as to whether it was open or closedo This opinion on his part was due to his conviction that the brakes on this train, including the engine and cars 1, 2, and 3, were definitely applied prior to instant wrecko <=]_73.=. WFO 98=523 LONGHURST said the anglecock from rear of car #3 was later placed on a car similar to the one which had been involved in the accident in its relative same position and tests conducted, At this time the angles cock handle was’roughly in a forty five (A5) degree position or was one half way between a completely open and completely closed position, He said in this position there was about a 3/16 inch opening in the air passage of the anglecock, He added the opening would be completely shut at an approximate sixty five (65) degree angle, Mr, LONGHUBST explained after the accident a simulated train had been put together using the same last ten (10) cars from train #173 and adding six additional cars and an engine, thus simulating the entire train at the time the accident occurred, - He advised these tests were conducted under the Association of American Railroads Code, which embodies the charging, application and releasing of brakes, leakage tests, and tests of emergency valves inside each individual car, LONGHURST stated the results of the tests of the entire train with the anglecock taken from the rear of #3 car in the position it was said to have been found after the accident were extremely good, This indicated that,with a 3/16 of an inch opening, the brakeage on the remaining cars was normal, LONGHURST added that,in addition to the tests made on the entire simulated train, tests were made on each individual car in accordance with the Railroads Code, These tests likewise were favorable, Mr, LONGHURST stated the air hoses on instant train were also put through the AAR tests and these hoses passed the test, These tests consist of a visual test of looking through one end of the hose and seeing light through the other end and rolling a steel ball from one end of the hose out the other end, No obstruction was noted in any of these hoses that were tested, Mr, LONGHURST added that some of the hoses on the first cars of train #173 were damaged = 17h = WFO 98~S23 to such an extent that these tests were not madeo The hoses at the rear of car #3 and the front of car #h were included among those passing the hose test,according to LONGHURSTO He informed the train tests were per» formed in accordance with the AAR Handbook relating to brake and air signal equipmento He said other tests required by the AAR were made in accordance with their test code entitled "Single Car Testing Device" on the individual cars of the simulated traino According to Mro LONGHURST, all these tests were favorable and revealed no defects in the braking system of this train. Mr. LGNGHURST was questioned as to how air was replenished in the reservoir tanks after application of the brakes had been madeo He informed each engine has a series of supply tanks which automatically supply air to the reservoir tanks, auxiliary tanks, emergency tanks and supply tanks located throughout the traino For example, he pointed out,in the event brakes were applied and twenty (20) pounds of air was used in the applicationlof the brakes, the supply tanks in the engine automatically replenished the air along the individual cars which was used in the application of the brakeso Simultaneously the pumps located in the engine automatically replenish the air used from the supply tankso He pointed out that valves automatically control the supplying of air between the reservoir tanks and the auxiliary tanks, emergency tanks and supply tankso Mro LONGHURST advised,in the event there was a one (1) pound per minute leakage at any point along the traing this leakage would continue even if the supply were cut Offg but the leakage would be governed by the amount of air under pressureo In other wordss the leakage being one pound per minute at say ninety (90) pounds pressure naturally would be less after the pressure had dropped to say thirty (30) poundso From the standpoint of possible sabotage, LONGHURST commented that he did not believe that anyone a175=- WFO 98w523 deliberately closing an anglecock could foresee the ultimate results which were obtained inasmuch as under normal conditions, if an anglecock had been closed on a train,that after running a short distance normal leakage would cause the brakes of the cars to be automatically applied, thus stopping the traino Mr. LONGHURST furnished as a possible explana= nation of the fact that the train did not stop automatically . the fact that the air pressure in the reservoir tanks has a tendency to escape through the triple valve to the brake pipe line. In this connection, he pointed out that the unusually slow leakage occurring on instant train might have permitted normal leakage through the triple valve from the reservoir tanks to equalize the pressure in the train brake line, thereby preventing automatic application of the brakeso He said he had never heard of this actually occurring and believed the anglecock on train #173 had become closed near enough to Washington to prevent sufficient train pipe leakage from forcing the brakes to be appliedo According to Mro LONGHURST, the triple valve located on each car between the reservoir tank and the brakes has three primary functionso The first function of the triple valve is to permit air to enter the reservoir tanko The second function is to apply the brakes when air is released from the brake pipe lineo The third function is to permit a recharge of the reservoir tank and also to release the brakeso According to Mro LONGHURST, under normal conditions in the event the conductor‘s valve in car #u or any of the latter cars on instant train had been opened, the brakes would have been applied on car #A and the remaining cars to the rear of train #1730 Mr. LONGHURST stated the Pennsylvania Rail= read tracks have a pulsating current which affects some of the en ines in operation thereono He said the engine to train 173 was equipped with a device which through the use of this pulsating current controls the speed of the train. According to Mro LONGHURST, this pulsating current is in effect in various restricted areaso If a train approaches @176: wro 98,523" at a speed, for example, of sixty (60) miles per hour, its speed, through the use of this pulsating current, would be reduced to say forty (ho) miles per hour, He pointed out, in the event the train reached this restricted area under the maximum allowed speed, this pulsating current would have no effect on the train, He further advised that actually instant train, under normal conditions, could have arrived in the Washington, D, 0,, area at a speed of say eighty (80) miles per hour and, without the engineer taking any action whatsoever to decrease the speed of the train, a series of these pulsating currents would have automatically stopped the train at Union Station, providing the brake lever was manually released after the train was slowed to the restricted speed, Mr, LONGHURST stated,inasmuch as the engineer had the brakes fully applied, this pulsating current had no additional affect on the governors or the brakes on instant engine, On January 26, 19539 information was received from Mr, LONGHURST that experiments conducted by him during the previous week end have caused him to form the belief that the anglecock at rear of car #3 on train #173 was closed by it being brought in contact with framing around the coupler, and subsequent testimony before the ICC Hearing would bear this out, He stated that the anglecock, being attached to the coupler arm by two supporting brackets, is guided by the various movements of the coupler, Mr, LONGHURST testified before Commissioner PATTERSON at the ICC Hearing on January 29, 1953, He recounted examinations and tests conducted by him on the date of instant wreck, as previously set forth in this report, At this Hearing, Mr, LONGHURST presented photo= graphs made,at his request and in his presence,showing the effects on the anglecock of various movements of the coupler on the New Haven type car, These photographs showed the anglececk to be in contact with the center end sill or framing below the coupler, This sill was described at the Hearing as the "bottom cross member of the buffer pocket portion of the underframe end construction," The tests conducted by Mr, LONGHURST were conducted on car #2 =17?» WFO 98~S23 (#86h3 from train #173), inasmuch as the anglecock from rear of car #3 (#8665 from train #173) had been removed shortly after the wrecko The car on which the tests and examinations were conducted was said by Mr. LONGHURST to be a New Haven type car, as was car #3 of the wrecked train. Mro LONGHURST showed copies of various exhibits, which had been introduced into evidence at the ICC Hearing, to the interviewing Agent. ICC Exhibit #56 is a photograph of the coupler head, which photograph had been taken from directly in front of the coupler head. This exhibit shows the coupler head swung laterally to the left as you face the photograph and jacked vertically to within 1 1/8 inch of contact with bottom of buffer or top cross membero According to Mr. LONGHURST, the coupler head in this photograph is moved over ll inches from the coupling line center, He said in the position shown in the photograph the coupler head still had not reached the maximum point of its lateral movement away from center. He explained that regulations require the movement of the coupler head be at least 13 inches laterally in each direction from center, or there would be a total of 26 inches through which the coupler head will move laterally. He explained there are spring and tension devices which cause the coupler head to ride in the center of the car (coupling line center) when in an "at rest” ‘position, or no pressure is being applied to it. (See Exhibit on Page 1790) In addition, Mr. LQNGHURST informed the regulations also require the vertical dimension of the carrier opening for the coupler shall be sufficient to allow the tightlock coupler (type used on Car #3) of standard length to move three inches above and three inches below the coupling line center or a total of six inches through which the coupler head will move vertically. In conjunction with ICC Exhibit #56, Mr. LONGHURST said ICC Exhibit #59 was taken with the coupler in the identical position as is shown in #56. He pointed out that Exhibit #59 shows the anglecock to be in actual contact with the center and sill despite the fact the coupler = 178 = ICC# 56-PHOTO OF COUIPMR MO'ED_ OVER li INCHES I.-A’I.‘El'-ZALLY FROM GENMR TO WITHIN 1 AND 1/ 8 INCH OF CONTACT WITH BUFFER. * _ L l ‘r. 9 ‘ x V " . X‘. . . ii Icc #59-PHOTO saox-«me ANGLE coox IN conmcm WITH cmmn END SILL-'.~.'HEN comma IS IN POSITION ; SHOWN IN #56. ‘ wro 98=523 still has not reached the maximum point of its possible vertical movement, (See Exhibits on Pages l79~l80.) ICC Exhibit #55 was said by Mr. LONGHURST to’have been introduced at the hearing for the purpose of showing the vertical clearance between the top of the coupler and the buffer to be 3 and 5/8 inches on the New Haven type car, This was introduced, he said, to prove the extent of the possible upward movement of the coupler on the New Haven type car to be 3 and 5/8 inches as measured by him. (See Exhibit on Page 1820) According to LONGHURST, ICC Exhibit #53 is a photograph showing the anglecock on the New Haven type car in its normal position as it is situated when the coupler is centered, This exhibit shows the anglecock to be 2 inches below the center end sill or the bottom cross member. Exhibits #53 and #55 were introduced for the purpose of showing that the anglecock is situated only two inches below the center end sill whereas the possible vertical movement of the coupler is a full 3 5/8 inches, (See Exhibits on Pages 182~183.) ICC Exhibit #60, according to LONGHURST, is a photo showing the anglecock to be in actual contact with the center end sill, Mr, LONGHURST_stated this Exhibit was introduced in conjunction with Exhibit #62, which shows the coupler centered but jacked vertically to within 7/8 inch of contact with the buffer or top cross member," Mr, LONGHURST informed Exhibit #60 was made while the coupler was in the position shown in Exhibit #62, (See Exhibit on Pages l8h~l85,) Mr, LONGHURST explained ICC Exhibit #63 is a photograph of the center end sill or bottom cross member on the rear of car #3 or #8665, It was taken from underneath the car and shows marks or abrasions which LONGHURST stated were caused by the anglecock being brought in contact with_it. (See Exhibit on Page 186,) t was explained, by Mr, LONGHURST, he had introduced additional photographs into evidence at the ICC Hearing, He informed, however, the photographs mentioned above a 181 = ICC #55-PHOTO- OF COUPLER IN CENTERED POSITION SHOWING 3 & .5/8 INCH CLEARANCE BETWEEN TOP OF COUPLER AND BOTTOM OF BUFFER OR TOP GROSS IEMBER. 182 J ICC #53-PHO'l’O SHOWING ANGLE COCK IN NORMAL POSITION & (AS WIiE‘.I\T COUPLER IS CENMRED) WITH 2 INCH CLEARANCE BETWEEN IT AND CENTER END SILL OR BOTTOM CROSS EEMBER. 183 \ ICC #60-PHOTO SHO‘.'IING- ANGLE COCK II‘? COMPAQ? WITH CEHTER END SILL ’é!HEN‘OOUPLI-‘EP. JACKED TO POSITION . snow IN #52, 1 ' ICC #62-PHO’J'.'O OF COUPLER IN CEI\T‘I‘@D POSITION BUT JAGKED VER'1'.‘ICAI.LY TO WITHIN '7 /8 INCH OF CONTACT WITH BUFMR. ICC #63-PHOTO OF CENTER END SILL OR,BO’I.‘TO?-/E CROSS MEMBER on FROM‘ 0}? GAR #8665 TAKEN 330134 U‘ﬁDE.- NEATH GAR SHOWING MARKS OR ABRASIONS C U SED BY CONTACTS BY A1\?GLE COCKS. , WFO 98aS23 afford a clear picture of his testimony and the several additional photographs, some of which are duplicates of the above, were not actually neededo 44’ Mro LQNGHURST advised, in addition-to the lateral movement and vertical movement of the coupler, there is an additional movement, which he referred to as an ‘ inward and outward or forward and backward movement of the couplero This movement tends to “cushion” the effect of pushing or pulling motion on the care This movement, according to LONGHURST9 was in effect in the closure of the anglecock at rear of car #39 as were the vertical and lateral movements of the couplero As stated, the various movements of the coupler control the movements of the anglecock, which is attached by means of two brackets to the coupler armo An additional factor, which Mro LONGHURST said had effect on the closure of anglecock at the rear of car #3, is that car #h of this train was a combine type venicleo He stated that most cars have locking devices on each side of the coupler, by means of which the joining couplers of two cars may be locked togethero This locking device, when in effects causes the couplers on the two cars to ride at the same level and, theoretically, without the locking device, one coupler could conceivably slip completely out of the other couplero Inasmuch as there is no locking device on the combine type car, Mro LONGHURST pointed out it is impossible to lock the coupler of that vehicle to the coupler of any other vehicleo In addition, he pointed out that the vertical movement of the coupler in the combine type car is limited to a 5/8 inch opening between the coupler and coupler frame, through which it passeso The fact that the coupler on the front of car #h and the coupler on rear of car #3 could not be tied together or locked, according to Mro LONGHURST, indicated to him that even more _ strain than usual was on the coupler at the rear of car #30 He saidg in being locked together9 two couplers tend to absorb the strains and stresses to which one or the other is exposedo In connection with these different type couplers, Mro LONGHURST advised that an upward movement of car #3 and a downward movement of car #h would cause the coupler on the front car to be riding near the top of the coupler of WFO 98=523 car #h, He said, in these positions, sudden exertion caused by the thousands of pounds of train cars involved would more readily cause the coupler on car #3 to rise to the height of its possible vertical movement, In addition to this difference in the two couplers between cars #3 and #h of train #1739 Mr, LONGHURST stated there was still another factor concerning potential movements involved, He said the spring assembly in the four wheel trucks of car #h has a total deflection of 3,67 inches, As opposed to this, he pointed out the spring assembly in the four wheel trucks of car #3 has a total deflection of 7 13/16 inches, according to evidence intro— duced at the ICC Hearing, He pointed out these differences in structure of the two cars involved increased the varying motions of the two cars and likewise increased the stresses and strains to which the couplers were exposed, Several of the aforementioned exhibits introduced by Mr, LONGHURST show the anglecock on the New Haven type car to be located directly below the beveled edge of the center end sill or framing below the coupler, According to Mr, LONGHURST, Exhibit #69 was introduced into evidence at the ICC Hearing by Mr, BERT JONES, an official of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad, He said this Exhibit is a mechanical drawing, blueprint, or sketch, more specifically described as an anglecock location chart or drawing, pertaining to the New Haven type cars, This chart calls for the location of the anglecock to be h and l/8 inches back of or inside of the beveled edge of the center end sill, Mr, LONGHUBST said the photographs introduced into evidence by him prove the anglecock on the New Haven type car to be incorrectly located, inasmuch as the anglecock is actually directly beneath the beveled edge of the center end sill, (See Exhibits on Pages l80al83»l8h,) MP, LGNGHURST stated in view of the facts mentioned by him, he is satisfied instant accident was caused by the anglecock at the rear of car #3 being brought in contact with the center end sill by the vertical and other movements of the coupler on car #3, thereby forcing the anglecock into contact with the center end sill, He stated this, of course, a 188 a WFO 98=523 caused the engineer to lose braking control of that portion of the train back of the closed anglecock. He informed in view of his findings and his knowledge of railroading he is satisfied that sabotage did not occur in instant matter. He expressed the opinion that in the future, whenever the New Haven type car is shopped for repairs, the very first thing done to it will be the relocation of the anglecock to the point called for in their blueprint or drawing, He said if an anglecock were located in its proper position it would not touch the center end sill during its various movements caused by the movements of the coupler. MP0 LONGHURST advised it is even conceivable that an anglecock on the New Haven type car could be completely closed as a result of only one blow against the center end sill, In other words, he said it was possible that the locking device could be depressed, the handle raised, and the handle of the anglecock turned to a closed position as a result of one contact between the anglecock and the center end sill, Mr, LWNGHURST was asked whether he had observed the tests conducted at Union Station on January 29, 1953, in which the anglecock on one car was closed as a result of jerks or snatches by an engine on several cars. He advised upon completion of the ICC Hearing on January 29, 1953; he had proceeded to Union Station for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the reported partial closure of an anglecock on the Federal Express on the previous nighto_ He said he did not observe any tests being conducted at that time but had been informed of the results of such testso Mr, LONGHDRST stated these results were not surprising to him in that he is satisfied the anglecock on the Federal Express on January 15, 1953, had been closed as a result of having been forced into contact with the center end sill, due to the mechanical structure of the car, and not as a result of any human act, The Interstate Commerce Commission held a Hearing regarding the train wreck, This Hearing began on January 26, 1953., The Hearin‘g‘concerned itself with the facts, conditions, and circumstances connected with the accident which occured on January 15, 1953. i 189 = wro 98:-523 Mr. LONGHURST made available a copy of the report of the ICC, which was made as a result of their Hearing which was concluded on January 29, 1953. This 15-page report was found to contain a resume of the information furnished by various witnesses. There was included in the report descriptive information pertaining to the Washington Terminal Yards and distances between cities along the route of the Federal Express. (See Photostat on Page 9.) As a result of this Hearing, the ICC made the following findings: "1. The angle cocks on New Haven car 8665 and other cars of similar construction are so located that the handles of the angle cocks are permitted to come in contact with the bottom cross member of the buffer pocket portion of the_under= frame end constructiono "2. Between the time the brakes of No. 173 were released after the train stopped at Baltic more and the time the engineer attempted to apply the brakes as the train approached Washington the angle cock at the rear of car 8665, the third car of train N00 173, became closed, obviously as a result‘ of contact between the handle and the bottom cross member, and after this occurred the brakes of the rear l3 cars of the train could not be applied from the locomotive. "3. The engineer was not aware of the condition of the airabrake system until he attempted to reduce the speed of the train by the use of the air brakes. "ho Because the air brakes of‘the rear 13 cars could not be applied from the locomotive after the angle cock became closed, the engineer was not able to stop the train short of the end of station track No. 160 -1909 WFO 98=S23 "50 The two trainaservice employees who were in cars behind the third car did not become aware of the necessity of making an emergency brake application until it was too late for them to take effective actiono" In additions the ICC made the following recommendation as the result of this Hearings "We recommend that all passenger train cars equipped with tightlock or similar type couplers operated over any railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act be inspected ‘ immediatelyg and that such cars on which any § angle cock is so located that the handle can 1 come into contact with any other portion or i appurtenance of the car be withheld from service until such condition is correctedo“ e 191 e mvo 98-S23 X0 WESTINGHOUSE AIRhRAKE COMPANY EPLOYEES I 1. Mro John'W. Henry, Mechanical Expert JOHN W. HENRY, a9 South Clinton Street, East Orange, New Jersey,-advised he arrived in Washington, Do 0. around 8:00 p.m. the day of the train accident. He took no part in the examination of the _wreck or any of its partso (HENRY could relate what he had learned by at- tending the hearings on the accidento HENRY was of the opinion that the train could not have come from New York to Washington with brakes operat~ ing on only three cars, and advised it was his opinion the anglecock on the rear of the third car must have been closed in Baltimore, thereby causing the brake failure in Washington. 2° Mr. Richard Ma Beswick, Assistant Manager RICHARD M. BESWICK, Ring Building, Washington, D. Co; was out of town at the time of the accident and did not arrive in Washing» ton, D. C. until approximately 7:00 acme, January 16, 1953. His knowledge of the crash was obtained through a conference with Mro Go Do STEWART, Westinghouse Airbrake Copany, Pittsburgh, on the morning of January 16, 1953. In the afternoon of January 16, 1953 he went to the Ivy City Termi- nal and observed the brake shoes on two of the first three cars and found them to be burned, indicating very heavy braking on these two carso At 8:00 p.m., January 16, 1953, BESWICK stated a test wasamade of the braking system of the locomotive by applying the same type of locomotive to a train of sixteen cars using the same braking system as used on the train involved in the crasho Approximately ten minutes of tests were conducted, and the results of these tests proved the braking system to be entirely satisfactorye BESWICK stated that in his opinion ﬁ;would be impossible for Train #173 to make the run from New York to Washington, Dc 0., making stops at Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, with brakes on only the locomotive and the first three carso BESWICK advised he believes it is possible for the aglecock to come out of a locked position through vibra~ tion but highly'improbablee ’ _ BESWICK concluded by stating that in his opinion the anglecock on the first car was open prior to the crash; the anglecock on the third car was in an more closed position than it was when he observed it after the crash; and that he believes the anglecock was manually closed in Baltimore. ' 192 WFO 98~S23 39 Mr, W} B, Kirk, Chief Engineer W; B. KIRK, Test Engineering Department, Westinghouse Airbrake Company, Wilmerding, Pennsylvania, advised he did not have an actual part in the tests which were conducted on the equipment of the wrecked train, but he did observe various tests which were conducted by the Pennsylvania Railroad officials, He made a general statement that all of theequipment that he saw tested proved to be in good working ordero KIRK furnished his opinion and conclusion as to the cause of the wreck in that he believed the anglecock locaedzn;the rear of car three was closed or partly closed at the time of the wreck. He based this opinion on the fact that the brake shoes of the first three cars of the wrecked tnain showed evidence of extremely heavy braking while the last thirteen cars of this train showed only evidence of normal braking. KIRK said there could not have been this difference unless there had been some— thing which let the brakes apply on the first three cars of the train and prevented the brakes from applying on the last thirteen cars of the train, . KIRK and Go L, COTTERS, Director of Engineering, West- inghouse Airbrake Company, Wilmerding, Pennsylvania, did conduct tests to determine the time recuiredwto recharge the airbrake pressure on thirteen cars of a train similar to the cars involved in the wreck on January 15, 1953c They conducted six tests under various conditions because the Westinghouse Airbrake ﬁompany was not completely familiar with all of the conditions which existed at the time the unwrecked cars of the Federal Ex» press were recharged in the'Washingtdn, Do C. yards, COTTERS pointed out that they did not know if there was a charge left in the train or whether it was completely devoid cf charge, Neither did they know the condition of the water supply on te train after the wreck or the type of equipment used on the switch engine which did the charging, KIRK advised the results of these tests, which were made to determine the time for initial charging of a train under various condi- tions, were recorded on a trainograph (described by KIRK as a pressure re- corder which measures air pressure against time), KIRK said he and his assistants had simulated the braking equipment of a thirteen car passenger train and used twentywfour R L railroad equipment in this test. KIRK and his assistants also used a 3 GD compressor operating at 275 rpm, This compressor directs sixtyefive cubic feet of free air per minute. 193 ‘«"51.'*‘0 98-==-S23 For the 'pu1”pose of these tests KIRK said he had considered 105 pounds to be a full charge in the airbrake pipes. He said it was not practical to attempt to reach a 13.0-«pound pressure as it might take as long as an hour to build the pressure from 105 pounds to exactly 110 pounds, He said seldom do engineers attain 11.0 pounds pressure upon charging a train and usually consider some mic: 1.eint between 101-. and 110 pounds as a full ohargeo In these tests it was also assumed the engine of the switcher doing the charging was running at an idlixlg speedo At tie ';G13Q1'u.S21.~f}13 oi" 'Li;etc~.=;t.s KIRK said these tests showed that it would not ’;e;=::: ts:-ent;; to "£J:,.3.x"by minutes to charge a train, and if the engineer who charged the unwzrecked cars of the Federal Ewrese after the wreck said it had taken him twenty-=five minutes to charge the train, he undoubtedly was guessing and became confused during the excite» mento ' KIEQK said the wrecked train could not have had a charge lees than ﬂiirtyefive PS1 or the engineer would have gotten an emergency eppiication of brakes from the protection valves which are located on the individual cars of the treino KIFLK pointed out he has previously stated he observed air leakage tests made on the train after the wreck wtioh showed that the leakage was between one and one--half pounds per minumo ho Mn Ho Linhzartg District Engineer, General Office He M. LEZ~H%;2.t’t‘1‘9 "'?'estin,gfnouse Airbrake Company, ’~’v’i1.merding, . . {D . . 1 Pez1nsylvan:c_a, aiso pcinted out that the ‘Iest3.nghouse /Lirbrake bompany con-- ducted no tests on the r.'reei«:e<i t.*r.ei113 but he and ":”§., Bo KIRK din‘ act as ob-= - servers while Penn yitvanie Iia:i_'3_rced o;i’:t‘icia,3.s made these testso ‘1'_.I1‘§IA.‘RT said that even though he ‘zmei e‘cser'<;ed the tests made of the equipment-of the vrrecked train he had r2<.n‘;. attezegi-i.e<i to reach any conclusion or develop any opinion of his own concernizzg, tkzae cause of instant wreoko He said he wcxxid deciine to give any o3i’i'~her:d 2?-}’JZ‘;.13iOI1 concerning the matter because had not attempted to :o:~:'~:e.§L €2,213: c2e:.r.=:i,3:i.m'x in the matters 50 Eire Gariton Du 3f:.r,w:.=.:*t9 'Vice==1’resident G;'L?.L’l‘QE~I 33° S'.‘F££’L’x§iT3 ‘s'Zestingb.ouse Airbrake Company, {file-= meir-ding, Permsy].vanie.9 on emnuery 269 1953 stated he had attended all hear== inge cc-mua::t.ec1 by the railroad with reference to the accident; he had been present at the time any test was made of the train equipment inv clved in this accident; and he was then of the opinion that the anglecooks could we 98-623 not have been closed otuer 4%::;.n ‘mgr human hando He was of the opinion the train was not running 8.";-'f£L;;’ at the *-iwe of the accident; that the brakes were e.;;pj.5.ed on the engine am? on the first three cars of the train; and that ‘without any question ?.':<3y'~.;e1~e reducing the speed of the traino £11 the evidence indicated “the ‘rat-alces had applied properly on the engine and en the first three cars '.-:-v‘.~e.:m.ee 1:1‘ the i’:—1ct the brake shees and the wheels were heated and also the :22‘:-we sLo:—:~«: eefizzitely reflected prolonged heavy brakingg STE'fA%2T stated treat his company, since the accident , had made a test; and it 1:; his 1’<=.-5:0,! lection that they found they could stir}; :1 train of this ‘f‘..‘_‘,"_«‘C?5 b1‘e,:<in;> *-with the engine and the first three 057.1253‘; from a siztyw-mrlle 1w“ he-211* e1'—eerT€ to a etc}: in any-"oximately sixty» five hmldred feet, j;,rmrj.r'2iz1g«: the tr:'.a:Ln was on a. level and not on a gradeo He felt even though tshere we-3 in*r:>1.vr2d in this case a one percent down-» grade, :~.t still would izave been ;.c:.=-:.~3i.‘L~le to stop this train, having in mixed tue 1%:-.sult:—3 oi‘ the on the It-zvela He stated Lhere was no signifiw came tr- the ram, that th-.-: 1’7zZ‘.A‘:‘:,i.S ei‘ we train did not siide. F1‘-eye? i£‘3.‘3}Zi:1g: 1‘f:,..-L=§.tS wheiz the wheels continue to turn, and the fact that there 2.2.: ms ev‘:‘z.-:';r.-me. zine wheels locked and slid indicates mare ;;ositive.$.y that the 3:>:.*;.=J.~:es on the engine and the first three cars were operating preperiy ti. rsa'..i:'2u;‘:; braking pcvwero He stated that i2‘.’,, in fa-2*, the w11ee.§.s had slm, ti»: .?.::{3..:’f“8Z‘ womu‘ have done everything he could to stop them from sliding, amt: *m',=u3,a.L uc>rma.Lly make them move by applying sand“ "¥hez1 ewe:-"i if “zzz feet that the br eke shoe had become 3.0 her. as to became gem’.-:'x. ;1lf: ;.;:. .t::n ~rzm1Zi.c.i eut dmm on the by‘ aking powerg he regﬁiezi there had been .-:6; »:.s:*~mr.=:rd.', run his recollection where a train run wild down a E1111, *2 an *cha'£_: case the brake snoe became so hot it eglattered up on the -"2-.1: eras: tZ~;:‘.~; :.. 1;: even by subsequent tests that the Ifeczi: that the metal L:.~.;3 bc°c:':sw:- :12“-j.*:.ex: and haci splattered off the brake shees in nothing tn do ~.-:’.‘.:n <_4»:=.cz‘eus:.~.1::,-, the brake application but actually made g;e<;::: braking };=nssi’::-let, E‘_ee..aﬁ;.==s:? 0?-Ede? metal was continually moving in ecuttet. with the ’o1‘a2<eso ->3TE”%'.’.53%'1‘ '-‘t~ ted 132.32., in his opinion, the closed angleeock at the end 01‘ number one ear tree meeting to ac: 1 Ltithis accident, and for prar:'t.:i.c:el purgeeee shoulu ne L".O1’3E>ll1E.’!I‘r5r'i as open at the time of the accidento The erzgleeocak at the end es” the t1'sJ?.i!,-£1!‘ three car , in his npinion, =:.i.need_.,:x-.1d this closed 30-=;it:z.c=;1 is =.~“m2+. brought about this accident; He reached this conclusion be:;:n;se of c-.ertain facts 0% factors: I 3? JL WFO 98-523 ao The brake shoes on the first three cars were partially molten, and it was obvious this condition had occurred most recentlyo be The ICC inspector, Mro LONGHURST, had found the wheels and brake shoes warm after a alspe of time of almost three hourso c. On cars four through sixteen Mro LONGHUBST had found the wheels and brake shoes cold, indicating no brakes had been ap- o ‘ d. He had.witnessed the testing of the brakes on the cars and the'testing of the braking equipment on the locomotive and had noted all brakes tested properlyo eo He had observed the testing of all the protec- tion valves on the cars, and they had all functioned properlyc f. He knew'it was impossible for trains to go through New York City without being properly checked and tested, and he was satisfied when the train left New York City the air brakes were func~ tioningo ' - go’ The fact that the conductor on the third car had pulled the air and had gotten no results indicated definitely that the engineer had applied the brake on the third car and obstruction was therefore at the end of the third car and not ahead of it. It was his opinion that the anglecock could not have been closed by anyone prior to the stop at Baltimore because the brakes on the last thirteen cars would have been definitely dragging before the train reached Washingtono It was his opinion that te anglecock was closed at Baltimore because the brakes would not have been dragging on the last thirteen cars because the time element was not sufficient to bring about, an application of brakes due to air leakage from the brake system. ‘He stated also that it;Was, in his opinion, virtually impossible for anyone to close an nglecock once the train was in motions He likewise was positively of the opinion that vibration would not close an anglecock, and he could not conceive of something striking the lever on an anglecock in such a manner as to cause it to change from an open to a closed posi- tiono ' 196 WF0 98-523 STEWART was again interviewed on January 29, 1953 for the purpose of determining his conclusions based upon his attendance at the ICC hearings and as a result of the inquiries. he-made while in Washington, D. C. STEWART advised he would prefer to give his conclusions in two parts:’ (1) His conclusions based upon testimony given and informa— tion obtained by him up to noon of January 28,1953. (2) Conclusions based upon information obtained subsequent to noon of January 28, 1953, with regard to the first period of time, STEWART referred to the summary made toward the end of the Washington Terminal hearings on the previous Friday, January 23, 1953. He furnished a copy of his testimony, pertinent parts of which are set out hereinafter, STEWART's testimony followed a statement by Chairman KERL to the effect that it would be appreciated if STEWART would furnish an opinion on this case, based on all the testimony that was presented at the inquiry made by the Washington Terminal Company. KERL made this comment: "You have heard all the testimony, and you have heard most of the facts that have been developed, and I would like to have your opinion as an expert, in your own way, please." Mr, STEWART: “This statement may not list the various factors in the best order, but from what I observed firsthand and sons of the things I heard, I will make several observations, ?I think it would be well if I just numbered them, too, so that it wll make them stand out a little better, “Number one: I observed the testing of the 13 cars the night following the accident, and all brake equipment functioned as intended, "Number two: The next day, I observed the testing of the locomotive air brake device which had been ranoved from the wrecked locomotive an placed on a locomotive of the same type, and all of the devices functioned as intended. "Number three: I observed the brake shoes of the three head cars after those three cars had been taken down to the enginehouse yard and they showed definite indications of having been very hot, globules of cooled mo1ten.metal hang- ing on most of'them, and a lage percentage of them were worn almost to the shoe head, 197 WFO 98-5 23 =“Now, I had our laboratony make a test of the position "Number four: During the testing of these 13 cars aw and, by the way, to which had been added three cars in normal condition, simply to get a l6—car train ~- the anglecock that had been on the rear end of the third‘ car was installed on the rear end of this new third car, and the handle placed in what was thought to be the position in which it was found following the wrecko There was no difficulty in charging the rear end of the train through that anglecock, nor in making a service and an emergency applicationo "Number five: We observed single car testing of all of the cars, all of the 13 cars, and those on which protec~ tion valves were installed worked properly to provide an automatic emergency application when the brake pipe pressure leaked slowly to approximately thirty pounds. "Number six: I heard testimony that the engineer had made emergency brake application. "Number seven: I heard. testimony that the conductor had opened the back-up valve on the third car and obtained no exhaust of airo “Those are the facts on which I would base some observa- tionso ' "My first observation would be that the engineer was sucw cessful in applying the brakes on the locomotives and the first three cars; first, because the condition of the shoes as I saw them, and, second, because the conductor pulling the service back-up valve got no exhaust of air, indicates he got no applioationo He was responsible for making no brake applicationo "My next observation would be that the anglecock between cars 3 and h, at the time of the wreck, was closed, and at the time it was observed it was open, and therefore there must have been some movement of that handle during that interval of timeo of‘the anglecock handle —u not this one, but exactly the 198 WFO 98—523 same type -- to see what angle it would be from closed, when it would be possible to pass through a brake applica- tion and when it would not; and this is the result that I obtained. "At 65 degrees closed, you can make no brake application indicating you can pass no air through it, "At 6h degrees, a 20-pound reduction can‘be made in 90 seconds, "At 60 degrees, a 20—pound reduction can be made in 12.8 secondso "An emergency could not be obtained until the anglecock had been closed only to 50 degrees. "Now, I ﬂhink those figures are significant, in that the difference of 5 degrees is the difference between getting no service application at all, no matter how long a time elapses, and getting a normal service application, just 5 degrees; and it is pretty difficult for anybody to observe a difference of 5 degrees in looking at a handle, and it is necessary to have 10 more degrees movement in order to get it sufficiently open to get emergency. I think that is significant to indicate that there is no question that ~ the cock was closed at the time of the accident; that no brake application on the rear of the train could come from the engine or from conductor opening this valve on car number threeo "Another observation wouhibe that although you found the first car anglecock closed when it was lying in the pit, it would be significant, we will say, from a sabotage standpoint, but it is an academic findng as far as the application of the brakes is concerned, because the engi- neer went to emergency, and the conductor tried to operate the brake on the third car and got no exhaust, »So, the conclusion is that the engineer did get a brake through the locomotive and the first three cars. l “Another observation'would be ~— and we calculated this —~ that if that train were going approximately 60 miles an 199 WF0 98-523 hour on level track, and the brakes were on the locomo- tive and the first three cars, it would have required . over 6,000 feet to have stopped that train; and as I under- stand, from the time that the engineer moved the brake valve, there was less distance than that. "Furthermore, there was some thought, not definitely ex- pressed, that the train was going faster than 60 miles an hour at that point, plus approximately a one per cent downgrade. It was varied, and therefore all we could do was to calculate it on the level, and at some given speed, and we selected 60 miles an houro "Another observation - and this will be of interest to Mr. LONGHURST, because he stated that he was there between one and two hours after the wreck, and found the wheels on the first three cars quite warm. "I had a test made on our laboratory inertia machine, in which we simulated the energy that would have to be dissi- pated by those three cars and locomotive to brake as heavi- ly as it was possible with a.maximum air-pressure for the distance that "we are informed was involved; and the tempera- ture of our wheel in our test laboratory rose to 380 degrees, and at the end of the test it was 12h degrees; at the end of three hours it was 110 degreeso So that there is no ques- tion that Mr. ﬁONGHURST’s observation was very accurate as to the work done, that wheels doing a large amount of work would be at that temperature, and those wheels were dping a large amount of worko That confirms that the brakes on the first three cars were doing a heavy job of brakingo" With respect to the testimony given since noon of Janu- ary 28, 1953, Mr. STEWART advised he desired to quote from his testimony given at the Senate Hearing, inasmuch as it expressed his conclusions as of this date: “I'have testified that I did not believe it (anglecock) could be vibrated closedo You.have seen the anglecock here and know that here are some rather complicated move- ments ihat have to be”made before it can be turhedo It is conceivable that by some very odd circumstance, you 200 WFO 98-5 23 could get a combination of inanimates hitting that in such a way, that it would move it, I can't conceive of it." STEWART continued that since that time he has listened to LONGHURST’s testimony and noted the exhibits. STEWART was-referring ‘,to the theory resolved by'H, R, LDNGHURST, ICC, that the wreck of this train was due to a mechanical failure rather than sabotage, Details of this so-called LONGHURST theory are set out in detail elsewhere in this report, According to STEWART, LONGHURST has submitted convincing evidence that practically all of the elements necessary for the movement of the anglecock in question to a closed position were present. STEWART explained he used the expression "practkally all" because it had not been revealed how the anglecock could be raised nor was it revealed that the force de~ livered to the anglecock handle by things coming in contact with the car- rier iron, would be that necessary to carry the anglecock key to a com- pletely closed position. He continued it is conceivable that if the draw bar were drawn upward at a sufficiently fast rate, the anglecock handle might be carried up into an open position by its own inertia, It would appear, he said, that this would have to be a very fast movement, because the inertia effect is greater than the downward thrust of the draw bar hangar, Also, STEWART stated he did not testify this action would move the anglecock to a sufficiently closed position to out off the flow of air, because with the anglecock in an excessive angular position, it is conceivable that the angleeock in its movement toward a closed position would move out of engagement with the carrier support, STEWART added that, in other words, he could not tell whether such action would move the handle of the.angleeock as far as sixty degrees, which would be neces« sary in order for the air flow to be cut off, It should be noted that STEWhRT pointed out at this time that his observations, as indicated herein, were based upon testimony which he actually heard at the various hearings, including the ICC hearing. He made it clear to the Agents that in addition to this, he was aware of tests that were being conducted at the time while the ICC hearing was in progress, but he stated he wanted to make sure his opinion, as given up to this point, did not include any information relating to such tests which had not yet been mentioned or officially brought before the ICC hearing. 201 WFO 98-523 ‘ STEWART stated the revelations since noon of January 28, 1953, brought about by such tests as were made in connection with the so-called LONGHURST theory, were of sufficient character as to have all the elements. present to close an anglecock, as to justify the railroad's action of promptly relocating anglecocks on each car which have them lo» cated in a position where there is any likelihood that they might come in contact with the carrier arm sill, ’STEWART also furnished his opinion regarding the possi- bility of sabotage in connection with the wreck of Train #173 on Janua*y 15: 1953: "Having heard all of the testimony in respect to the acci- dent of Train #173, I find that it is more plausible to ac- count for the closure of anglecocks by mechanical means than by human means. Having in mind the very limited times available on the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad at Providence, Rhode Island, and the Pennsylvania Railroad at Baltimore, Maryland, coupled with the presence of train- men in the close vicinity of the anglecocks found closed on two occasions. It is practically impossible to conceive of a person having an opportunity to close them on one occasion let alone two occasions, On the other hand; subsequent study of the location of this particular anglecock with respect to the other car members and the verification that free mo» tion was possible between the several elements, and that this motion should be of such a character that could tendto move the anglecock to a closed position, it is entirely plausible that such action took place, The same situation was noted on a PRR car on the morning of Januany 29, l953, following the finding of its anglecock in a closed position which adds credence to the theory that mechanical means is responsible for similar closure," After making this statement to the Agents, STEWART, in an off—the-record manner, advised that the revelations which have occurred ﬁwere of sufficient character to cause_all the railroads to promptly relocam all anglecocks having positions similar to the anglecock involved in this matter. It is also noted that at one point in the interview STEWART stated it looked like "the possibility of sabotage had been washed out". 202 WFO 98—523 It was explained to STEWART that during the investiga— tion, railroad employees with long years of experience had stated that when the engihe, operated by the wreck crew at Washington Tenninal, was coupled to the rear end of the sixteenth car of the train during the salvaging operatibns, at the point where the anglecock between the engine and car sixteen was turned to the open position for the purpose of pump~ ing up the train line, preparatory to moving, there was an immediate drop in the engine air pressure fro ll0 pounds PSI to 30 pounds PSI.‘ STEWART stated he definitely considered this information to be non-factual. He advised that operating procedures in this regard require the trainman, when turning the anglecock, to do so very slowly and to halt in the turn- ing procedure as soon as the sound of moving air reaches his ears, he stated the purpose of this procedure is to prevent an emergency applica- tion of the brakes on all cars which are connected, which emergency appli- cation would be caused by a rapid turning of the anglecock which would penmit a consequent rapid decrease in the pressure in the engine, In response to questions asked Mr. STEWART advised that in a situation where a switch engine with 110 pounds pressure showing on the gauge is attached to thirteen railroad cars which have a train line pressure of thirty pounds, if the anglecock were rapidly turned from a closed to an open position, the brakes on all cars, as well as the engine, would go into emergency application. He explained this by saying that the immediate reduction from the engine, occasioned by the turning of the anglecock from a closed to an open position, will cause the pressure from the engine reservoir to rush into line, thus throwing the brakes on the engine into emergency, which, in turn, would throw the brakes on all of the other cars in emergency, He again pointed out, however, this situa- tion is impossible. He stated that the pressure in the train line cannot drop to thirty pounds when there are any cars equipped with U0 valves on the train for the reason that when the train line pressure is reduced to thirtyafive pounds, all cars equipped with U0 valves automatically have emergency application of the brakes. Further, when any car equipped with U0 valves goes into emergency, all other cars on that train, assuming the anglecocks are in an open position, also have an emergency application of the brakes, whether they are equipped with U0 valves or D~22 valves, It should be noted at this point that Engineer LACEY, who operated the switch engine on the morning of January 15, 1953, advised Agents of this office that when he was connected to car sixteen,after the accident, the pressure on the gauge in his engine dropped from 110 pounds to thirty pounds. STEWART stated 203 WFO 98‘-523 that even if the pressure in the train line of thirteen cars were fifty to seventy-eight pounds, when the connection was made to the switch engine, the reduction caused in the switch engine line by the turning of the anglecock connecting the engine and the train would also cause the brakes on the whole train to go into anergency, if the anglecock were not turned’ slowly from a closed to an open position, . _ He explained that because of ﬁiis when railroad cars are connected to an engine, even when the pressure in the train line and engine line are about the same, the anglecock should be slowly turned to make .sure that the reduction created is not too rapid. If it is too rapid, it will set the brakes. STEWART was asked to state whether, in the light of his‘ 7 experience, it would have been possible for Train #173 to have been operated from its make—up at Boston into the Washington Terminl with no brakes on cars four through thirteen, and from the point of departure fiwm1New Haven on cars four through sixteen, He stated this was utterly fantastic, and could not possibly have happened, and, in his opinion, shou1d.be completely discarded in connection with this case, 20h WFO 98-5 23 INDEX AGNEW, R. L. ALBRITTEN, ARTHUR L. ALDRICH, SIMON BAILEY, FANNIE BAILEY, LYNN BALL, HARRY So 21, BARBER, LRRIS LILLYBRIDGE BASBORB, BEATRICE BERRY, BDRARD PETER BRSRIOK, RICHARD M. 20, BILLOUPS, EDWARD BLUCHER, CALVIN L. BOGUE, BL, Tc BORLB, LENORE BOWIE, RAYMOND SBLROUR BORIR, RUTH BOWLDIG, ROBERT Do BRBRRR, HARRY Lo BREWER, Ross ALBERT BRORRR, HARRY WILLIAM 1R, 21, BROWI\I_. JOHN JOSEPH BROWN, RAYMOND BRCWN, THERON BROWN, BBSLEL 1.. BRUMLEY, ED‘-.-"ARE R. BRYAN DORIS No BO'r:..R§z, "'.?ILLIA1‘.‘ To ’J1LLD.»’a.RA§.i(%, RLIGGIFERO F0 CARBON, SALRJBL R0 OARPBRLL, LDORARD CAPINO, JOHN CARIOTA, OOLOORRIO CARPENTER, O. Ho OARRIOK, '* BL R0 CARTER, ALECK Re CHESLEY, ERNEST CHIDSOAT, CHARLES s. CIJ:1WzENTS, JOHN F., OOBR, Jo 205 16.1. 3.03. 117 118 101. 99 123 WFO 98-523 COCHPENNA, JOHN OOLBERT, RICHARD A. COLEMAN, GEORGE COLLINS, MARGARET Ea CONNERS, NALIEE ODEN CORCOEAN, WILLIAM JOSEPH COSTELLO, IJIAOFEI N, COX, DAVID Bo, JR.. COXEN, FEEDEDICK IL, CDAETEEE, CHARIES M. GRILMER, HONAED STANLEY CROSS, ELWOOD H, CRUMP, FRANK A, CUNNINGHAM, JOHN ROBERT DANIELS, JEFF DAVIII, JANES DAVIS, JAMES C, DANID, NAECAEEI K. DAESON, MCLAURIN C. DEROSIER, JOSEPH w. DevINCENIIs, PAUL J. DINUNZIO, JOSEPH DIXON, CIMNCE DOBSON, WILLIAM A, DONAH 11., GERTRUDE DGUGIIERTY, DONALD J. DULEI, JOHN S. DUNCAN, EDNAED DUPUIS, ALEIANDEE EATON, JADES ENCLEEI, EEININ C, FAHEY, JAMES L, FAIR, FRED D, FAULKNER, E, FAULKNER, L. E, FEENEI, JOHN DEICEI 15, FITCH, JOHN L, FITZPATRICK, JOHN J, 206 21, 161 112 53 76 38 87 128 1A3. 151 156 100 97 101 62 101 160 ‘ 56 90 I02 100 91 1.5 121; 118 60 87 160 9 2 112 10A 1314 61 WFO 98-S23 FLAIL, LEONARD FOSS, MURRAY G, FREEMAN, JOSEPH THOMAS FREEMAN, RUBY " FREEMAN , Sm.-IATHA FRIEDRLAIF, HENRY FRIEND, uxmas E. GALE, J, GALLANT, FRANK B, GAMBLE, ROBERT J. GARNER, EIMER GEIPE, A. R. GIBSON, GONZLEE GILLIS, EUGENE M, GITTINGS, JOHN F.., JR. GLENN, LEROY GLERNGN, PAUL J. GGDRIR, JACK GOQDE, FRANCIS XAVIER GOODWIN, HAROLD S. GORE, ROBERT E. GOULD, FRANCIS J, GGULEFTE, PAUL R. GRAFT, WALTER GRASTDBF, GEGRGE GRAY, EDWARD GREENHAUGH, JOHN L, GRIG, RICHARD WARREN JOSE” 'R;G:.3:z;rGN, :R:o::GG S,, JR. RARILFGN, JOHN L. HAFLFTGR, JARS HANCOCK, BENJAMIN G, HARLEY, R, JOSEPH_ RAR1;G::, Rn. J, HARRIS, ARISTIDES GEORGE HASTINGS, PHILLIP HAUPT, H, H. HAWKINS, JAMES HAYNES, JOHN HEINTZ, RGFARE R, HENRY, JOHN G, 207 lob 20', 192 NFC 98-523 HOLMES, EDWARI) LEON 112 HUHLAND, HAWTHORNE 56 HUGHES, CLARENCE BEN 111 NUCI-N33, WILLIAM 159 NUNLNN, N, A, 105 HYNES, KZEERNAN uh JACKSON, ALVIN J 51 JACKSON, JOHNNY K, 159 JACKSON, JOHN N, 52 J.ANIsoN, LEROY 105 JEFFERIES, HORACE GREELEY S1 JEFFERSON, RICHARD, JR, 85 J;CNN1:NCs, JOSEPH H, 133 JOHNSON, OSCAR 109 JOHNSON, ROBERT CLARENCE, JR, 157 JOHNSON, ROBERT N, 100 JOHNSON, NILBUN A, 101 JOLLY, ORVILLE D, 169 JONES, HAROLD N, so JON:~:s, JAJES ELISE 98 J0 ‘gas, JOHN L5, 50 JORDAN, EVERETT N, 100 J()I't1)AN, J,N.zNs J, NS JOYNER, EDITH 105 N, SANUNL 101; 1:NLL1', FAUL 1I‘RED‘N?,ICK N9 I~:EN!:.‘;EL', .LN..~,'s C C2 z~.N,~u;, s3:ONNN 33 Kim “~33, JOHN N6 NINC, F%?.P3D 15', 21, 73 KIs~E'G, I°€ILLI2»‘:CE E, 16, 3? KI}il3Y, NON 153. KIRK, N, B, 193 KI.(,‘PP, P,A’x'}xiO3ﬂ) 2,, 17, 122 Ki\‘0T‘I’, JOSEPH J), 17, 123 KNOX, CLJ~.1>:zs 98 :<_NAEr.J:~:R, JOHN 103 ‘NNMSKN, CONRAD s, 77 KREAHER, N;,LN:«;n B, "E? 208 -‘bu % _ mfg, ’1‘.'u‘;1,t‘g.1ﬂu * - . V0 Hg -- ~~ .. ' 4» “:hmr~x3r»»: . ° I a ' . 0 v ‘ w n a _ 4, ' J 0 |I . - .g.,_~. 8 0“ u U 3,: ‘ H F 15,05‘ I U u\‘ V V" o ' '1 73-‘9-’,.i‘‘1-‘»‘'i‘«'"1'=?-’*-‘5a 9‘ "~'1.J1:JE* Q’ . x 5 "9" . -E Y ~ v " 9 <3 7 u «u 9 1 I (f ‘ U .‘ 0 ‘ ‘WK: .3 l «A ° “L n°°m ; 1 E‘ _ > ,» ll "Vu.)_§‘ .53 '.\4 U W” n — J ‘I . 7 ge. 9- “ ,_ “. " ~ .': ~; 9 . L w '.g_:J’-1t.(_;; £ . ‘V Q _“ U .. - gi ‘ 3‘? ‘ - , 0“ '\n; ‘ ‘ ' 2 { ’. V, _ x -. L" v‘ .. » ~ »-.- . . n . ' I; ‘(’»“K_75_'7:.‘3t\"I‘s<~':3;":. U.“:,. '.3iL"I1f5fLJ;.IfJ L-to: «\ ‘ W .. "’ ‘.' ‘ vi “H ' ‘- '“r:Tl" CI 0 . ’ «. -‘,1 = ~ «: -é , r u - » . \ _. w " " «G 5- -w . ,l .1.-wE§fm:E*517..,v. ..E:».. -llisu. ° ” ' ° !\ V ‘ ’ ¥ '-=¥',L £1;oH.I1- 12;‘ :1.L_... ' » ' ~a1.o1u13A:i'z1}:A,gw;° 12¢; 0‘ ‘ l ’ L “ — - '.'w*-"-1- _ - ‘— .\ ‘. ,< y » E -I f*L1t“J:{I<»~.a.»,,.}xI1LE‘I, 13:14 n ‘xf! ‘J1’; /_ I_ V _‘,: . ' ' é ) - R :1 iguueng .;:«u:w.::“»~ kw % . ° an ’° ‘ 2 «;;m"r:_, ‘-m;in“ "' ., . I o, , V 1 6, I 2 G i. "1; ‘ , 3 n V ' I _-3;.» , . , ,. % ‘ I _ . V .|_,.l‘r".‘:'.»1‘5‘."3I‘.::. . - ' ' 1., , ’“ ' ix 1 . 0 ° ., ' '.<:lf;3i:‘%?—'.‘-L‘ ::g1"+:%., £L4N’3?~v§=I-HZ’. .- Q _ %- - 4 -$5., i3s4*a£t.>?‘@—:.L ‘" _ 5 . % " 5 = miréié - ' ‘ — 1*a1;_(‘;~*,~‘.;.\.-I:23‘,i4_;~2«;’_,A $ M." . , " rli. ‘ _ . . G ‘ . ‘_ __ _ " ‘ ‘ ' I ' — .1} .2 if: U u I n D l - .3 \. .-.- - I l 0 “ O ‘X " ‘rd “ 3'.Iui’1 # C _ D a 0 T v ~ -$2.?-mg; .r2~ZJL§_'{.: C ; ' . u — _ - I 2. .~ .' t 9 '1»r..- ,3 " 2 - u f}: ‘t: ‘E’ L V I - _ ~ - ’ 1 so“ 5- *-.. ‘-‘S "NFC 98-523 MOORE, PAUL RUSK MOYER, JOHN WILLIAM MORRISON, WESLEY B. MURPHEY, THOMAS JOSEPH MYSKAJTYS, FRANK McARDI.E, BAOLF. mcnozwzn, JOSEPH MCDONNELL , FREDERICK C-LAVER MOKAY, CHESTER mcpmmsou, JOHN S, McS'!'iEE1\‘EY _, 'JH@:IAS J . , SR. NELSON, WILLI.5L-I A. NEVULIS, MARY NOLAN, FPANK J. NOONAN, JOHN‘ J, NOVAK, LEWIS 1.-L. OUTLAW, RICHARD H, OWENS, T. O, PALEPINELLA, JOI1HW. PANNEBAKER, ‘:‘TII.LIAM PARADEE, w,II,LI;_A2,-1 Co PATTERSON, H, E. PATTERSON, J. E. PEAL, ‘IL, A, PEARSON, THOMAS E‘... PERKINS, GRANVILLE mscm, ROBERT EDWARD PHARES, ROY , PHILLIPS, 1’4‘ILLI§‘xLi HEI\RY PICK, SAMUEL PINSONNEAULT, THOMAS PZISTORINO, FRANK POLEN, GEORGE E, POPE, HARRY Bmamy, JR, POTHIER, JOHN We PRIMM, "fILLIAIx'£ PAUL J Omfrtrno, ROMEO JOHN QUINN, L. B. 210 120 1h, 21, 68 114, 21, 70 75 20 102 5,3 5? 131 89 1'? , 121 199 93 86 WFO 98-523 RAINEY, FRED 0.. RICHARDSON, N, N. ROBBTNS, THOMAS B._ ROBINSON, NILLIAN B. ROPPER, P. N. ROWLAND, JOHN DONALDSON RUBY, MAMIE RUFFIN, LARGEST RUHIEY, G. H. RUSSELL, ALEXANDER RYAN, JOSEPH LAWRENCE RYBICKI, STANLEY N. SALMON, ‘RAY SAMPSON, SCROUGER SANTELLO, ANTHONY DANIEL SAWYER, HAROLD FRANCIS SCHAEFFER, WILLIAM So SCHAUB, ETREBIL A. SCHENCH, RALPH A. SCHLEGEL, ANDREW P. scoTT, JOHN A, SCROCGINS, CALVIN O... SCROGGINS, PAUL R. SHAW, JAMES B. SHEA, THOMAS Fa SHEEHAN, JOHN J, SHEPPARD, GEORGE H. SIBEGOGUE, J; E. STNNS, ‘-’{ILLIA}3§ so SINES, PRESTON SNITH, HOLLY v., SNITH, JOHN HENRY SNITH, WIILIAM SMITH, NOODRON N, SPENCER, HARVEY N. SPTNDLE, N. 32., SR. STANNISKI, HENRY STATEN, ‘;*IILLIAM~ H. STATON, ONNNOLL 211 22, WFO 93-S23 STERNER, STEVENS, .STEWART, SEEHAET, H. O. STEWART, M. L, E SMITH, JOHN H. ~ STEINHETZ, ELMER STRICKLINE, FRANK JOSEPH STRYKER, HILLIAN B. A strHzALKOwSKI, HENRY R. SULLIVAN, EHANK J. ‘SULLIVAN, JAMES E. SVIGOS, JOHN SHAEEOHD, JOHN E, '18,.19, 11:6, SHANSON, OSCAR O. SYKES, OHAHLES HESIEK G. M. HUSSELL G. OA-ELTON D. 18, 2O, 23, TAFT, CHARLES ANTHONY TAYLOR, EILLAHD A., JH. TETER, JOHN THERRES, JOHN EENO, JR. THCMAS, JOSEPH E,» THOMPSON, HELVILLE A. TILLMAN, ROBERT TOHNSEND, LUTHER TRAOEY, N, S, VJD A0 TROIS, LEON EEUSOELLO, GUISEPPE USUAL, A. E, VERTER, GEOHGE ALLEN WALKER, WILLIAM Co‘ WALKER, EELLIAN WALKER, VANCE H. WALLACE, EDWARD E. HALLINS, JAMES P. WALRATH, H. G. HALSH, HAHTIN J, 212 103 117 191: 100 158 92 86 85 S1 WFO 98‘-523 WALSH, WILLIAM P. WARD, RALPH EUGENE WEBB, GEORGE STANLEY 20,23,33,16h,lﬁ WEICH, HENRY JOHN 91 15: 3.5 8 1:1 ‘NEIGHTMAN, WILLIAM BURTON 17,20,763; WELLING, JOHN c. WELLS, CHARLES JAY WHITE, JOSEPH W. WHTIE, BARBARA M. W-IILDNER, E. H. WILLIAMS, JOHN H. wI"IsoN, MARTINI. _ WILSON, wILLIAI.-I E. WYATT,‘ JOHN B. YOST, WALTER ZANIBONI, PETER W. ZELLERS, c. E, ZEEIAITIS, J. J. ZIMMEBIEAN, LEROY HAMILTON 213 F 162 92 33 199 :81 146 1014 87 99 81: 99 93 5? 102 102 97 WFO 98-S23 ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE‘. 1 One copy of this report is bei;,g:su‘unitted to the Boston, New Haven, Balthmore and New York Offices inasmuch as it reflects investi- gation conducted in those divisions. For the information of the Bureau, inasmuch as information contained in this report has previously been attributed to individual agents conducting the investigation in various field offices, instant report is not attributing separate interviews to individual agents. The status of this report is being marked closed inasmuch as the extensive investigation conducted has failed to develop any evi- dence of sabotage or a violation of the Federal Train Wreck statute; It is the opinion of experts in the railroad field that the cause of instant crash was a structural error. Boston T-1:, Boston T~2: Boston T23: 1 Boston T-h: Boston T-S: INFORMANTS | |Boston, Massachusetts. 9 |Boston, Massachusetts. _ _ _ Dover Street Yard, NY, N & H ER, Boston, Massachusetts. ’ Boston, Massa- CHIISB E58 9 L ‘outh Boston, Massachusetts. The above individuals are being afforded temporary informant symbols at their own request in order that their identity might not be divulgedo 21h b7D lr WFO 98-523 REFERENCES: Report of Special Agent LKWRENCE E. BUSCHER dated Februs ary 2, 1953 at Washington, D. 0. Bureau letter %o'Washington Field Office dated February 9; 1953. ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE 215 *1
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Title: Wreck, Pennsylvania Railroad Train, Federal Express, Washington Terminal, Washington, D.C. January 15, 1953
Date: 1953-02-04, 1953-02-26
Description: Supplemental report from Special Agent in Charge for Butte, MT with a report on an interview with Mr. Frank A. Rowe Sr. of Boise, ID
Text: Director, FBI February 26, 1953 SAC, Butte (98-342) //// WRECK, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAIN, FEDERAL EXPRESS, WASHINGTON TERMINAL, WASHINGTON, D. 0., JANUARY 15, 1953 4 ReBu1et to Mr. FRANK A. ROWE, Srl, Boise, Idaho, February .9 1953 . On February 16, 1953, Mr. FRANK A. ROWE, Sr., 1615 Idaho Street, Boise, Idaho, was interviewed and advised that he is pros~ ently fifty-eight years of age and e...
Show moreDirector, FBI February 26, 1953 SAC, Butte (98-342) //// WRECK, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAIN, FEDERAL EXPRESS, WASHINGTON TERMINAL, WASHINGTON, D. 0., JANUARY 15, 1953 4 ReBu1et to Mr. FRANK A. ROWE, Srl, Boise, Idaho, February .9 1953 . On February 16, 1953, Mr. FRANK A. ROWE, Sr., 1615 Idaho Street, Boise, Idaho, was interviewed and advised that he is pros~ ently fifty-eight years of age and employed as Heating Superin- tendent, State of Idaho Department of Highways, 27th and Fairviow Avenue, Boise, Idaho. Mr. ROWE stated that until 1929 he had been employed as a railroad engineer with the Union Pacific Railroad and while so engaged during March of 1927 or 1928 had been operating a Series 2500 steam locomotive hauling approximately sixty loaded freight cars on the eastbound run from Oregon to King Hill, Idaho. Mr. ROWE had stopped his train at Nyssa, Oregon, with no difficulty and had continued on a distance of about fifteen miles to Notus, Idaho, at which point he was to pull onto a siding. As he approached the siding at a recalled speed of about twenty miles an hour, Mr. ROWE stated he noticed he had slightly over seventy pounds pressure on his brake line, standard for freight trains and forty pounds less than utilized on passenger trains, but that at the time of applying the brakes his only response was of about one second duration as compared to the eightwor ten~second response ordinarily found on a train having the number of cars as was being hauled. As a result of the one~ second response, Mr. ROWE advised he was aware that he had bra:e~ age in only one or two cars immediately behind the locomotive and that the rest of the cars were not being affected. with the momentum of these cars pushing, the train continued for two and three-quarters miles before coming to a halt. Q2’ * ?' ARCHED123 £«":mDExE RKM:mJw cc: p2’- Washington Field 0 .... TO: Director, FBI RE: WRECK, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAIN, FEDERAL EXPRESS, WASHINGTON TERMINAL, WASHINGTON, D. 0., JANUARY 15, 1953 2/26/53 As soon as possible after getting his train off the main line, Mr. ROWE asked the train conductor what the brake pressure had been in the caboose and had been informed that there, as in the locomotive, the pressure had been over seventy pounds, con- firming Mr, ROWE's suspicion that the line was stopped up some- where near the third car. Accordingly, Mr. ROWE disconnected the air hose between the second and third car and, tilting the<hose, could hear some~ thing rattle inside and, disconnecting the hose from the head end of the third car, discovered an ice ball large enough in size to block the hose at the end where it joined onto the hose from the second car. Mr. ROWE stated that it was his opinion that, when he applied his brakes, the pressure pulled the ice ball up against the smaller opening of the air hose and prevented brake ictign on the cars behind that point with the resultant inability o s op. Mr. ROWE stated he had informed various railroad officials of his findings, but they had appeared disinterested and no rec- ognition was taken of this possible cause for a mechanical failure. Mr. ROWE had no theory as to how moisture could have collected in the line, later to form into a solid ice ball, but pointed out that it had happened and that any subsequent investigation would fail to disclose such a condition inasmuch as the ice would have melted away. Mr. ROWE pointed out further that in reading of the wreck of the Pennsylvania train at the Washington terminal, he had formed the opinion that such an ice ball could have conceivably blocked the brake line as it had in his case, and was desirous of calling the matter to the attention of the Bureau for possible assistance in investigating the cause of the wreck. Mr. ROWE was thanked for his interest in this matter and assured that his suggestion would receive every consideration.
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Title: Transport Statistics in the United States for the Year Ended December 31, 1954
Date: 1954-12-31, 1955-01-01

Title: Annual report on the statistics of railways in the United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission for the year ending 1953.
Date: 1953-12-31, 1954-01-01

Title: B-121 FOIA Request Files from FBI regarding the Wreck of the Federal in 1953
Date: 1953, 1953
Description: Files from the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to the FBI's investigation of the accident at Union Station in January 1953 involving The Federal.

Title: The Railroads of St. Louis.
Date: 1959, 1959

Title: B-1 Barriger Scrapbooks

Title: Annual Report on Transport Statistics in the United States for the year ended 1957
Date: 1957-12-31, 1958-01-01

Title: Transport Statistics in the United States, For the Year Ending December 31, 1959
Date: 1959-12-31, 1960-01-01

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